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Summary
This thesis applies self-categorization theory (SCT) to the behavioural and
experiential dimensions of spatiality and crowding. A literature review in
Chapter 2 will highlight the study of ‘personal space’ as a dominant theoretical
approach to understanding variable crowding experiences. Several problems
with the conceptualisation of ‘personal space’ will be discussed and in Chapter
3, SCT will be introduced as a theoretical framework, which can explain
spatiality and crowding in terms of identity and group-level processes.
Chapter 4 investigates the impact of group relations on spatiality. In study
1, participants in minimal groups sought closer proximity to an in-group member
than to an out-group member. Study 2 used national categories as the basis for
identification. Although non-significant, the findings mirrored those of study 1.
Additionally, the relationship between perceived difference and physical
distance was moderated by the group context of the interaction. Chapter 5
investigates the impact of group context and interaction distance on
participants’ subjective experience. The hypothesised effect of these two
independent variables on participants’ experience was not supported.
However, participants in studies 3 and 4 expressed a desire for closer proximity
to in-group members than to out-group members. Chapter 6 investigates the
effect of visualised crowding on subjective affect. In study 5, participants who
visualised an in-group crowd reported higher positive affect and lower negative
affect than those who visualised an out-group crowd. In study 6, the relationship
between imagined ‘crowding’ and affect was mediated by social identification.
The relationship between physicality, social identity and ‘collective joy’ was
quantified in a field study (study 7), which also provided suggestive evidence of
physical synchrony increasing social identification. A laboratory study (study 8)
supported the suggestion that synchronised movement can increase social
identification, thus leading to a more positive experience of close proximity.
These finding are discussed in terms of a two-way embodiment model of social
identity processes in crowds.
5Contents
List of figures and tables………………………………………………………… 11
Chapter 1: Introduction and thesis overview………………………………… 13
1.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………. 13
1.2 Thesis overview……………………………………………………………. 16
Chapter 2: The consequences of crowding: Literature review and the
personal space approach………………………………………………………... 22
2.1 What does ‘crowding’ mean?……………………………………………... 22
2.2 The implications of a ‘booming’ population……………………………… 23
2.3 Responses to crowding: Evidence from animal studies……………….. 24
2.4 Human responses to crowding…………………………………………… 28
2.5 Explaining variable responses to crowding……………………………… 39
2.6 Personal space……………………………………………………………... 44
2.6.1 Determinants of personal space…………………………………… 46
2.6.2 Evaluating the personal space approach to crowding…………... 51
Chapter 3: Theory development – the social identity approach and self-
categorization theory……………………………………………………………... 55
3.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………. 55
3.2 Understanding individuals and groups…………………………………… 56
3.3 The minimal group paradigm……………………………………………… 64
3.4 Social identity theory………………………………………………………. 66
3.5 Self-categorization theory…………………………………………………. 70
3.5.1 Applications of SCT: Group and ‘individual’ phenomena……….. 75
3.5.2 Applying SCT to crowd behaviour…………………………………. 78
3.5.3 Applying SCT to spatiality and crowding……………………….…. 85
6Chapter 4: Behavioural variations in ‘personal space’ – a self-
categorization approach…………………………………………………………. 92
4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………. 92
4.2 The current research………………………………………………………. 99
4.3 Study 1………………………………………………………………………. 100
4.3.1 Overview……………………………………………………………… 100
4.3.2 Method………………………………………………………………... 101
4.3.2.1 Design………………………………………………………. 101
4.3.2.2 Participants………………………………………………… 101
4.3.2.3 Dependant measures…………………………………….. 102
4.3.2.4 Procedure…………………………………………….……. 103
4.3.3 Results………………………………………………………………... 107
4.3.3.1 Manipulation checks………………………………………. 107
4.3.3.2 Main effects………………………………………………… 108
4.3.4 Discussion………………………………………………………….… 109
4.4 Study 2………………………………………………………………………. 110
4.4.1 Overview……………………………………………………………… 110
4.4.2 Method………………………………………………………………... 112
4.4.2.1 Design………………………………………………………. 112
4.4.2.2 Participants………………………………………………… 112
4.4.2.3 Materials and measures………………………………….. 112
4.4.2.4 Procedure………………………………………………….. 114
4.4.3 Results………………………………………………………………... 116
4.4.3.1 Manipulation checks………………………………………. 116
4.4.3.2 Main effects and interactions…………………………….. 118
4.4.4 Discussion……………………………………………………………. 120
74.5 General discussion…………………………………………………………. 125
Chapter 5: Group context and the experience of proximity – A self-
categorization approach………………………………………………………….. 128
5.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………….. 128
5.2 Study 3………………………………………………………………………. 133
5.2.1 Overview……………………………………………………………… 133
5.2.2 Method………………………………………………………………... 136
5.2.2.1 Design………………………………………………………. 136
5.2.2.2 Participants………………………………………………… 136
5.2.2.3 Dependent measures……………………………………... 136
5.2.2.4 Procedure…………………………………………………... 137
5.2.3 Results………………………………………………………………... 139
5.2.3.1 Manipulation checks………………………………………. 139
5.2.3.2 Experience measures: Main effects and interactions…. 140
5.2.4 Discussion……………………………………………………………. 142
5.3 Study 4………………………………………………………………………. 144
5.3.1 Overview……………………………………………………………… 144
5.3.2 Method………………………………………………………………... 145
5.3.2.1 Design………………………………………………………. 145
5.3.2.2. Participants………………………………………………... 145
5.3.2.3 Dependent measures……………………………………... 145
5.3.2.4 Procedure…………………………………………………... 147
5.3.3 Results………………………………………………………………... 148
5.3.3.1 Manipulation checks………………………………………. 148
5.3.3.2 Experience measures: Main effects and interactions….. 149
85.3.4 Discussion……………………………………………………………. 151
5.4 General discussion…………………………………………………………. 153
Chapter 6: Psychological responses to imagined crowding……………… 156
6.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………….. 156
6.2 Study 5………………………………………………………………………. 161
6.2.1 Overview……………………………………………………………… 161
6.2.2 Method………………………………………………………………... 162
6.2.2.1 Design………………………………………………………. 162
6.2.2.2 Participants…………………………………………………. 162
6.2.2.3 Dependent measures……………………………………... 162
6.2.2.4 Procedure…………………………………………………... 163
6.2.3 Results......................................................................................... 165
6.2.3.1 Manipulation checks………………………………………. 165
6.2.3.2 Dependent variables: Main effects………………………. 166
6.2.4 Discussion……………………………………………………………. 167
6.3 Study 6………………………………………………………………………. 169
6.3.1 Overview……………………………………………………………… 169
6.3.2 Method………………………………………………………………... 170
6.3.2.1 Design………………………………………………………. 170
6.3.2.2 Participants…………………………………………………. 170
6.3.2.3 Measures…………………………………………………… 170
6.2.3.4 Procedure…………………………………………………... 172
6.3.3 Results………………………………………………………………... 172
6.3.3.1 Manipulation check………………………………………... 172
6.3.3.2 Correlations………………………………………………… 172
96.3.3.3 Simple mediation analyses……………………………….. 173
6.3.4 Discussion……………………………………………………………. 175
6.4 General discussion…………………………………………………………. 176
Chapter 7: Introducing a two-way embodiment model of social identity
processes (1). Identity, physicality and ‘collective joy’: A field study…… 179
7.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………….. 179
7.2 Study 7………………………………………………………....................... 183
7.2.1 Study overview………………………………………………………. 183
7.3 Method……………………………………………………………………….. 185
7.3.1 Phases of data collection…………………………………………… 185
7.3.2 Participants…………………………………………………………… 185
7.3.3 Measures……………………………………………………………... 186
7.3.4 Procedure…………………………………………………………….. 187
7.4 Results……………………………………………………………………….. 187
7.4.1 Model 1: Perceived location in the crowd as a mediator of the
relationship between social identification and positive experience…… 188
7.4.2 Model 2: Social identification as a mediator of the relationship
between perceived location in the crowd and self-reported positive
experience…………………………………………………………………... 189
7.4.3 Model 3: The effect of ‘synchronised movement’ on social
identification and self reported positive experience……………………. 190
7.5 Discussion…………………………………………………………………… 191
Chapter 8: Introducing a two-way embodiment model of social identity
processes (2). Identity, synchrony and ‘collective joy’: A laboratory
study…………………………………………………………………………………. 194
8.1 Introduction………………………………………………………………….. 194
8.2 Study 8………………………………………………………....................... 197
8.3 Method……………………………………………………………………….. 198
8.3.1 Design…………………………………………………………. 198
10
8.3.2 Participants…………………………………………………… 198
8.3.3 Materials………………………………………………………. 199
8.3.4 Measures……………………………………………………… 199
8.3.5 Procedure…………………………………………………….. 201
8.4 Results……………………………………………………………………….. 203
8.4.1 Reliability analyses…………………………………………... 203
8.4.2 Main effects…………………………………………………… 203
8.4.3 Multiple mediation model……………………………………. 205
8.5 Discussion…………………………………………………………………… 207
Chapter 9: Discussion and conclusions………………………………………. 210
9.1 Summary of findings……………………………………………………….. 210
9.2 Contributions………………………………………………………………… 217
9.3 Limitations and directions for future research…………………………… 222
References……………………………………………………………………... 229
Appendix 1: Chapter 4, study 1 – participant brief……………………… 257
Appendix 2: Example dot matrix……………………………………………. 258
Appendix 3: Chapter 4, study 1 – ‘typicality’ measures………………... 259
Appendix 4: Chapter 4, study 2 – list of traits……………………………. 262
Appendix 5: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule……………………. 263
Appendix 6: Chapter 5, study 3 – participant brief……………………… 264
11
List of figures and tables
Figures
Figure 4.1 Room layout (Chapter 4, study 1)………………………………….. 106
Figure 4.2 Room layout (Chapter 4, study 2)………………………………….. 114
Figure 4.3 The effect of group context and perceived difference on
‘personal space’……………………………………………………… 118
Figure 6.1 Social identification as a mediator of the relationship between
desired distance and subjective negative affect…………………. 174
Figure 6.2 Social identification as a mediator of the relationship between
desired distance and subjective positive affect…………………... 175
Figure 7.1 Perceived location in the crowd as a partial mediator of the
relationship between social identification and self-reported
positive experience…………………………………………………... 188
Figure 7.2 Social identification as a mediator of the relationship between
perceived location in the crowd and positive experience………... 189
Figure 7.3 Social identification as a mediator of the relationship between
phase of demonstration and self-reported positive experience…. 190
Figure 8.1 Example of a clapping pattern given to participants as part of
the stimulus for the ‘learning task’………………………………….. 199
Figure 8.2 Laboratory layout (study 8)………………………………………..... 201
Figure 8.3 Multiple mediation model for direct and indirect effects of
condition (synchronised vs individual movement) on self-
reported positive experience………………………………………... 205
Tables
Table 5.1 Means and standard deviations for participants expecting
discussion with an in-group or out-group members at ‘close’ or
‘far’ interaction distances (study 3)…………………….................. 141
Table 5.2 Means and standard deviations for participants expecting
discussion with an in-group or out-group members at ‘close’ or
‘far’ interaction distances (study 4)…………………….................. 149
Table 6.1 Means and standard deviations for participants who visualised a
train carriage in no crowd, interpersonal crowd, and in-group
crowd contexts……………………………………………………….. 166
12
Table 6.2 Social identification, desired proximity, and subjective affect:
Means, standard deviations and correlations……………………... 173
13
Chapter 1: Introduction and thesis overview
1.1 Introduction
On 22nd of January 2008, I found myself in a familiar situation. I was walking
along a street in London amongst a large crowd of people, shoulder to shoulder
with those on either side of me, with little room in front or behind. Like others in
the crowd, I was being jostled from side to side as I walked, struggling at times
to stay on my feet. Having grown up in London, I had walked along crowded
streets many times before. I did not usually tend to find being pressed against
so many strangers to be a particularly pleasant experience. Christmas
shopping on Oxford Street is a definite no-go for me due to the dense crowds
and I shudder at the thought of a daily commute on the crowded London
Underground1. But this crowd was different. I enjoyed the close proximity of
those around me. I welcomed the hug from the stranger next to me as he
kissed the top of my balding head, and as I watched the smiles on the faces of
those around me as they raised their arms in the air and united in song, I
wished that the moment would go on and on.
This was obviously no ‘ordinary’, everyday crowd of consumers or
commuters. My football team – Tottenham Hotspur – had just beaten Arsenal
(our arch-rivals) 5-1 to reach our first cup final in nine years. The crowd I was
immersed in was made up of fellow Tottenham supporters as we made our way
from White Hart Lane (our stadium) to the local station, vociferously celebrating
our historic victory.
I have been going to football matches on a regular basis since the early
1990s when I was in my early teens. So although that particular night in 2008 is
fresh in my memory, it is just one example from a catalogue of joyful crowd
memories that football has provided me with over the years. I consider myself
lucky to have experienced standing on the terraces as the crowd swayed from
side to side; to have taken a ride on the ‘tidal’ surge of the crowd as everyone
leaned forward in an attempt to see the action. Terrace experiences such as
1 When initially writing this chapter, a daily commute on the London Underground was simply an
unwelcome thought. However, having since taken up full-time employment in central London,
the commute on the crowded Tube has become a daily reality. I can confirm that the experience
is just as bad in reality as it was when confined to my imagination!
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these were consigned to the history books with the introduction of all-seater
stadiums for most league sides. However, despite football terraces being a
thing of the past, an important goal or victory can still draw strangers physically
closer together as they hug and shake hands in celebration in the stands, on
the streets, and even on crowded trains – quite a contrast to the behaviour
observed and the emotion experienced on those very same trains during
morning rush hour.
As I hope to have illustrated with this personal account, exposure to
density can be predictive of highly contrasting experiences and personal
consequences. This subjective view is reflected by over half a century of
crowding research. There seems to be little doubt that exposure to dense
crowds can be associated with negative psychological outcomes for those
present. Crowding can be associated with increased physiological and
psychological stress for commuters on trains (Evans & Wener, 2006) and
increased feelings of claustrophobia and frustration for consumers in
supermarkets (Aylott & Mitchell, 1998). However, these outcomes are
relatively minor when considering examples of extremely high density, which
can have catastrophic physical consequences. For example, eleven
concertgoers were killed in a crush as they made their way into the Riverfront
Coliseum (Ohio, Cincinnati) to see The Who play a concert in 1979 (see
Johnson, 1987). Ten years later, 96 Liverpool fans lost their lives and many
others suffered from serious physical injuries following a crush on the terraces
at Hillsborough – the home stadium of Sheffield Wednesday Football Club,
which was the host venue for a F.A. Cup semi-final between Liverpool and
Nottingham Forest (see Grech, Bellamy, Epstein, & Ramsdale, 1993).
The tragic loss of life at Hillsborough brought issues of crowding and
crowd safety to the forefront of public consciousness. Lord Justice Taylor
(1990) conducted an inquiry into the disaster and concluded that failures by
South Yorkshire Police, the local authority, and Sheffield Wednesday Football
Club led to the overcrowded terraces. As a result, Taylor (1990) recommended
that stadiums in the old first and second divisions (now called the Premier
League and Championship respectively) be converted to all-seater stadiums to
minimise the risk of future overcrowding. Twenty years have passed since
15
Taylor’s recommendations were published and there have not been any crowd
density related disasters in English football during that time.
When considering this safety record, it seems hard to argue against the
suggestion that the abolishment of terraces from English football stadia may
have minimised the risk of physical injury from overcrowding. However, that is
not to say that it has improved the general experience of all of the fans who
safely watched the majority of properly organised matches from the terraces.
Indeed, the following personal account of a Hillsborough disaster survivor
reveals that even shortly prior to the tragic overcrowding that cost so many their
lives in 1989, there was a jovial atmosphere among the Liverpool fans on the
packed terrace:
I can remember a beach ball being thrown around, the large multi-coloured
ball bouncing off unexpected heads who weren't watching, cheers from all
round. The ball was now being thrown between the two pens. Everyone
having a good time, very good humoured with the atmosphere building…
(Gary Burns, retrieved 2009)
The tendency for football fans to enjoy standing in close physical proximity
to one another did not escape the notice of Lord Justice Taylor. When
recommending that all-seater stadiums should become a legal requirement in
the wake of the Hillsborough disaster, Taylor (1990, p. 13) acknowledged that
many football supporters objected to the imminent loss of terracing, when he
wrote:
…to many young men, the camaraderie of singing together, jumping up
and down, responding in unison to the naming of the players, their
emergence on to the pitch, the scoring of a goal, an unpopular decision –
all of these are an integral part of enjoying the match. They like being part
of an amorphous seething crowd and do not wish to have each his own
place in a seat.
This sentiment is echoed by ‘Stand Up Sit Down’ (2006) – a lobby group who
are campaigning for the re-introduction of standing areas to English football
16
stadiums. Thus, like me, people enjoyed being on the crowded terraces. As will
become clear in the chapters that follow, the enjoyment of close proximity to
strangers is not limited to football crowds. Anthropological (e.g., Durkheim,
1995/1915), sociological (e.g., Malbon, 1999), historical (e.g., Ehrenreich, 2007;
McNeill, 1995) and psychological (e.g., Cassidy, Hopkins, Levine, Pandey,
Reicher, & Singh, 2007; Neville & Reicher, 2008) accounts of crowding have
shed some light on the potential for high density at nightclubs, raves, religious
festivals, community dances, and military and political parades to facilitate
‘collective joy’ among their attendees.
The central aim of this thesis is to determine the question, which has so
far been neglected, regarding the conditions under which crowding (density)
can be enjoyed, as well as experienced as aversive on some occasions. I will
argue that a single theoretical framework (self-categorization theory) should,
and can, account for this variability of experience. Moreover, this same
framework can account for the evidence that the experience of psychological
togetherness can act as both a cause and a consequence of physical unity.
1.2 Thesis overview
Crowding research, which was largely motivated by fears of an impending
population boom, peaked during the 1970s and then slowed to a trickle during
the 1980s and 1990s before virtually drying up at the start of this century. This
begs the question as to why, after such an enthusiastic start, did research into a
phenomenon that is an unavoidable and arguably integral part of modern life,
come to a virtual standstill? One possible explanation is that the early crowding
researchers left us confused due to the fact that they struggled to define the
very phenomenon that they sought to explain. As will be shown, this lack of
clarity was reflected in crowding theories and as a result, we were, and still are,
left with a set of conflicting theoretical approaches to crowding, none of which
offers a wholly satisfactory account of the diverse array of crowding responses
that are on display as we look around us during the course of our daily lives.
It is hoped that the research presented in this thesis will go some way to
re-opening the debate with a fresh theoretical approach to the psychology of
crowding. Chapter 2 will present a detailed review of the crowding literature, in
which an attempt will be made to define crowding in the context of this body of
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work. The chapter will provide a historical overview of crowding research,
beginning with the early work that was conducted on animals, and then moving
onto the research that attempted to uncover the human consequences of
crowding in neighbourhoods, institutions, in the home, the street, at sports
events, and in the laboratory. As will become clear, the work to be described
failed to uncover a simple generic effect of crowding, and as a result, several
theoretical approaches were developed, each with the intention of accounting
for the apparent variability in responses to crowding.
Chapter 2 will offer a critical appraisal of some of these theoretical
approaches. The bulk of the appraisal will focus on the personal space
approach, which suggests that when close physical proximity is perceived as a
violation of the self-other boundary, it can serve as an antecedent to potentially
aversive psychological consequences of crowding, such as anxiety, discomfort
or stress. The personal space approach has been widely accepted as a viable
theoretical tool for explaining variable crowding responses. However, as will be
shown, the approach is not without its weaknesses, and as such, these
weaknesses must be addressed and compensated for before psychological
responses to crowding can in fact be understood in terms of so-called personal
space.
One of the major weaknesses inherent in the personal space approach is
that hypotheses relating to when close proximity will or will not be perceived as
a violation of the self-other boundary have often relied on vast lists of disjointed
intervening variables as opposed to a unified theoretical framework. A further
weakness lies in the fact that there has been a tendency for researchers to
frame the self-other boundary as something that is strictly ‘personal’ – an
individual-level variable (although as will be shown, there are exceptions) – and
in doing so, they have often overlooked the potential for social identities and
group-level processes to influence our perceptions of who we define as ‘self’
and who we define as ‘other’, and consequently, whether close proximity will be
perceived as an intrusion, or whether it will be welcomed. Another major
problem with the traditional personal space approach is that it can only account
for whether or not close physical proximity will have a negative impact on a
perceiver (i.e., whether or not the self-other boundary has been violated), but it
18
offers no explanation as to when close proximity might be experienced
positively.
The primary aim of this thesis is to address these and other weaknesses in
the personal space approach by applying an already established social
psychological theory of group processes to the study of spatiality and crowding.
Chapter 3 will introduce self-categorization theory (SCT: Turner, Hogg, Oakes,
Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) as the theoretical framework that can potentially
overcome these problems. This is not the place for a detailed description of
SCT. However, in short, SCT suggests that people can self-categorize either
according to their unique personal identities (i.e., in terms of their differences
from other individuals) or in terms of any one of a potentially infinite range of
social identities (i.e., in terms of their similarities to other in-group members and
differences from out-group members). According to SCT, when self-
categorized according to a social identity, people will perceive in-group
members as part of their psychological selves, whilst out-group members will be
perceived as ‘other’. It is therefore easy to see how this theoretical framework
can be applied to the study of spatiality and crowding. If group processes can
determine who is self and who is other, they can surely also determine who we
want to be close to and when close physical proximity will be perceived as a
violation of the self-other boundary. Thus, in theory, it is likely that spatial
preferences are not merely a personal variable, but also dependent on group-
level processes.
In the chapters that follow, the extent to which SCT can explain spatial
variability will be tested empirically. In line with the traditional personal space
approach to proximity and crowding, it will be argued that the same processes
that might impact upon proximal behaviours in one-to-one interactions will also
impact on our desire for, and responses to close proximity in dense crowds. In
other words, our perceived psychological relations with those with whom we are
sharing a space will determine whether the self-other boundary has been
violated regardless of whether we are close to just one person or to a large
crowd of people. In fact, it will be argued that if anything, any effects that might
emerge from one-to-one interactions might be magnified when we are in close
proximity to several others in a dense crowd. This suggestion will be based on
the theoretical argument that if a crowd is made up of those perceived as
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separate from self, a perceiver’s zone of selfhood will not be intruded upon from
just one direction. Instead, it will be violated from the front, back and sides.
However, if the crowd is perceived as self, the perceiver will be surrounded by
not just one, but several people with whom they share a sense of unity and
togetherness.
Chapter 4 will present the first empirical test of the applicability of SCT to
spatial behaviours. In two controlled laboratory experiments designed to
examine the impact of group relations on ‘personal space’, participants will be
asked to arrange two chairs for an anticipated discussion with either an in-group
member or an out-group member. If, as expected, the group context of an
interaction determines whether another person will be perceived as self or
other, it follows that participants will seek closer proximity to an in-group
member than to an out-group member. Whilst study 1 will be a simple test of
group relations on spatiality, study 2 will examine the extent to which
participants make use of physical space either as a reflection of their perceived
differences from out-group members, or to reconcile perceived differences from
other in-group members and hence facilitate intra-group consensus. The
experimental paradigm to be described in Chapter 4 will also be modified for the
studies presented in Chapter 5. Whilst the focus of Chapter 4 will be the
behavioural dimension of ‘personal’ space, Chapter 5 will examine participants’
experience of either anticipated or actual close proximity to in-group and out-
group members.
Chapter 6 will signal a move away from studies of one-to-one interactions
towards an investigation of the impact of group relations and physical proximity
in small groups and crowds. However, before investigating physically co-
present crowds, Chapter 6 will present two studies in which participants will
imagine themselves immersed in a crowd before taking part in a subsequent
task to establish whether imagined density can have psychological
consequences similar to those that might be expected following immersion in
actual crowds. This experimental paradigm is adapted from a series of studies
by Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, and Darley (2002), which investigated the
impact of imagined co-presence on subsequent helping behaviour.
Participants will be asked to imagine being on a densely populated train
carriage in various scenarios in which group context will be manipulated.
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Rather than focussing on helping behaviour as a dependent variable, the
studies will examine how group processes can impact upon participants’ desire
for space in their visualisations, and more importantly, on their affective state
following the visualisation task.
As a natural progression from the laboratory work to be described in this
thesis, Chapter 7 will present a field study, which will be carried out at a protest
march in central London. As will hopefully become clear during the literature
review in Chapter 2, a disproportionate number of crowding studies have
focussed on crowd events in which people are unlikely to be united by a shared
social identity, with the inevitable consequence being negative responses to
such situations. Therefore, the field study presented in Chapter 7 will be
conducted at an event in which a shared social identity is likely to be highly
salient. This will allow for a test of the relationship between protestors’ sense of
social identification with their fellow crowd members, their physical relations with
those crowd members, and how these variables might interact to impact upon
the protestors’ positive experience associated with being in the crowd. Chapter
7 will also start to unpack the potential two-way relationship between
psychological and physical processes in crowds. To elaborate, the majority of
the research described in this thesis will investigate whether a shared social
identity can draw people physically closer together. However, the field study
described in Chapter 7 will present an opportunity to begin to examine whether
being physically immersed in a crowd of people and more importantly, how
acting in physical synchrony with those people, might feed back and enhance
collective feelings of unity, with the consequence of making close physical
proximity a more positive experience.
The initial test of the relationship between synchrony, identity and
crowding will be based on the assumption that a period of sustained marching,
chanting and playing musical instruments will involve some form of
synchronised physical movement. A more stringent test of the potential effect
of synchronicity on identity and hence the two-way relationship between social
identity and physicality will be conducted in a controlled laboratory study, which
will be described in Chapter 8. Following this, Chapter 9 will conclude this work
with a critical evaluation of how the research presented in this thesis contributes
to the crowding literature, both in theoretical and practical terms, and will also
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signal potential avenues for future researchers who are interested in a social
identity approach to spatiality and crowding.
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Chapter 2: The consequences of crowding: Literature review
and the personal space approach.
2.1 What does ‘crowding’ mean?
In the opening chapter, it was suggested that exposure to ‘crowding’ might
evoke diverse responses. This idea will be developed in this chapter by delving
more deeply into the literature. This will include an evaluation of both the
physiological and psychological effects of crowding on animals and humans,
and a discussion of some existing approaches to explaining why exposure to
crowding can elicit negative responses in some instances and positive
responses in others. However, before continuing with this discussion, it is
important to clarify what the term ‘crowding’ actually means.
As will be shown, crowding can be seen as a phenomenon that occurs in
populations, households, institutions, public spaces, or in laboratories. A wide
variety of definitions have been proposed over the years. For some, the term
‘crowding’ refers to density. This can be objective physical density (the amount
of space available per person, e.g., Freedman, 1975, 1979), spatial density,
(the amount of space available per group of people; e.g., Loo, 1972), or social
density (the number of people present within a particular space; e.g., Baum,
Aiello, & Calesnick, 1978). For others, crowding is associated with unwelcome
close proximity (e.g., Aiello, Epstein, & Karlin, 1975; Evans & Wener, 2007;
Worchel & Teddlie, 1976). ‘Crowding’ has been defined as a negative
psychological state associated with exposure to physical density (e.g., Cox et
al., 1984), or a situation whereby “the individual’s demand for space exceeds
the available supply of such space” (Stokols, 1972, p. 75). In other words, there
has been substantial disagreement in the literature, with some ‘crowding’
definitions focussing on physical density, and others focussing on perceivers’
evaluations of such density.
In their book – Too Close For Comfort: The Psychology of Crowding –
Insel and Lindgren (1978) decided that these conflicting definitions and
redefinitions rendered crowding as a construct that is simply too complex to
define. They explained their position to the reader in the following way: “We
shall therefore take the coward’s way out by not attempting to construct a
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definition of crowding that would in the end satisfy no one. We shall instead talk
about crowding as though everyone understands what it means.” (p. 16). Insel
and Lindgren (1978) defended their approach by pointing to a precedent in the
study of intelligence – a construct that researchers have struggled to define.
However, it could be argued that the failure to clearly define ‘intelligence’ has
led to confusion in the literature. For this reason, it is unacceptable for the
authors of a book on the psychology of crowding to opt out of providing a
definition of the construct that is at the centre of their investigation, or to do so
based on the premise that the reader will simply know what it means.
I am going to be a little braver in my approach by at least attempting to
clarify what crowding means in the context of this body of work. To begin with,
there is no reason to suggest that any of the definitions outlined above are any
more correct or incorrect than the others. Crowding can mean all of those
things (depending on what it is that a researcher is interested in). As such, the
review of the literature in this chapter will incorporate research from each
approach to highlight the effects that crowding can have when defined broadly.
However, for the purpose of theory development in this thesis, the term
crowding refers to situations of close physical proximity – the type of proximity
that might occur not only in manufactured interactions in the laboratory (as will
often be the case in this thesis), but also in naturalistic settings – i.e., in sports
stadiums, nightclubs, shopping malls, on public transport, and in town centres.
In line with Freedman’s (1975, 1979) definition of crowding, which focuses on
density, it is argued that crowding should be seen as a physical condition, but
that psychological responses to crowding can vary. ‘Crowding’ should not
necessarily be seen as something bad, or something to be feared, but as
something that can evoke joy as well as stress or anxiety. Although the primary
focus of this body of work is physical co-presence and proximity in physical
crowds, this chapter will also consider crowding in populations or residences
(be them private or institutional), as research into crowding effects on these
levels has played an important role in the history of crowding research.
2.2 The implications of a ‘booming’ population
According to the Office for National Statistics (2008), population growth in the
United Kingdom has increased over recent decades. This is due to a number of
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factors including increased birth rates, decreased death rates, and changes in
migration patterns (Office for National Statistics, 2008). Rapid population
growth is not exclusive to the UK, however. In the space of just nine years
(between 1996 and 2005), the population of the United States of America
increased by approximately 27 million people, China saw an increase of
approximately 86 million people, whereas the population of India grew by
approximately 158 million people (United Nations Statistics Division, 2005).
The obvious consequence of such rapid human population growth is that unless
populations spread out more and occupy more of the planet surface, exposure
to physical crowds will become increasingly more frequent as more and more
people fill a limited amount of space. This in turn raises questions regarding
how exposure to physical density might impact upon our physiological and
psychological well-being.
Psychological research has sought to address this question for almost half
a century. In 1961, the chairman of a symposium on the consequences of
population growth declared the following: “Now that the rate of human
population increase has itself increased to unparalleled proportions, the
problems of food supply and standing room become insignificant and academic
compared to the problem of increasing stress and decreasing sanity…” (Coon,
1961, p. 427). What is clear from this statement is that the pioneers of crowding
research believed that the prognosis for human sanity would be bleak if
population growth continued to gather pace. The statistics cited above show us
that populations did, and still do, continue to grow in a way that concerned
academics such as Coon. Therefore, a review of the crowding literature that
has emerged since Coon (1961) expressed his concerns will help to clarify
whether his prediction of crowding-induced pathology was well founded.
2.3 Responses to crowding: Evidence from animal studies
It is important to note that Coon’s vision was not based solely on whim, but on
the evidence emerging from a series of animal studies. There have been two
dominant approaches to studying the effects of population density on animals
(Christian, 1961). The first involves placing individuals from a particular species
(often mice, rats, or voles) into large groups with a limited amount of space, and
to monitor how the crowded environment affects their subsequent behaviour.
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The second approach involves housing a colony of animals from a particular
species within a limited amount of space (in pens or cages, for example) with
ample food, water and nesting material present, and to allow the colony to grow
freely to establish how the gradual crowding process might impact upon the
animals.
While early examples of both approaches produced similar results, an
often-cited example of the latter approach is a series of studies of a
domesticated strain of the Norway rat, conducted by Calhoun (1962, 1970).
The rat populations were housed in specially designed enclosures and allowed
to breed freely. As population density increased, so too did social pathology.
Calhoun (1962, 1970) noted that the rats tended to group together – a
phenomenon he referred to as “pathological “togetherness”” (Calhoun, 1962, p.
139) – thus increasing density and social interaction in particular areas of the
enclosures. Infant mortality was high; female rats were unable to carry and
wean their offspring, while adult males displayed abnormal sexual activity and
cannibalism. These types of pathological behaviours were collectively referred
to as a “behavioral sink” (Calhoun, 1962, p. 139).
Calhoun (1962, 1970, 1976) proposed that the pathological behaviours
that resulted from increased social interaction served to limit population
numbers. This assumption was based on the fact that the rat populations
tended to settle at 150 adults even though they could have grown to 5,000
when the reproductive rate of the rats was considered. However, the apparent
pathological effects of density appeared to be long lasting as opposed to being
a temporary population control mechanism. When the two healthiest males and
four healthiest females were removed from the dense environment and re-
housed in a more spacious dwelling, they did not display normal reproductive
behaviours, and any offspring that they did manage to produce, did not survive.
This was taken as evidence to suggest that populations exposed to high density
may have eventually died out (Calhoun, 1962).
Christian (1961) observed similar behavioural responses to high density,
this time in mice. For example, female mice displayed abnormal mating
patterns and poor rearing of their offspring. However, going beyond Calhoun,
Christian (1961) also observed physiological responses to crowding, such as
increased adrenocortical activity (which is associated with situations of stress)
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and a decline in male reproductive function (characterised by weight decreases
of the preputial glands, seminal vesicles, and testes), particularly in low-ranking
males (Christian, 1961). In line with Calhoun, researchers interpreted these
physiological responses to crowding as an evolved mechanism of population
control, triggered by increased incidences of social interaction (e.g., Snyder,
1961).
While many of the negative effects of density and crowding discussed so
far have emerged from rodent samples (which might rightfully be seen by some
as relatively far removed from humans), they have also been found in samples
of non-human primates. Elton and Anderson (1977) imposed space restrictions
onto a group of 13 captive baboons by moving one wall of their enclosure at
relatively regular intervals (ranging from 30-43 days) until they were left with
50% of their initial space. The long-term crowding that was imposed on the
baboons had several consequences, such as an increased frequency of intra-
group aggressive displays, culminating in a ‘riot’, and also an increase in sexual
behaviours. When space was at a minimum, infants and low-ranking females
became particularly withdrawn from the group. These behavioural changes led
the authors to conclude that: “Social disintegration, as well as individual
pathology, was the end result of crowding…” (Elton & Anderson, 1977, p. 233).
Similar crowding effects emerged from various monkey samples. Male
Japanese macaques displayed increased aggression as population numbers
grew – a finding attributed to an increased number of antagonists in the social
groups (Eaton, Modahl, & Johnson, 1981), while both male and female
Japanese macaques displayed mild and severe aggression when the troop was
exposed to acute crowding (approximately 2.3% of the space that they had
become accustomed to) (Alexander & Roth, 1971). Similarly, rhesus macaques
engaged in an increased number of aggressive competitive behaviours when
their living space was reduced by 50% (Southwick, 1967).
The early evidence certainly appeared to hint at density-related pathology
in non-human primates – our closest cousins in the animal world. However, the
density-aggression link in monkeys may not be as clear-cut as initially feared.
One group of researchers have suggested that the aggression observed in the
early work might have been a result of either – a) the monkeys being housed in
new environments, or b) the monkeys being housed with a large number of
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strangers – rather than being a simple effect of crowding per se (de Waal,
Aureli, & Judge, 2000). When these potential confounding variables have been
accounted for in the experimental design, high density has been shown to lead
to an increase in anxiety-related behaviours, but to also lead to a reduction in
aggression in chimpanzees (e.g., Aureli & de Waal, 1997).
So what possible explanation could there be for this negative correlation
between density and aggression in chimpanzees – a correlation that stands in
stark contrast to the density-aggression link hypothesised by Calhoun, and
hinted at in the early non-human primate research? A likely answer is that
unlike rodents, primates can respond to crowding by adopting behavioural
strategies which can help them to avoid aggression, or at least minimise its
severity (de Waal, 1989). For example, chimpanzees have been shown to
avoid conflict when exposed to short-term crowding by reducing the frequency
of their social behaviours (Aureli & de Waal, 1997), although some evidence
suggests that this could be limited to females (Videan & Fritz, 2007). Like
chimpanzees, there is evidence to suggest that capuchins (van Wolkenten,
Davis, Gong, & de Waal, 2006) and long-tailed macaques (Aureli, Van
Panthaleon Van Eck, & Veenema, 1995) display avoidance behaviours as a
response to short-term crowding.
Another strategy employed by non-human primates exposed to crowding
is one of tension-reduction. Tension-reduction refers to a situation whereby
individuals in a crowded group increase the intensity of intra-group friendly
behaviours to actively reduce tension (de Waal, 1989), and is more commonly
associated with medium- to long-term crowding (Sannen, Van Elsacker, &
Eens, 2004). To illustrate, Judge and de Waal (1997) found that male rhesus
monkeys increased grooming and huddling (behaviours known to reduce
aggression) when density increased, whereas females displayed an increase in
aggression towards kin-group females, but displayed aggression-reduction
behaviours (such as increased grooming) towards males and non-kin females.
Similar responses to crowding have been found in other non-human primates.
Baboons employ tension-reduction strategies such as huddling (Judge,
Griffaton, & Fincke, 2006), bonobos increase their grooming behaviours (Paoli,
Tacconi, Borgognini Tarli, & Palagi, 2007), and gorillas have also been shown
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to employ tension-reduction strategies in response to crowding (Cordoni &
Palagi, 2007).
To summarise, as has been shown in the preceding section, crowding can
have harmful effects on many mammal species. However, there is evidence to
suggest that some non-human primate species can adapt to increased density
by employing various behavioural techniques to either avoid or minimise
aggression. This raises obvious questions regarding human responses to
crowding. Are we doomed to a crowded future characterised by the
degeneration of our social relations like Calhoun’s rats? Or are we able to cope
with crowding like our cousins in the monkey world? Going one step further,
might we enjoy, and hence seek out ‘crowding’ as the anecdotes and
observations presented in the opening chapter suggest? These are the
questions that will be addressed in the following section.
2.4 Human responses to crowding
It is easy to see why the evidence of social pathology as a by-product of
crowding in animal studies raised concern among those who were interested in
the potential human consequences of crowding. Calhoun’s work in particular
was published at a time when population numbers were booming, people were
‘flocking’ to city centres, and displays of so-called ‘social pathology’ in the form
of urban riots and increased drug taking were headline news (Ramsden &
Adams, 2009). If, like rats, humans are pre-disposed to display ‘pathological
togetherness’ by gathering in city centres and public spaces, then it follows that
the subsequent density might give rise to a ‘behavioural sink’.
Ramsden and Adams (2009) recently highlighted the fact that this line of
reasoning pervaded popular culture during the 1960s and 1970s. They argued
that Calhoun’s terminology tapped into the fears of a generation – particularly
his description of his rats’ pathology as a ‘behavioural sink’ – with the term
‘sink’ being long-associated with urban vice and corruption. The accessibility of
Calhoun’s writing to a non-scientific audience, coupled with his willingness to
speculate that his findings would transfer to humans (e.g., Calhoun, 1962, 1970,
1974) ensured that the impact of his work would be far-reaching (Ramsden &
Adams, 2009). Ramsden and Adams (2009) provide examples of how
Calhoun’s work directly influenced politics, popular books and films, and the
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popular press, with each linking urban life to a breakdown of social morality and
order.
However, the impact of Calhoun’s work was perhaps at its greatest in the
scientific world, as evidenced by the sheer number of crowding studies that it
spawned (Ramsden & Adams, 2009). Although it may be stating the obvious, it
is important to point to Baron and Needel’s (1980) point that humans and
animals are fundamentally different. Humans have the cognitive, linguistic and
perceptual capabilities to interpret different crowds in different ways. Thus,
whilst the animal and human findings are not directly comparable, several
researchers set out to test whether Calhoun’s findings really would transfer to
human populations. Some of their findings will be discussed below.
One approach to studying the relationship between density and pathology
was to examine the extent to which they co-existed in populations. This was
investigated on two levels: in the home and in the neighbourhood. Starting at
the neighbourhood level, or in other words, at the macro-level, researchers
began to unearth what they believed to be a density-pathology relationship in
urban settings (e.g., Leyhausen, 1965; for a review see Fischer, Baldassare, &
Ofshe, 1975). One study of 656 cities in the U.S. found that neighbourhood
crowding (dwellings per square mile) accounted for a significant amount of
between-city variance in incidences of rape, robbery, and car theft in large cities
(Booth, Welch, & Johnson, 1976). These findings emerged after controlling for
variables associated with increased crime-rates, such as ethnicity, education
levels, income, age, overall city population size, and number of residents who
were native to the city.
While these findings presented a worrying picture of urban life, they only
told one side of the story. For example, a study of New York City found that any
positive correlations between population density (defined as people per acre
and people per residence) and ‘pathology’ (defined in this case as juvenile
delinquency, births out of wedlock, psychiatric hospital admissions, cessation of
psychological treatment, and infant mortality) became largely non-significant
when the effects of ethnicity and income were controlled for (Freedman,
Heshka, & Levy, 1975). Several studies have corroborated Freedman et al.’s
(1975) findings, as demonstrated in an article by Choldin (1978). Choldin
reviewed several macro-level studies designed to investigate the relationship
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between population density and a wide range of pathologies, including mortality
rates, crime rates, juvenile delinquency, and mental illness. He concluded that
positive correlations between density and pathology (when defined as mortality,
crime rates or juvenile delinquency) became non-significant when social
structural variables, such as ‘type of household’, were held constant. However
it should be noted that the review did uncover evidence of a potential
relationship between density and mental illness.
The contrasting views that were briefly discussed above demonstrate that
it is difficult to draw firm conclusions from studies conducted at the
neighbourhood level. What is more, some of the study designs are open to
criticism. The most obvious problem is that as has often been the case in the
broad study of crowding phenomena, different neighbourhood-level studies
have defined ‘crowding’ and ‘pathology’ in different ways, thus leading to
different findings (Lawrence, 1974). A further important consideration is that
many of the neighbourhood-level studies tend to be based on correlational data.
It is therefore impossible to conclude with confidence that just because a so-
called density-pathology relationship exists, that one variable is the cause of the
other. A final problem with macro-level analyses such as these relates to the
unit of measurement. Some studies, such as the one conducted by Booth et al.
(1976) have made between-city comparisons, where city was used as the unit
of analysis. Therefore, to extrapolate from this study that crowding might lead
individuals or sub-groups within a community to display ‘pathological’
behaviours would be to commit an ecological fallacy (Booth et al., 1976). In
other words, when studies are conducted at a macro level, the findings should
be interpreted at that level. To elaborate, cities with higher densities might
experience higher incidences of ‘pathology’ than lower density cities. However,
there is also likely to be high levels of variation within cities. Therefore, some
individuals living in low density cities will be more likely to display pathological
behaviours than individuals living in high density cities, so to use a city level
study to claim an individual level relationship between density and pathology
would be misleading.
In order to reduce the problems associated with macro-level analyses, and
to glean a clearer picture of the direct effects of crowding on groups and
individuals, it is useful to examine the findings from micro-level analyses.
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For example, Galle, Gove, and McPherson (1972) explored the effects of
household density in Chicago. They examined its impact on domains that are
linked to social pathology, such as mortality and fertility rates, poor child rearing,
male aggression, and admissions to mental hospitals; pathologies which
reflected those observed in Calhoun’s rats. When conceptualising density as
‘people per room’, and ‘rooms per housing unit’, they found that higher density
was related to increases in mortality rates, fertility rates (which stands in
contrast to Calhoun’s rats, but is still interpreted as ‘pathological’ by the authors)
aggression, and ‘poor child rearing’, but not to admissions to mental hospitals.
These findings held when the influences of social class and ethnicity were
controlled for (although Freedman (1975, p. 60) questions the validity of Galle et
al.’s (1972) conclusions, claiming that weak correlations emerged only after
questionable statistical manipulation took place).
Other studies of household crowding yielded similar results. Gove,
Hughes, and Galle (1979) collected data from Chicago residents who were
defined as having either high or low socio-economic status. The researchers
randomly picked black, white, and ‘mixed race’ participants from both ends of
the social spectrum, who lived in crowded and non-crowded homes (with
objective crowding defined as people per room) to obtain a representative
sample. It was found that living in crowded homes was associated with
negative psychological outcomes such as reduced positive affect, lower self-
esteem and happiness levels, and an increase in psychiatric symptoms,
incidences of ‘nervous breakdown’, and feelings of alienation. Crowding was
also related to poor physical health, which was defined as insufficient sleep and
increased incidence of infectious illnesses. The authors concluded that the
relationship between objective crowding and these negative consequences was
explained by feelings of excessive social demands and a lack of privacy.
Duckitt (1983) conducted a similar study, this time in a poor area of South
Africa, inhabited by black residents. After controlling for variables such as sex,
age, marital status, whether the participants had parents, what kind of job they
had, their income, their education level, and the type of house that they lived in,
it was found that ‘crowding’ (defined as the people-to-room ratio within each
household) was associated with an increase in negative affect, but it did not
appear to decrease positive affect. It is important to note, however, that while
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significant, the correlation between ‘crowding’ and negative affect was just r =
.17, even though the sample size was large (433 participants). So while
significant, this effect was relatively small.
More recent research has also linked residential crowding with negative
outcomes. Evans, Lepore, and Allen (2000) investigated the relationship
between culture and tolerance of household crowding. Four groups of
American residents were contacted by telephone and interviewed. These
groups represented Anglo-Americans, African-Americans, Mexican-Americans,
and Vietnamese-Americans. Like much of the residential crowding research
that preceded Evans et al. (2000), it was found that density (again defined as
people per room within a household) was positively correlated with
psychological distress, regardless of the cultural background of the
respondents.
Although a great deal of research links household crowding with negative
psychological outcomes, the relationship does not appear to be straightforward
or automatic. For example, Evans, Lepore, and Schroeder (1996) found that
architectural features of the home might significantly reduce the psychologically
harmful effects of crowding. Specifically, it was found that people living in
homes with greater ‘depth’ were less likely to experience psychological distress
associated with crowding (with crowding defined as people per room). ‘Depth’
was defined as: “the number of spaces one must pass through in order to get
from one point in a structure to one or more specific termini” (Evans et al., 1996,
p. 42). The authors suggested that greater depth to a household created more
degrees of separation between housemates. As a result of this structural
separation, participants may have felt less need to withdraw from their
housemates, thus strengthening social relationships and ameliorating the
negative effects of crowding (for more on the relationship between social
withdrawal and the negative consequences of residential crowding, see Baum &
Valins, 1979; Evans & Lepore, 1993; Lepore, Evans, & Schneider, 1991). Thus,
it appears that it might not be household density per se that leads to pathology.
Instead, it appears that unavoidable crowding leads to social withdrawal,
resulting in a breakdown in social relations, and thus a loss of social support.
Studies of household crowding provide a useful insight into the effects of
residential crowding. However, it should be considered that participants in
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these types of studies were free to leave the crowded environment as and when
they pleased. Therefore, studies of institutional crowding provide an opportunity
to examine the density-pathology relationship when escape is not possible.
Prisons provide an ideal backdrop for research of this nature.
Prison populations in the U.S. increased by 94% between 1975 and 1980
(National Institute of Justice, 1980, as cited in Cox, Paulus, & McCain, 1984)
and then quadrupled between 1980 and 2003 (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2004, as cited in Franklin, Franklin, & Pratt, 2006). There were also large
increases in the prison populations of England and Wales between 1992 and
2002, with the female and male populations increasing by 184% and 57%
respectively (Home Office, 2002). The construction of new prisons has not
matched the demands that these population increases have placed on penal
systems, leading to a situation widely seen as one of overcrowding in both the
U.S. (Franklin et al., 2006) and in England and Wales (The Howard League for
Penal Reform, 2006).
A large body of research investigating the effects of overcrowding in
prisons has emerged. In a cross-institutional study, Cox et al. (1984) found that
population increases in prisons which had not expanded their facilities were
associated with increases in disciplinary problems, death rates, suicide rates,
and commitment to psychiatric units. The opposite pattern emerged when
prisons saw their populations decrease. Like many of the researchers who
investigated the impact of density on animals, Cox et al. (1984) attributed these
pathological effects to the frequent social interactions and subsequent over-
stimulation and stress that come with increased density. This stands in contrast
to the social withdrawal explanation that is put forward in the household
crowding literature. However, this discrepancy makes sense as the nature of
social relations in prisons and households might be expected to be qualitatively
different – thus, social interaction in a hostile prison environment might cause
distress, but might be a source of support in a home environment, such as a
university hall of residence.
Negative consequences of crowding in prisons have also emerged when
studies have focussed on inmates within institutions as opposed to making
between-institution comparisons. D’Atri (1975) conducted a study on inmates in
three U.S. prisons. In each of the prisons, inmates were housed in either small
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cells (one or two person cells) or large dormitories. The inmates in the
dormitories were found to have higher blood pressure than those in the smaller
cells – a finding attributed to the stress of ‘crowded’ living (see also, Paulus,
McCain, & Cox, 1978). D’Atri, Fitzgerald, Kasl, and Ostfel (1981),
supplemented this finding with a longitudinal analysis. It was found that inmates
who were moved from single-occupancy cells to multiple-occupancy dormitories
experienced a rise in blood pressure, whereas the blood pressure of inmates
who were left in single cells remained the same, thus adding further credence to
the suggestion that these physiological effects were due to the crowded
environments.
While evidence suggests that prison crowding is related to physiological
changes such as raised blood pressure, there is also evidence to suggest that it
might be related to a range of other pathological outcomes. To use one
example, illness complaints were more frequent for participants housed in
dormitories as opposed to single cells (McCain, Cox, and Paulus, 1976), and for
those housed in the more densely populated of two prisons (Wener & Keys,
1988), which could be indicative of differences in actual or imagined illness.
As has been the case for both neighbourhood and household density,
several studies of institutional density have produced contradictory results –
arguably due to the fact that ‘pathology’ has been so broadly defined. To
illustrate, whilst the studies described above examined the relation between
crowding and pathology, with pathology defined as perceived or actual illness,
other studies have examined the relation between crowding and pathological
behaviours, such as inmate misconduct or aggression. Franklin et al. (2006)
meta-analysed 16 such studies and concluded that prison crowding does not
necessarily lead to inmate misconduct, whilst Gaes (1994) claimed in a
literature review that evidence of a direct link between crowding and inmate
violence is weak, and suggested that it seems more likely that other variables,
such as prison management practices, might mediate any density effects.
Steiner and Wooldredge (2009) agreed that prison research has produced
contradictory evidence of crowding effects. They claim that this could be due to
inconsistencies in the definitions and measures of both crowding and
misconduct, and the fact that many researchers have failed to consider potential
mediating variables, such as inmate involvement in educational or vocational
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courses, the level of inmate supervision, and related to this last point, whether a
particular area of a prison facilitates misconduct because it is more secluded.
Based on the evidence presented so far, it seems that while on the one
hand there is evidence of a crowding-pathology relationship (with pathology
including illness, stress and (anti) social behaviour), on the other, there is
evidence to suggest that this is by no means an inevitable outcome. The work
discussed so far has been limited to neighbourhoods, households, or
institutions. The problems associated with neighbourhood level analyses were
outlined above. While many of the same criticisms can be levelled at studies
conducted at the household or institutional level (i.e., that they often use
correlation data, and are inconsistent in their definitions of (i) crowding, and (ii)
pathology), they at least make it possible to reduce the number of extraneous
variables by allowing for stricter control over the sample. It also becomes
easier to make direct inferences from the sample statistics as the study designs
often use specially designed individual self-report or behavioural data, rather
than utilising official administrative data and then extrapolating from it.
However, the residential work has tended to examine crowding effects in either
special circumstances where escape is impossible (such as institutions), or in
small units where the ‘crowds’ are made of acquaintances, friends, or family
members (i.e., in residences). What of physical crowds of people, which largely
consist of strangers; the type we might find on an everyday basis in the street,
on trains, in clubs, in sporting venues, etc? Perhaps more even more pertinent,
what of pseudo crowds that one might encounter in the controlled laboratory
environment?
There is a large body of research designed to examine responses to
density in both experimentally manufactured and naturally occurring crowds.
Again, work conducted in this area has shown that physical crowds of people
can give rise to a diverse range of psychological outcomes, although the
quantitative work certainly seems to be heavily weighted towards supporting the
density-pathology relationship.
Starting with studies conducted in the laboratory, participants exposed to
high density reported higher levels of negative affect, evaluated the room more
negatively, and rated the experimental procedure as less pleasant, less worthy,
and less interesting, than participants exposed to low density (Griffitt & Veitch,
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1971). Research has also shown that experimentally manipulated density can
result in reductions in both interpersonal attraction and altruism (Veitch &
Arkkelin, 1995), whereas Sherrod (1974) demonstrated that while crowding did
not directly impact on task performance, participants who had previously been
exposed to crowding were more likely to display frustration on a subsequent
(non-crowded) task. These studies have examined the effect that crowding has
on negative mood. However, Prerost (1981) found that rather than leading to
an increase in negative affect, crowding inhibited participants’ positive mood.
In contrast, Aiello, Thompson, & Brodzinsky (1983) found that although
participants reported highest stress and discomfort levels when they were
exposed to high density, those in the high density conditions gleaned greater
pleasure from listening to clips from various comedy shows than did participants
who listened to the same clips in less crowded environments. This finding hints
at the potential for crowded environments to facilitate positive emotions.
Similarly, Schultz-Gambard (1977) found that although high density led
participants to feel more stressed, to rate the room as more unpleasant, less
comfortable, and less cosy, they felt more positive towards other crowd
members when they felt they belonged to a common group. This idea will be
explored extensively in the chapters that follow.
While there is some evidence of positive responses to crowding in the
laboratory, it is somewhat limited. Work that has been conducted out in the field
is even more mixed. Starting with the negatives, two studies conducted by
Mackintosh, West, and Saegert, (1975) examined the effects of crowding in
public spaces. Participants were taken to either a shoe store (study 1) or a train
station (study 2) in either busy or quiet periods. In study 1, participants were left
in the busy store to write descriptions about twelve pairs of shoes and three
other shoppers. In a subsequent task, participants were taken to another part
of the store and asked to a) draw a map of where the shoes that they had
described were located, b) the characteristics of the shoes and the other
shoppers, and c) to rate how likeable the shoes and the other shoppers were.
While there was no effect of likeability on shoe or person rating, participants in
the high density condition were less able than those in the low density condition
when it came to reproducing an accurate map and correctly recalling the
characteristics of the shoes, which suggests some cognitive ‘overload’. In study
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2, having been left to complete 42 simple tasks in either a crowded or un-
crowded train station, participants in the crowded station reported higher levels
of negative affect and scepticism.
Further field studies have lent support to the view that crowding can give
rise to negative outcomes. Commuters on crowded trains have been shown to
display increased physiological and psychological stress (Evans & Wener,
2006), whereas consumers in supermarkets reported feelings of claustrophobia
and frustration (Aylott & Mitchell, 1998).
However, as has been the case with each area of crowding research
discussed so far, there have been conflicting findings. For example,
Proshansky, Ittelson, and Rivlin (1976) suggested the following anecdotally:
“Crowding may be pleasurable as well as painful. Some people thrill to the
excitement of the crowded city. Other things being equal, a large crowd is a
good indication at the theatre, stadium, beach, or party” (p. 179). Proshanksy et
al.’s claim has received recent empirical support. For example, in an online
questionnaire study designed to investigate the variables that contribute to
atmosphere and home advantage in English football grounds, it was found that
a full capacity crowd is considered to be more important for a ‘good
atmosphere’ than the actual number of people in attendance (Charleston,
2008).
However, a clearer demonstration of positive responses to crowding
comes in the form of a study conducted by Cassidy, Hopkins, Levine, Pandey,
Reicher, & Singh (2007) at the Magh Mela. The Magh Mela is a Hindu festival,
which takes place in India for a month every year. The festival becomes
densely populated. Sanitary conditions and facilities are extremely poor, and
attendees are exposed to constant loud noise. If a clear density-pathology
relationship existed, conditions such as these would be expected to give rise to
widespread psychological deterioration. However, both qualitative (interviews)
and quantitative (questionnaire) methods of data collection revealed extremely
positive mood states among respondents.
Cassidy et al. (2007) presented a psychological analysis of collective joy at
religious festivals – a phenomenon that has been extensively documented and
researched from the perspective of sociologists and anthropologists interested
in collective ritual. For example, following an extensive period of ethnographic
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study of aboriginal societies in Australia, Durkheim (1915/1976) theorised that
religious collectives could experience what he called ‘collective effervescence’ –
an intense feeling of joy that not only emerged in collective ritual, but depended
upon physical co-presence. According to Durkheim (1915/1976, p. 215):
The very fact of the concentration acts as an exceptionally powerful
stimulant. When they are once come together, a sort of electricity is
formed by their collecting which quickly transports them to an extraordinary
degree of exaltation.
Thus, according to Durkheim, this ‘electricity’ and ‘exaltation’, or in other words
‘collective joy’ that is associated with religious ritual is a product of physical co-
presence. However, as noted by Olaveson (2001), Durkheim’s concept of
collective effervescence referred to an altered state of consciousness – a state
of ecstasy. Durkheim associated this ‘ecstasy’, which might have been a
thoroughly enjoyable, positive subjective experience, with delirium and
pathology. To illustrate, when discussing the joyous states associated with of
religious ritual, Durkheim (1915/1976, p. 226) commented:
It is certainly true that religious life cannot attain a certain degree of
intensity without implying a physical exaltation not far removed from
delirium. That is why the prophets, the founders of religions, the great
saints, in a word, the men whose religious consciousness is exceptionally
sensitive, very frequently give signs of an excessive nervousness that is
even pathological.
Despite Durkheim’s interpretation of religious ritual as something
pathological, his observations lent weight to the argument that dense
collectivities can facilitate positive emotions. Collective joy, however, is in no
way limited to religious crowds. As already mentioned in the previous chapter,
there are countless anecdotal examples of positive responses to immersion in
crowds. Ehrenreich (2007) discussed many of these in a recent historical
account of ‘collective joy’. As well as religious festivals and rituals, Ehrenreich
(2007) provides a detailed overview of collective events throughout history,
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such as carnivals, military processions (see also: McNeill, 1995), nightclubs
(see also: Malbon, 1999), and sporting events (see also: Morris, 1981; Neville &
Reicher, 2008), which have operated as a platform from which people can come
together to transcend the barriers of social class and ethnicity, and unite,
perhaps only fleetingly, in feelings of collective comfort, pleasure, and joy.
However, Ehrenreich (2007) also makes an important point when she highlights
that even when there is clear evidence of such collective joy, it is often labelled
by those outside as something pathological, with tag-words such as ‘hysteria’ or
‘mania’ (or in Durkheim’s case - delirium). ‘Beatle-mania’ is an example of this.
This brings the current section to a close. To summarise, it is seems that
rather than leading to a generic aversive response, exposure to crowding can
evoke variable responses, be it in cities, neighbourhoods, households,
institutions, public spaces, or in laboratories. While much of this variation
relates to when crowding, will, or will not be experienced negatively, there has
been some acknowledgement of the potential positives of crowding –
sometimes from psychologists, but more often from historians, anthropologists,
or sociologists. Some of the work has attempted to explain why residential
crowding might be experienced so variably. For some, the answer lies with
architectural features promoting social withdrawal, or encouraging people to
make and maintain supportive social networks. For others, it is due to
unavoidable social interaction and hence stressful ‘over-stimulation’ that comes
with crowding in institutional settings. For others still, the answer lies with
inconsistent methodologies and definitions. However, so far, there has been no
discussion of theoretical approaches which attempt to explain variable
responses to exposure to large physical crowds – those at the religious festival,
nightclub and football terrace. The following sections will introduce, and critique
some theoretical approaches to such variability in responses to, and desire for
crowding.
2.5 Explaining variable responses to crowding
As demonstrated in the previous section, ‘crowding’ can evoke a diverse range
of psychological responses. Several attempts have been made to explain
when, and why, crowding might be experienced in a particular way. These were
criticised for their limited application as they often only accounted for residential
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crowding. The sections that follow will focus on variable responses to physical
proximity and density in physically co-present crowds in laboratories and
naturalistic environments.
For some, variable responses to crowding can be attributed to individual
differences and perceptions. One of the first psychologists to question the
density-pathology link, and to suggest that crowding might be associated with
positive outcomes, was Jonathan Freedman (1975). Freedman claimed that
exposure to physical density served to intensify a person’s typical response to
others co-present. According to Freedman (1975, p. 105), “…high density
makes other people a more important stimulus and thereby intensifies the
typical reaction to them”. In other words, if a person typically experiences close
proximity to certain people as aversive, density will strengthen the aversion,
whereas if they experience close proximity as pleasant, density will make it
more so. Freedman also claimed that certain situations are unpleasant (such
as being on an underground train) whereas others are pleasant (such as being
at a sports match), and that high density will intensify these situational
responses. Freedman (1975) elaborated on this by saying that even in a
‘positive’ crowd, there becomes a point whereby density becomes unpleasant
due to “physical discomfort, odors, and lack of freedom to move” (p. 93).
At first glance, Freedman’s theory makes a lot of sense. It can certainly
account for intra-individual variations in crowding responses. However, it is
open to criticism. Let us assume that density does simply intensify typical
reactions to certain people. Now imagine a football fan standing on a terrace
watching his team. His team scores a goal and the man finds himself jumping
for joy. He then finds himself roughly jostled by other fans in his immediate
vicinity. A stranger standing next to him reaches out, grabs the man, and
embraces him in a hug, as does the stranger’s friend. Despite the sweat on
their t-shirts and their terrible body odour, the man joyfully hugs them back.
Does this imply that the man usually likes being near sweaty, smelly strangers,
but density just exacerbates this and makes it joyful?
Freedman might concede that in this situation, something is operating
other than an intensified typical response to the men. Instead, it could be that
being at a sports event is enjoyable, and therefore, the density increased
enjoyment despite the odious crowd members. However, the flip side must
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then hold for this to be true. In other words, the unpleasant journey on the
underground must simply become more unpleasant when there are lots of
people squashed together in a carriage. Now imagine that the same man is on
his way home from the football match on an underground train. He is
surrounded by yet more, sweaty, smelly men and cannot move. The men
support his team, who have just won their match. They are laughing and
chanting and the man joins in. Thus, in this situation he is in a normally
aversive situation (on a crowded train), surrounded by normally aversive people
(sweaty and smelly men), yet he is having a thoroughly positive experience. It
is difficult to see how Freedman’s (1975) density-intensity theory can explain
the man’s response to this scenario. Granted, it is a hypothetical scenario, but
it is not an implausible one.
A recent paper by Drury, Cocking, and Reicher (2009) casts further doubt
on Freedman’s (1975) approach. Drury et al. (2009) interviewed survivors of
the 2005 London bombings, many of whom had been on packed underground
trains during the morning rush hour. As much research has shown, close
proximity to commuters on crowded underground trains can be a source of
stress and discomfort (e.g., Evans & Wener, 2007). Therefore, if Freedman’s
theory were true, and density simply intensifies existing feelings towards other
people, the survivors of the London bombings should have simply experienced
greater aversion to those around them on the packed trains. However, an
external event (the detonation of a bomb) led survivors to act in pro-social ways
towards strangers – showing concern and offering assistance. Of course, it is
not being suggested that any of the survivors felt joyful or elated. However,
Drury et al.’s (2009) work demonstrates that contextual variables can alter our
perceptions of fellow crowd members, which stands in stark contrast to
Freedman’s suggestion that density simply intensifies our (pre) existing states.
It seems that what is missing from Freedman’s theory is some
acknowledgement that the nature of the relations between crowd members can
be influenced by contextual variations (e.g., scoring a goal, or coming under
threat), rather than being a symptom of individual likes and dislikes. Rather
than reducing crowding responses to individual perceptions, they should be
seen as social psychological phenomena and treated as such. Despite this, like
Freedman, several psychologists have implicated individual-level variables
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when explaining responses to crowding (although these often relate to when a
crowd will or will not be experienced negatively rather than when it might be
experienced positively). These individual-level variables have included feelings
of being blocked from attaining a particular goal (Proshansky et al., 1976), a
lack of privacy (Altman, 1975), sensory overload (Milgram, 1970), and loss of
control (Baron & Rodin, 1978).
In contrast to these one-dimensional individualistic approaches, other
researchers have outlined a wide range of potential mediators between physical
density and psychological response. For example, Rosenthal and Mayer (1983)
highlighted the fact that crowding research designs tended to be oversimplified,
and that rather than singling out one or two independent variables, researchers
should instead consider multiple interacting determinants of crowding. To
compensate, Rosenthal and Mayer (1983) outlined ten explanatory variables.
According to the authors, “These are (including the number of S’s per constant
space which, of course, is the crowding variable itself) the types of activity the
S’s are engaged in, the cubic volume of space available to each S, the hedonic,
aesthetic, and architectural responses to space…” and also, “…varieties of
interpersonal contact, duration of contact, external and internal stimulation, the
environmental background or context in which the crowding event occurs,
breaks in the situation, and the geographic origins and other socio-economic
characteristics of the S’s who participate in crowded situations” (Rosenthal &
Mayer, 1983, p. 96).
It could be argued that in providing such a comprehensive list, Rosenthal
and Mayer (1983) have overcompensated for the simplistic approaches that
they are so critical of. Whilst in some cases, each of their variables might
influence crowding responses, they simply provided a list of variables, rather
than a theory which links them. More importantly, their list falls short when
applied to some real world examples. Let us go back to football for another
anecdotal example. For a male, English, working class football fan attending a
match alone, wearing neutral clothing, and standing on a crowded terrace, most
of the variables on the list would be held constant. However, his response to
the crowding would probably vary depending on whether he was surrounded by
fans of his team (potentially positive response), or whether he had accidentally
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been issued a ticket for the opposing team’s terrace (potentially negative
response).
It could be argued that the two variables on Rosenthal and Mayer’s (1983)
list which might best account for this football fans’ positive or negative response
might be (i) variety in the nature of interpersonal contact, and (ii) internal and
external stimulation. The problem with the first is that Rosenthal and Mayer
distinguished between interpersonal contact on a business or personal level,
whether the contact is based on a hobby, whether it involves touching or
kissing, whether it involves overt hostility, and the list goes on. In the scenario
discussed above, it is possible that none of these would vary between the two
scenarios. The ‘away’ fans would have no reason to suspect that the fan was
one of the ‘enemy’, and would therefore display no overt hostility. They would
all be there because they share a ‘hobby’ or interest, the level of touching would
be the same, and so on. Using internal and external stimulation (as defined by
Rosenthal and Mayer) as explanatory variables is also problematic. First, they
relate external stimulation to factors such as noise levels, which would be
constant across the two scenarios, and second, they equate internal stimulation
to variables such as personality, or alcohol and drug consumption. Again, it is
unlikely that there would be any between-scenario variance on these
dimensions.
Some of the crowding theories discussed so far have been criticised for
being overly individualistic – e.g., they focus on intra-individual processes, or
fixed individual characteristics. In doing so, they exclude the ‘social’ from
something that should, in many respects, be seen as a social phenomenon.
Others have been criticised for being overly simplistic when considering the
influence of other people on the individual perceiver (e.g., Freedman’s, 1975
theory). Others still have been criticised for leaving us with a long list of
disjointed variables and lacking a workable theoretical framework that can be
applied to diverse crowding responses. So far, there has been little
consideration of the ways in which contextual variables might (a) influence
crowd members’ perceptions of themselves and those around them, (b) impact
upon the relations between crowd members, and (c) how these relations might
subsequently impact upon the experience of close proximity and crowding. In
the following section, the personal space approach to crowding will be
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discussed as a potential first step towards overcoming these theoretical
shortcomings.
2.6 Personal space
One well-established theoretical approach that has been used to explain
variation in a) interpersonal proximity, and b) responses to crowding, while
considering physical relations between crowd members, is that of personal
space (e.g., Evans & Wener, 2007; Freedman, 1975; Worchel & Teddlie, 1976;
Worchel & Yohai, 1979). Personal space was originally studied during the
1950s in relation to territoriality – the territorial behaviour observed in animals
(e.g. Hediger, 1955). However, the concept was later developed to incorporate
human social conduct, and was described by Sommer (1969, p. 26) as “an area
with invisible boundaries surrounding a person’s body into which intruders may
not come”. The logic behind applying the concept of personal space to
crowding is that crowding will be experienced negatively when (a) a perceiver
becomes negatively aroused by a personal space intrusion, and then (b)
attributes that arousal to others in the environment (e.g., Worchel & Teddlie,
1976). Goffman (1971, p. 30) summed this up in his description of personal
space as “the space surrounding an individual where within which an entering
other causes the individual to feel encroached upon, leading him to show
displeasure and sometimes to withdraw”.
There is empirical support for Goffman’s prediction. An example of this is
a classic early personal space study conducted by Felipe and Sommer (1966).
In an experimental design which might raise a few eyebrows on a modern-day
ethics committee, patients in a psychiatric hospital were approached by a
confederate. In the two experimental conditions, the confederate sat six inches
away from the patients (or ‘victims’, as the authors called them) and either
looked at the participant while taking notes and ‘jiggling his keys’, or simply sat
there while occasionally ‘jiggling his keys’ (Felipe & Sommer, 1966). In the
control condition, the confederate simply sat at the opposite end of a bench to
the patients. It was found that the hospital patients were more likely to leave
the bench when the confederate sat very close to them, or in other words,
‘invaded’ their personal space.
45
Of course, this study is open to criticism. Most importantly, the fact that the
study was conducted on patients in a psychiatric hospital raises questions
regarding whether the findings will generalise to other populations in other
settings. Felipe and Sommer (1966) acknowledged this and carried out a
similar study to compensate, this time in a university library. A female
confederate approached female students who were working alone at a large
table. The confederate sat at five varying distances from the participants,
ranging from approximately three inches between the adjacent chairs at one
extreme (condition one), to four feet (and the table) separating the chairs at the
other extreme (condition five). In the three middle conditions, the experimenter
left distances that ranged from 15 inches to two chairs’ width between herself
and the participants. There was also a control condition, in which students were
observed from a distance. It was found that participants were significantly more
likely to leave the table, or to ‘take flight’ in condition one (the closest condition)
as opposed to the other four conditions combined. The researchers also noted
that when the participants did not leave the table, they responded to personal
space intrusions by erecting barriers with their books, bags and coats, or they
physically turned away from the experimenter (Felipe & Sommer, 1966).
Barash (1973) observed similar responses, again in a university library.
However, the tendency of participants (who were students) to ‘take flight’ was
stronger when the confederate was wearing a suit (faculty attire) as opposed to
jeans and a t-short (student attire), thus giving further credence to the
suggestion that personal space intrusions will evoke a negative behavioural
response, but raising questions regarding when this might happen.
At first glance, these studies appear to support the suggestion that
personal space intrusions will lead to social withdrawal. However, it could be
argued that the participants were not simply responding to the close physical
proximity of the experimenters, but instead to their anti-normative behaviour.
Participants may have perceived a stranger’s decision to sit in close proximity
when there were plenty of spatial alternatives as unusual – even threatening –
and this may have caused their observed defensive behavioural responses.
However, in another ethically questionable, yet undeniably creative
experimental design, Middlemist, Knowles, and Matter (1976) noted
physiological responses to personal space invasion. Central to their
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investigation was the premise that physiological arousal (brought on by stress)
affects male urinary function. According to the authors, stress will impact upon
relaxation of the external sphincter, thus increasing the length of time that it will
take for urination to begin. In addition, increased intra-vesicle pressure, again
brought on by stress, will shorten the length of urination. Therefore, the authors
hypothesised that personal space invasions would lead to delayed onset, and
decreased length of urination, brought on by stress. The experimenters
occupied a university lavatory to test this hypothesis. The lavatory had three
urinals. In the two experimental conditions, a confederate appeared to urinate
at one urinal, while an ‘out of order’ sign was placed on another, leaving the
third urinal free. This configuration was arranged so that in the ‘close distance’
condition, the participant was forced to urinate at the urinal adjacent to the
confederate. In the ‘moderate distance’ condition, one urinal was left between
the participant and the confederate. In the control condition, the participant was
left to urinate alone with both of the other urinals marked as out of order.
Meanwhile, a second experimenter hid himself away in a cubicle, armed with a
stopwatch and a periscopic prism to allow him to see under the door to visualise
the participants’ urine flow. As predicted, it was found that urination onset was
slowest, and the flow-duration shortest, in the ‘close’ condition, followed by the
‘moderate distance’ condition, and then quickest, and longest, in the control
condition. While these findings tell us nothing about potential mediating
variables, such as privacy invasions, or ‘performance anxiety’, they do highlight
the potential negative physiological responses associated with personal space
invasions.
2.6.1 Determinants of personal space
So just how much personal space do we need before ‘taking flight’,
experiencing discomfort, or showing signs of negative physiological arousal?
Sommer (1969) suggested that a person in a crowd requires at least two square
feet of personal space. However, empirical observations have suggested that a
wide array of intervening variables can influence how much space people seek
from others. Logic therefore suggests that as personal space zones vary, so
too will people’s responses to physical proximity in crowds. Some of the
variables that can impact on proximity preferences will be briefly discussed here
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(for extensive reviews, see: Altman, 1975: Altman & Vinsel, 1977; Hayduk,
1983).
One approach to explaining variability in personal space is to consider
cross-cultural variation (e.g., Hall, 1966). Edward Hall – an anthropologist who
was one of the pioneers of personal space research (which is also called
proxemics) – claimed that American people (and hence, ‘Westerners’) tend to
use four types of personal space distances. These range from intimate
distances (ranging from physical contact to eighteen inches), through to
personal distances (ranging from one and a half feet to four feet), social
distances (ranging from four feet to twelve feet), and finally, public distances
(ranging from twelve feet to twenty-five feet and greater) (Hall, 1966, 1976).
Hall suggested that although these categories also exist in non-Western
cultures, the actual distances within each category might vary. Following an
extensive qualitative research programme, Hall (1966) concluded that Latin,
Arab, and Asian individuals seek closer proximity than do Westerners, and that
they will subsequently experience inter-personal close proximity to strangers,
business associates, and other (non-intimate) acquaintances more positively.
To use an illustrative example, a business meeting between an Asian and an
American might become awkward due to both having different, culturally
determined ideas as to what constitutes an appropriate distance. They might
both seek to interact at a ‘social distance’, but a social distance in America
might be further than a social distance in parts of Asia. Thus, as the American
moves further and further away to feel more at ease, the Asian will feel less
comfortable, and thus seek closer proximity, resulting in an uncomfortable game
of ‘cat and mouse’. When transferring this culturally determined proximity
principle to crowding, Hall (1965, p. 191) went as far as suggesting “culture is
possibly the most significant single variable in determining what constitutes
stressful density” (as cited in Lawrence, 1974, p. 714).
Although there is empirical evidence of cross-cultural variations in personal
space (e.g., Aiello & Thompson, 1980; Beaulieu, 2004; Lomranz, 1976; Smith,
1981; Sussman & Rosenfeld, 1982), a cultural approach is far too simplistic. To
illustrate, consider Hall’s (1976, p. 164) following assertion: “For members of a
non-contact group, it is taboo to relax and enjoy bodily contact with strangers!”.
Altman and Vinsel (1977) agreed with Hall. When discussing the discomfort
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experienced by Americans ‘subjected’ to contact at intimate distances in public
spaces, they said: “It is easy to demonstrate these feelings of discomfort by
asking people to face one another within the intimate zone. People almost
invariably become tense, giggle with discomfort, avert their gaze, turn their
bodies away from one another, or act in other ways to make this distance
psychologically less intimate” (Altman & Vinsel, 1977, p. 184). This may be the
case for some participants in the laboratory, aware that their behaviour is under
scrutiny from an experimenter. It may also hold for some naturalistic scenarios,
such as on the London Underground or the New York Subway during rush hour.
However, the claim that such responses are “almost invariable” is a fallacy. As
highlighted in Chapter 1, English people and Americans – both defined as
belonging to ‘non-contact’ groups – do sometimes relax when experiencing
close physical contact with strangers, and they often enjoy it (see also,
Chapters 7 & 8). Rather that responding awkwardly, giggling, and turning away,
etc., people often embrace strangers in their intimate zones, turning to face
them to dance, chant and celebrate.
There must therefore be alternative explanations for within-culture
variations in personal space. Indeed, a long-list of intervening variables has
emerged over the years. Altman and Vinsel (1977) suggested that these
should be broken down into three categories: individual factors, setting-
environmental factors, and interpersonal factors. Each of these will be
addressed in turn.
Individual factors: As suggested by its title, the first category is
comprised of factors that relate to the individual perceiver, or in other words,
demographic variables, such as age and sex. There is evidence of each of
these having an effect on personal space. With regards to age effects, young
children have been shown to require less space than those approaching
adulthood (Aiello & Aiello, 1974), whereas young women have been shown to
require less personal space than elderly women (Winogrond, 1981), thus
suggesting that interpersonal distancing might increase from childhood through
to adulthood.
The effect of an individual’s sex on their spatial behaviours has received
more attention, and although the findings seem to be inconsistent (Hayduk,
1983), Uzzell and Horne (2006) claimed that the consensus in the early
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literature was that there is a tendency for women to require less personal space
than men (for example, see Sussman & Rosenfeld, 1982). However, there is
evidence to suggest that rather than women simply requiring less space than
men, there might instead be a sex effect when the physical orientation of a
personal space invasion is considered, with men responding more negatively to
‘face-to-face’ invasions, and women responding more negatively when intruded
upon from the side (Fisher & Byrne, 1975). Uzzell and Horne (2006) have
recently gone further by claiming that biological sex has less impact on personal
space (or interpersonal distance, as they call it) than gender role, which is
acquired through social learning. They found that regardless of biological sex,
people who scored high in masculinity sought greater distances than those who
scored high in femininity.
Setting-environmental factors: Situational factors, external to the
perceiver, can also have an influence on personal space. One example is
whether an interaction takes place indoors or outdoors. Participants
approached by an experimenter in an outdoor setting required smaller distances
before experiencing discomfort than those approached in an indoor setting
(Cochran, Hale, & Hissam, 1984). The authors suggested that these
differences might be understood in terms of the amount of vertical space
available to the participants. To elaborate, the authors proposed that as vertical
space (the space above participants’ heads) increased, their horizontal space
(the space between them an the experimenter) would decrease accordingly, as
was shown to be the case.
Further aspects of the indoor environment can influence personal space.
Gifford and Sacilotto (1993) conducted a field-study on female office workers
who were matched for age, status within the organisation, wages, person-
orientation (the extent to which they were oriented to learning about other
people), and thing-orientation (the extent to which they were oriented to learning
about non-human animals, machines, and objects). The main difference
between the two groups of women was the design of their workspace. Women
in the ‘social-isolation’ group worked at desks separated by screens, whereas
women in the ‘non-isolated’ condition worked at desks in small workspaces,
which facilitated social interaction. Women from both conditions were asked to
approach an experimenter to take part in a seemingly unrelated task. Following
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their approach, the distance that they left between themselves and the
experimenter was measured. It was found that women who worked in isolation
required significantly more personal space than those who worked in a non-
isolated environment. Gifford and Sacilotto (1993) suggested that the women
who worked in isolation had become accustomed to low levels of social
stimulation, and thus sought greater distances when interacting to maintain
these low stimulation levels.
Interpersonal factors: The third category relates to the extent to which
the attributes of a potential interaction partner, or the psychological relationship
between an individual and their potential interaction partner can impact upon
their personal space. This was an area first addressed by Hall (1966) in his
qualitative assessment of personal space. Hall stipulated that people would
seek closer proximity to friends and relatives than to business associates or
strangers. Following a review of quantitative investigations of personal space,
Sundstrom and Altman (1976) agreed that interpersonal relationships could
impact on spatial behaviours. They concluded that the relationship between
close proximity and subjective comfort would be dependent on the relationship
between interactants. They suggested that dyads made up of friends would feel
the most comfortable when interacting at close proximity, followed by dyads of
strangers who were expecting interaction. Finally, they suggested that pairs
made up of strangers who were not expecting to interact with one another
would feel the most discomfort when experiencing close proximity. While such
a theory makes perfect sense, it does not take into account other factors that
might influence the relationship between two interacting strangers.
As shown in the section on ‘individual factors’, the age and sex of an
individual can have an effect on the distances that they seek from others.
However, there is also a line of research which has shown that the age and sex
of a potential interaction partner can also have an effect on how near or far an
individual wishes to be from them. With regards to age, a study by Fry and
Willis (1971) found that personal space invasions by children on adults resulted
in age-dependent responses: five year-olds were received positively, eight year-
old were ignored, whereas 10 year-old elicited negative responses, similar to
those brought on by adult personal space invasions. With regards to sex, it has
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been shown that people tend to seek closer proximity to men than they do to
women (e.g., Willis, 1966).
‘Race’ is a further demographic variable shown to influence personal
space in ‘interpersonal’ contexts. For example, Willis (1966) found white and
black conversation partners sought marginally significantly more space from
one another than did pairs of white or black conversation partners. In a more
recent study, Goff, Steele, and Davies (2008) asked white participants to set up
chairs for an anticipated discussion with either white or black conversation
partners (who were in fact part of a cover story and not really due to arrive at
the laboratory). It was found that when the discussion topic related to racial
profiling – a racially sensitive topic – participants sought greater distance from
their black partners than from their white partners. Leibman (1970, p. 220)
explained the impact of ‘interpersonal’ demographics (such as race and sex) on
proximity in the following way: “…it is normative in this society to prefer and feel
more comfortable with those who are familiar, that is, “one’s own kind””.
2.6.2 Evaluating the personal space approach to crowding
As has been shown, a wide array of factors can influence how much distance
people seek from others. However, there are two major problems with a
personal space approach to crowding. Firstly, at present, the link between
personal space and crowding only accounts for when close proximity will, or will
not, be experienced negatively. A person will respond negatively to close
proximity if they feel that their personal space has been violated, but will remain
neutral if they do not. Thus, there is no explanation as to why close proximity
might sometimes be experienced positively.
The second problem relates to the proposed determinants of personal
space that were discussed in the preceding section. While there is no reason to
doubt that each of the variables can influence a person’s proximity preferences
to some extent, the problem is that they simply provide us with a long list of
intervening variables, when what is actually needed is a psychological
framework linking theoretically the different person and situation variables. As
such, it becomes difficult to apply personal space to crowding.
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To elaborate, let us briefly consider Altman and Vinsel’s (1977) three
categories in turn to highlight how each provides a limited explanation of
personal space when applied to crowding.
First, as the individual factors describe relatively fixed personal
characteristics, relying on them alone leaves little room for explaining intra-
individual variations in personal space, and hence responses to crowding. If it
is considered that young people require less space than old people, that
masculine people seek greater distances than feminine people, and that
Westerners prefer more space than Asians, it becomes difficult to explain why
the young, masculine, Englishman discussed in section 2.5 might actively seek
out and enjoy close proximity on a football terrace, while he might experience
discomfort when crowded on a busy commuter train.
We could therefore try to explain this variability in terms of setting-
environmental factors – e.g., the young, masculine, Englishman seeks out and
enjoys close proximity on the terrace but not on the train because the terrace is
outside and therefore provides vertical space, whereas the train carriage is
indoors where vertical space is limited. However, again, such an approach falls
short when trying to explain variable crowding behaviours within a particular
setting – e.g., the crowded train carriage might cause anxiety and/or discomfort
for the young man when travelling home from work, but might be the scene of
great joy when he is surrounded by fellow supporters of his team when
celebrating a victory following a football match.
The final category of variables said to influence personal space
(interpersonal variables) also falls short when applied to intra-individual
variability within a particular setting. Firstly, to assume that friends are
comfortable with less space than strangers does not explain why people
sometimes enjoy close proximity to strangers in crowds – e.g., in mosh-pits,
stadiums, and at festivals. Secondly, if people seek out closer proximity to
others simply based on fixed demographic similarities such as skin colour or
sex, then all positively experienced crowds would be either single-sex or
‘racially’ homogenous. Obviously, this is not the case. A further problem with
so-called interpersonal factors is that many of them describe interactions based
on group-memberships (such as black vs white, old vs young, or male vs
female), so while interactions in this category might be between two individuals,
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and sometimes on an interpersonal level (e.g., when between two friends) they
should be renamed as intra-group or inter-group interactions when they refer to
group-level variables.
This brings us onto another problem with traditional personal space
research. There has been some acknowledgement of group-level influences,
such as culture, ‘race’, and gender, on personal space, and hence crowding
variability. However, this consideration is somewhat underdeveloped. Group
membership has been treated as an objective or demographic fact rather than a
subjective or psychological self-definition that varies as a function of both
perceiver and contextual variables. For example, consider Leibman’s (1970)
claim that people prefer closer proximity to ‘their own kind’. This claim is based
on the assumption that same sex, same ‘race’ others will always be seen as
‘one’s own kind’, irrespective of contextual and perceiver variations. This is not
always the case; a white, male office worker may see another man as his own
kind in a context that compares men with women. He may see a white person
as his own kind in a context that compares white people with black people.
However, in a context that compares office workers with construction workers, it
is likely that he will define a black, female office worker as more ‘his own kind’
than a white, male construction worker. The same principle applies to
crowding. Imagine the same man travelling home from work on a packed train,
surrounded by a demographically diverse group of strangers. There would be
no contextually determined reason for him to think of the other passengers as
‘his own kind’. However, if surrounded by the same demographically diverse
group of strangers on the way home from a football match, and all of them were
wearing the shirt of the man’s favourite team, they would be united by their
support for that team. It follows that the man might avoid close proximity, or
experience unavoidable close proximity as unpleasant on the first train where
there is no salient unifying group membership, but seek out and enjoy close
proximity on the second train where he shares group membership with his
fellow passengers. It therefore becomes clear that rather than seeing group
membership as a demographic given, a psychological approach to group
membership needs to ask the question of who we see as ‘our own kind’.
In the following chapter, and for the remainder of this thesis, a theoretical
approach to spatiality and crowding, which treats ‘group’ as a psychological
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entity that varies as a function of an interaction between perceiver and
contextual variables, will be developed. This framework will be based on the
principles of self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, 1982; Turner et al., 1987)
– a well-established social psychological theory of group processes. A SCT
approach to spatiality and crowding can account for the influence of contextual
variables on group-level processes, and in doing so, provides a potential
explanation as to why members of the ‘same’ social category (such as culture,
‘race’, or gender) should sometimes want closeness and sometimes want
distance from each other, and why close proximity in crowds can be
experienced positively in some situations but negatively in others.
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Chapter 3: Theory development – the social identity approach
and self-categorization theory
3.1 Introduction
So far, when considering theoretical approaches to crowding and spatiality, it
has become apparent that many (but not all – e.g., Rosenthal & Mayer, 1983) of
the psychological theories have focussed on individual perceivers. They have
relegated the others co-present to the back of the scene, merely serving as
amplifiers or irritants, a source of frustration or negative arousal. In doing so,
they have overlooked the potentially dynamic relationship between the
individual and other crowd members, and the psychological impact that group
memberships and group relations might have on an individual’s spatial
preferences and hence their responses to crowding.
However, there are exceptions. As discussed, broad group classifications
such as culture, ‘race’, age, and gender have all been shown to influence
spatial preferences. Thus, some researchers have flirted with the idea of group-
based norms and inter-group relations influencing spatial behaviours (and
therefore psychological responses to crowding). However, this has been on a
rather crude and underdeveloped level, which requires further attention. In
particular, factors such as intra-group and intra-individual variations in spatiality
need to be accounted for. Importantly, the proximity preference approach to
crowding also needs to account for not only when close proximity will, or will
not, be experienced negatively, but also when close proximity will give rise to
positive psychological outcomes.2
In an attempt to address these theoretical gaps in the personal space and
crowding literature, the current chapter will focus on developing a unified theory
of spatiality and crowding. It will be argued that the key to understanding
variations in our spatial preferences (and hence our varied responses to close
proximity in both one-to-one interactions and in dense crowds) lies with an
understanding of the flexible and context-dependant nature of the relationships
between individuals and other crowd members, and how interpersonal, inter-
2 Freedman’s (1975) density-intensity approach does in fact account for positive responses to
crowding, but was criticised for its inability to generalise to some situations of crowding (see
Chapter 2, section 2.5).
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group, and intra-group processes can determine the physical and psychological
outcomes of human interaction. It will be argued that a certain conception of
identity is needed to make sense of such variability in the content and form of
the relations between a perceiver and others co-present.
First, a brief historical account of some of the research examining group
processes will be presented. Following this, research and theory on inter-group
behaviour (including inter-group conflict) will be reviewed, along with an
overview of social identity theory. This will then lead onto an overview of self-
categorization theory (SCT) – the social psychological theory that will be central
to the hypotheses formulated and tested in this thesis. This overview will
include a discussion of the applications of SCT (particularly with regards to
phenomena previously discussed in individualistic terms, and also to crowd
behaviours) followed by a statement relating to the theory’s potential to explain
spatial behaviours and variable psychological responses to crowding.
3.2 Understanding individuals and groups
Group processes have been at the centre of academic debate in social
psychology for over a century. In his analysis of crowds (which can be seen as
a special case of the group), Le Bon (1895/1968) suggested that crowd
members lose their sense of self – their sense of identity – and then succumb to
the unconscious, instinctive, and primitive collective characteristics of the
‘collective mind’, which are different to the characteristics of each of the crowd’s
individual members. According to Le Bon (1895/1965): “…among the special
characteristics of the crowd there are several – such as impulsiveness,
irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of judgement and of the critical
spirit, the exaggeration of the sentiments, and others besides…” (p. 56). Le
Bon’s analysis painted a picture in which crowd members are under the
‘hypnotic effect’ of the collective mind, where acts and thoughts spread through
the group via the process of ‘contagion’ – a pathological and irrational spreading
of any behaviours or sentiments.
On a conceptual level, Allport’s (1924) individualist approach to group
behaviour sits in direct contrast to that of Le Bon’s ‘group mind’ theory. Allport
(1924a) referred to the group mind approach as the “group fallacy” (p. 691), and
claimed “…there is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely
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a psychology of individuals” (Allport, 1924b, p. 4). Allport’s (1924b) view of
group psychology also applied to the psychology of crowds, of which he
remarked: “…the individual in the crowd behaves just as he would behave alone
only more so” (p. 295). Allport (1924b) proposed that through the process of
social facilitation, the co-presence of others simply amplified an individual’s pre-
existing tendencies, which were obtained through instinct and social learning.
However, as noted by Reicher (2001), when it came to crowd action, Allport’s
approach bore a striking resemblance to that of Le Bon. That is, according to
Allport, when a crowd grows beyond a certain size, the crowd members’ learnt
responses become less functional, and instead they revert to their instincts,
which are destructive. Therefore, for both Le Bon and Allport, the crowd is
characterised by a mass that has lost its identity, is devoid of its will, and is at
the mercy of its instincts. Reicher (2001) noted another important similarity
between these seemingly opposing perspectives. That is, they both ignored the
potential for society and for contextual factors in general to shape the actions of
people in groups and crowds (the problems associated with applying the
theories of Le Bon and Allport to crowd behaviours will be revisited in more
detail in section 3.5.1).
However, towards the middle of the twentieth century, a body of empirical
work conducted in both laboratory and field settings began to offer new insights
into the relationship between individuals and groups that went beyond the
limitations of the ‘group mind’ and individualist approaches. In particular, the
findings began to highlight the impact that contextual variables could have on
group formation, and the impact that group formation could have on the
behaviour of individuals within that group. Specifically, they demonstrated that
intra-group and inter-group interaction played a vital role in the formation of
intra-group norms and inter-group attitudes.
The idea that group behaviour can become meaningful following a period
of interaction between group members (the interactionist approach) was
highlighted in a series of laboratory studies. Most notable were those
conducted by Sherif (1935, 1937) and Asch (1952, see also 1955).
Sherif’s (1935) work utilised a phenomenon known as the autokinetic
effect. The autokinetic effect describes a situation whereby an isolated point of
light is fixed at a distance from participants who are situated in a dark room.
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Although the light is stationary, it appears to move. As there is no point of
reference against which participants can judge the amount, or direction, of the
movement, they tend to differ in their judgements of the light’s ‘movement’
(Sherif, 1935). Thus, when individuals in Sherif’s experiment were asked to
judge the amount of ‘movement’ in repeated trials, they tended to report
distances within a particular range, and these ranges were peculiar to each
participant. However, Sherif (1935) noted that when those same people
estimated the movement of the light in small groups (with each individual
vocalising their judgement so that the whole group could hear), they tended to
converge on a norm that was peculiar to that group. When participants then
rated the movement alone in subsequent trials, their responses reflected the
group norm that had been established previously. This finding was taken as
evidence in support of the idea that in situations of uncertainty, group members
can be used as a source of information when making judgements, and hence
demonstrates the impact that group interaction can have on individual
perceivers. In other words, the individuals were not behaving ‘as they would
alone, only more so’, as suggested by Allport – they were acting in accordance
to a group norm that was established during a period of group interaction.
In Asch’s (1952) work, male participants attended an experimental session
in groups that ranged from seven to nine people. Only one of the group
members was a genuine participant – the rest were confederates. The groups
were shown two cards. The first showed a single line whereas the second
contained three lines of varying lengths – one being the same length as the line
on the original card and the other two being obviously different. The groups
were asked to state which of the lines on the second card was the same length
as that displayed on the first. In the first two trials, each of the ‘participants’
stated the correct answer. However, in some of the subsequent trials, each of
the confederates gave the wrong answer. Importantly, they each gave the
same wrong answer. Asch was interested in how the actual participants would
respond when the majority were clearly wrong, yet unanimous in their mistake.
While participants differed in their reactions, with some always going against the
majority and others going with the majority only some of the time, in total,
participants agreed with the majority in 36.8% of the critical trials – i.e. when the
confederates gave the wrong answer – even though they were clearly wrong.
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The findings of Asch (1952) and Sherif (1935) provided important insights
into intra-group processes. However, following the Second World War,
researchers began to question the psychological processes underlying inter-
group phenomena, such as prejudice, discrimination, hostility, conflict and
genocide.
In a similar vein to Allport’s (1924, 1962) individualistic approach to group
phenomena, individualistic social psychological theories were explaining inter-
group processes in terms of the individual attributes of those who acted on
behalf of their group (Tajfel, 1978a). Thus, they represented a shift away from
the interactionism of Asch and Sherif.
A good example is the theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno,
Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). Adorno et al. (1950) conducted
psychometric testing on 2,000 participants who responded to scales designed
to measure ethnocentrism, anti-Semitism, political and economic conservatism,
and potentiality for fascism. A sample of participants who attained high and low
scores on the ethnocentrism scale were also interviewed about their upbringing
and family relations as well as their career aspirations. It was found that
participants could be classified into a series of groups based on their responses
to the measures, which reflected patterns in their thinking styles. The authors
were most interested in the group containing respondents who scored high on
all four of the measures, or in other words, those with an ‘authoritarian
personality’. Authoritarians were found to be submissive to authority, dogmatic,
sexually repressed, more likely to see the world in terms of rigid categorisations,
adherent to conventional middle-class attitudes, ethnocentric, and had the
potential to express prejudiced views of minority out-groups, such as Jews.
Adorno et al. (1950) drew on Freudian theory and attributed the development of
the authoritarian personality to punitive child-rearing practices (which would
lead to an unresolved conflict between the child and their authoritarian parents),
and suggested that under particular social conditions authoritarians could
potentially become fascists (see Roiser & Willig, 2002, for a review).
On the surface, the theory of the authoritarian personality provided a
succinct and credible theory of inter-group conflict: people who are brought up
in a psychologically harmful way can go on to develop a ‘personality style’ that
would motivate them to endorse a set of values which included the derogation
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of out-groups and adherence to the rules imposed by in-group authority figures.
However, the reality was not so straightforward. For example, in a broad
critique of individualism in social psychology, Tajfel (1978a) criticised the
authoritarian personality when he noted that large proportions of national and
religious groups have displayed extreme out-group hostility (e.g., genocide)
even though all group members are unlikely to be authoritarians (or indeed to
have uniformly received punitive upbringings). More recently, it has been
demonstrated that individual personality measures (including measures of
authoritarianism) did not significantly predict the level of inter-group
discrimination displayed by participants who were asked to carry out an
allocation task using the minimal group paradigm (Reynolds, Turner, Haslam,
Ryan, Bizumic & Subasic, 2007; see the following section for an overview of the
minimal group paradigm). This shows that inter-group discrimination is not
simply reducible to individual personality differences – a finding that will be
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter (see section 3.5.1).
Other individualistic theories of inter-group behaviour focussed their
attention on unconscious processes (e.g. the frustration-aggression hypothesis;
Berkowitz, 1989; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939 - see Tajfel,
1978a for a critical review). Although these theories will not be reviewed in
detail here, it is worthwhile to note that in focussing on unconscious processes,
which are located within individuals, they too overlooked the historical context of
inter-group relations, the meaning that group membership might have for an
individual perceiver, and how it might shape their behaviour.
Whilst these theories framed inter-group hostility as an individual-level
construct, a body of work began to highlight the importance of group-level
process in the development of conflict between groups. For example, in their
classic series of studies, Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1954/1961)
designed an elaborate paradigm to test a series of research questions relating
to intra-group and inter-group processes.
The first question was whether a group of previously unacquainted
individuals would develop a hierarchical group structure after taking part in
collective activities and sharing common goals. The second question was
dependent upon the first being answered positively. That is, if groups were to
form when individuals worked together for common goals, would two groups
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formed in such away behave with hostility towards each other when faced with
a situation of inter-group competition for resources which would result in
success for one team and failure for the other team (leading to frustration due to
being deprived from luxury items). They also questioned whether hostile
attitudes held towards the out-group would become standardised within the in-
group.
To address these questions, Sherif et al. (1954/1961) selected 24 boys to
take part in a summer camp, called the Robbers Cave. The boys were matched
for age (approximately twelve years old), socio-economic status (lower middle-
class), religious background (Protestant), and other personal variables, such as
educational achievement, and social adjustment (they were all well-adjusted
insofar as they did not have a history of behavioural problems in school, at
home, or in the neighbourhood).
The boys were split into two groups by the experimenters for phase one of
the study. The groups were kept apart and were unaware of each other’s
presence. Both of the groups worked on several tasks (such as obtaining food,
water or other necessary items), for which success depended on within-group
co-operation. The researchers made extensive notes on the behaviours
exhibited by each of the groups (see Sherif et al., 1954/1961). It was found that
both of the groups formed into cohesive units. They gave themselves names
(the Eagles and the Rattlers), they developed a hierarchical structure (with a
clear leader, but less well-defined subordinate roles), and they developed their
own group rules, group norms, and even adopted a group song. Group
members who deviated from the standardised rules were either ignored by their
fellow group members or challenged, sometimes through the use of mocking
behaviour.
Towards the end of the first phase of the study, both of the groups became
aware of the presence of the other group and displayed an eagerness to
engage them in competition. The experimenters utilised this desire for
competition to introduce the second phase of the experiment, in which the
Eagles and Rattlers were pitted against each other in a multi-event competition,
which lasted for five days. The events included tug-of-war, baseball, and a
treasure hunt, whilst the prizes included a trophy and much-coveted pocket
knives for the victors. The competition began in relatively good spirits, with the
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winning teams in the early events applauding the losing side with three cheers
and so on. However, as the competition progressed, inter-group behaviour
became more hostile. For example, the groups verbally abused each other with
insults and derogatory songs, while the Eagles burned the Rattler flag and the
Rattlers raided the Eagles’ cabin in retaliation. Eventually both groups refused
to eat in the mess hall when the other group was present. When the boys were
asked to rate their opposition, members of both groups tended to rate their
opposition unfavourably (although there was not perfect uniformity in each of
the individuals’ negative attitudes and behaviours). This demonstrates that
there was at least a trend for hostility in both the attitudes and behaviours of the
in-group towards the out-group.
However, the third research questions of interest to Sherif et al. was
whether a contextual shift could lead to a reduction of inter-group conflict. To
address this question, the experimenters set up a range of tasks that involved
brief interactions between the members of the two groups (the boys tried to
resist this enforced interaction at first). The two groups were then faced with a
series of problems, which they needed to work on collectively (as finding a
solution would benefit both of the groups). In other words, they were faced with
a series of superordinate goals (see also Sherif, 1958). These goals included
fixing the water system so they could quench their thirst, or working together to
pull a ‘stalled’ truck, which was carrying their food. Although at first the boys
continued to act with hostility towards the out-group, signs of reconciliation soon
became apparent. The boys recommenced eating at the same time, even
mixing with the out-group at the dinner table. They also began to engage in
light-hearted inter-group banter and play. To corroborate these observational
findings, the boys were again asked to complete questionnaires designed to
assess their attitudes towards the out-group. Whilst there was still considerable
evidence of prejudice, it was found that ratings of the out-group became
significantly more favourable than those obtained at the end of the second
phase of the study, and hence demonstrates that the introduction of
superordinate goals successfully reduced inter-group hostility to some extent.
The Robbers Cave experiment demonstrated that group behaviour is by
no means the consequence of being at the mercy of the ‘collective mind’, as
proposed by Le Bon, nor is it an exacerbation of individual properties, as argued
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by Allport. Rather, it seems that individuals acted in accordance to group
memberships. The group memberships were psychologically real and
meaningful; norms, rules, flags and rituals defined the identities and shaped
behaviour. It was also evident that the behaviours and attitudes held by each of
the groups were influenced by the presence of a second group and the
contextually determined nature of the interaction between the groups. In other
words, intra-group and inter-group interaction, and the contextual backdrop to
that interaction, shaped the behaviours exhibited, and the attitudes held by each
of the groups.
The Robbers Cave studies led to the development of Realistic Conflict
Theory (RCT; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Sherif et al., 1961), which can be seen as a
contrast to the individualistic theories of inter-group behaviour that were
discussed above. Central to RCT was the hypothesis that competition for
scarce resources (for example, the medals and prizes in the Robbers Cave
study, or alternatively power, wealth or prestige in everyday examples of inter-
group conflict) between opposing groups acts as a precursor to inter-group
conflict. Thus, according to the theory, real situations of group conflict motivate
people to identify with their in-group and work together against the out-group to
attain a relevant, but scarce, resource. When opposing groups are then
brought together to work for a goal, which requires between-group co-operation
(a superordinate goal), conflict between the groups will be reduced (Sherif,
1958).
What becomes immediately clear is that RCT offered a refreshing
alternative to the individualistic approaches. Group conflict was hypothesised in
terms of real, contextually determined group relations as opposed to individual
differences or human ‘dispositions’. It demonstrated that anyone, as opposed
to only those who received punitive upbringings, or experienced frustration,
could express discriminatory behaviour in favour of an in-group over an out-
group.
Although RCT provided an excellent starting point in the development of a
social psychological theory of inter-group processes, a classic, and extremely
influential series of studies conducted by Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament
(1971) exposed its limitations and in part, led to the development of the social
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identity approach to inter-group relations. This series of studies will be outlined
in the following section.
3.3 The minimal group paradigm
Some of the studies described in the preceding section demonstrated the
impact that group formation could have on the behaviours and perceptions of
the individual perceivers within that group. Others demonstrated how group-
formation can, under certain conditions, lead to inter-group conflict, and under
other conditions, lead to inter-group reconciliation. However, one of the most
important findings leading to the development of the social identity approach to
inter-group relations emerged from the classic series of experiments carried out
by Tajfel et al. (1971). Tajfel et al. were investigating the minimal conditions
under which inter-group discrimination might occur. Male pupils from a state
comprehensive school were randomly divided into categories based on trivial
criteria such as their estimation of how many dots were in a series of rapidly
presented patterns, or their aesthetic preference for artwork by the artists Klee
or Kandinsky. Having been randomly assigned to one of these minimal
categories, participants were given the opportunity to anonymously allocate
money between two other participants. The other participants’ personal
identities were hidden – they were simply identified as participants who had
been assigned to either the same or different minimal category as the
participant allocating the rewards. Participants were informed that their
monetary allocations would have no bearing on their own financial outcomes, as
their own rewards would depend upon the allocation assigned to them by
another (anonymous) participant. Thus, they had no personal stake in their
allocations.
The emergent findings provided a powerful demonstration that the mere
categorization of participants into novel and relatively unimportant groups was
sufficient to create discriminatory behaviour in favour of the in-group. While
there was evidence of a ‘fairness’ norm – a tendency to distribute rewards
equally – the experimenters observed that participants also tended to award
more money to an anonymous in-group member than they did to an anonymous
out-group member. In addition, participants sacrificed the opportunity to
maximise absolute profits for (a) fellow in-group members, and (b) all of the
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participants taking part in the study, in favour of a relative financial victory by the
in-group over the out-group. This led Tajfel et al. (1971) to conclude that
relative advantage for the in-group over the out-group was more important to
the participants than “simple [absolute] material gain for the ingroup” (p. 176).
Importantly, the participants in Tajfel et al.’s experiments were acquainted prior
to their participation in the study (as they were children from the same school).
Thus, the opportunity to maximise reward for a group of people who were
historically bound together by their attendance at the same school was
overshadowed by the desire to reward anonymous others based on a novel and
minimal group categorization (Tajfel et al., 1971).
These conclusions were strengthened when Allen and Wilder (1975)
tested the belief similarity theory of discrimination (Rokeach, Smith, & Evans,
1960). Rokeach et al. (1960) had proposed that favouritism toward the in-group
over the out-group resulted from the assumption that in-group members will
hold similar beliefs to a person’s own beliefs, whereas out-group members’
beliefs will differ from their own. Allen and Wilder (1975) used a 2 x 2 design to
manipulate (a) group membership (based on painting preference), and (b)
similarity (based on an attitude questionnaire). An overall tendency to favour
the in-group over the out-group was observed. However, while an increase in
perceived in-group similarity led to more in-group bias than perceived in-group
dissimilarity, there was not a significant effect of out-group similarity on reward
allocations. Thus, group categorization rather than similarity had the greatest
effect on the discriminatory behaviour.
While this study provided evidence against the belief similarity theory of
discrimination, an alternative interpretation could be that the participants
displayed in-group favouritism due to perceived similarity on the relevant
performance domain (aesthetic preference) as opposed to the beliefs measured
by the attitudinal scale.
However, Brewer and Silver (1978) explicitly told participants that the
allocation to categories needed to be on a random basis due to all participants
expressing similar preferences on the initial performance task. Participants
again displayed inter-group discrimination in favour of the in-group. Therefore,
the suggestion that participants may have allocated money to in-group
members due to performance similarities on the relevant domains within the
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procedure (dot estimations or aesthetic preference) had been eliminated, and
further strengthened the suggestion that group categorization per se may be
sufficient for inter-group discrimination to emerge.
The finding that inter-group discrimination emerged following the division
of participants into minimal categories posed problems for RCT. As noted by
Tajfel and Turner (1979), RCT made a laudable contribution to the theorising of
inter-group processes by highlighting the contextual, realistic, and normative
nature of group processes. However, they pointed out that the conflict in
Sherif’s studies was institutionalised (implemented by the camp authority
figures), made explicit (and therefore a major part of the groups’ everyday
lives), and objective (insofar as one of the groups had to win whereas the other
group had to lose). Each of these elements were absent from the minimal
group studies, yet inter-group discrimination still occurred, indicating that
institutionalised, explicit, and objective competition were sufficient, but not
necessary conditions for inter-group discrimination (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
3.4 Social identity theory
Although formally presented in 1979, the ideas central to social identity theory
(SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) were developed in a series of essays and
papers that were written by Henri Tajfel and John Turner during the 1960s and
1970s (e.g., Tajfel, 1969, 1974, 1975; Turner, 1975). The theory was devised
to explain the conditions underlying social change – i.e., how, when and why
subordinate groups might resist oppression and seek to change the status quo.
As a theory of inter-group processes, SIT could explain the minimal group
findings in the absence of institutionalised, explicit and objective competition –
each of which were present in the Robbers Cave studies. When developing SIT,
Tajfel and Turner (1979) drew on one of the main observations implicit in Sherif
et al.’s work on inter-group conflict: competition between groups for scarce
resources can lead to identification with an in-group, which might in turn lead to
discrimination against an out-group. Tajfel and Turner (1979) felt that RCT’s
failure to explain the psychological processes responsible for this apparent
identification process (coupled with its inability to explain the minimal group
findings) rendered it incomplete, and subsequently used it as a starting point for
the development of SIT.
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One of the fundamental propositions of SIT is that human social interaction
operates on a continuum, ranging from interpersonal behaviour to inter-group
behaviour. Interpersonal behaviour refers to the social interaction of individuals
purely in terms of their individual selves, in a situation that is not influenced by
their memberships of social categories. In contrast to this, inter-group
behaviour relates to the social interaction of individuals based purely on their
memberships of various social categories, in a situation in which inter-individual
relationships have no bearing on the interaction.
Tajfel and Turner (1979) acknowledged that examples of behaviours at
either extreme are rare (although they used soldiers on opposing sides during a
battle as an example of behaviour nearing the inter-group extreme, and the
relationship between husband and wife as an example nearing the interpersonal
end of the continuum). However, they stated that movement along the
continuum towards either extreme would determine whether a social interaction
would be conducted at an interpersonal or inter-group level.
According to SIT, when group formation occurs, members of a given group
(or social category) will act in accordance to a social identity, which can be
defined as an individual’s “knowledge that he belongs to certain social groups
together with some emotional and value significance to him of his membership”
(Tajfel, 1974, p. 72). People will have a desire to see the groups with which
they identify in a positive light, and one way of doing so is to compare their own
groups with out-groups who can act as a point of reference. If a person is not
satisfied with a particular social identity, they will either try to leave the group, or
if unable or unwilling to do so, they will attempt to differentiate their own groups
from relevant out-groups in a way that maintains or establishes positive
distinctiveness.
A second fundamental aspect of SIT relates to how people perceive the
social structure of the society in which they live, and more specifically, the
relationship between social groups within their society. Tajfel and Turner (1979)
introduced a second continuum anchored by a social mobility belief system at
one and a social change belief system at the other. The social mobility system
refers to an individual’s belief that there is scope for them to change between
social groups within society. In other words, they perceive group boundaries to
be permeable and believe that through a variety of means (which can include
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effort, ability, money etc.), they will be able to gain social mobility. The
contrasting belief system – that of social change – refers to the idea that people
perceive society as rigidly stratified, and therefore established in a way that
makes it impossible (or at least extremely difficult) to move (as an individual)
from a group that causes them dissatisfaction. This could be due to social
constraints (e.g., in a caste system), legal constraints, or personal constraints
(e.g., not wishing to be perceived as a ‘traitor’). According to Tajfel and Turner
(1979), “The major characteristic of social behaviour related to this belief
system is that, in the relevant intergroup situations, individuals will not interact
as individuals, on the basis of their individual characteristics or interpersonal
relationships, but as members of their groups standing in certain defined
relationships to members of other groups” (p. 35, emphasis in original).
Therefore, when people hold social change beliefs and are dissatisfied with an
element of their standing in society, they will work as a group to alter the status
quo rather than move as individuals to alter their own individual status.
In the original formulation of SIT, Tajfel and Turner (1979) highlighted
three variables which would determine whether individuals will strive for positive
distinctiveness for their group. First, they must perceive their group
membership as being part of their self-concept. Second, the dimension of
comparison should match the comparative context. And third, the comparison
group should be seen to be relevant (where relevance is in part determined by
similarity, proximity, and situational salience).
When these conditions are satisfied and when group relations are
operating towards the end of the continuum anchored by social change beliefs,
positive distinctiveness can be maintained or achieved via a variety of group-
level methods. The method employed will depend on the perceived status of an
in-group (high or low) and the relationships between the in-group and relevant
out-groups, which can be secure (legitimate or stable) or insecure (illegitimate
or unstable). One such method is through the use of social creativity, which
can be broken down further into three parts. First, people may change the
dimension for comparison to one that is more favourable to the in-group.
Second, the meaning of values assigned to a particular group can be altered to
show that group in a more positive light. And third, a different group can be
used as a frame of reference. An alternative method used for countering a
69
negative social identity, or maintaining a positive social identity, is engaging in
social competition in an attempt to change the status quo. It is hypothesised
that this strategy will be employed when the relations between groups are
perceived to be insecure and therefore susceptible to change following direct
competition. When the social mobility belief system is operating, members of
both high and low status groups who are experiencing threats to their social
identity can attain positive social identity by moving to a new group when group
boundaries are perceived to be permeable. This method of achieving positive
distinctiveness is referred to as individual mobility (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
An important implication of these aspects of SIT is that social interaction is
contextually determined. Firstly, contextual factors such as the presence (or
absence) of a particular social identity at a particular time, will determine where
on the inter-personal - inter-group continuum a person, or group of people will
see themselves and others, which will in turn influence the nature of their
interaction. Secondly, societal structures (which are subject to change) and an
individual’s beliefs about those structures (which are also subject to change) will
influence how people see the world around them, and subsequently how they
will define and interact with other people; namely, whether those interactions
will be on an interpersonal or inter-group level. The implications of these
continua do not end here. According to SIT, when actions are near the social
change and inter-group poles of the continua, uniformity in group members’
actions towards an out-group will increase, while out-group members will be
perceived and treated “as undifferentiated items in a unified social category,
rather than in terms of their individual characteristics” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.
36). However, as interactions move towards the social mobility and
interpersonal poles, the out-group will be perceived as heterogeneous, and
therefore actions towards them will become more varied.
A theoretical framework has now been provided which allows a basic
understanding of inter-individual and group-based human interaction. Although
the above discussion of SIT is relatively brief, it is clear that the theory provided
a framework from which to understand the minimal group findings. For
participants in Tajfel et al.’s (1971) studies, the only way of attaining positive
distinctiveness was to discriminate on behalf of one’s group on the only
available dimension for comparison: the monetary rewards allocated to either
70
group. Therefore, it makes theoretical sense that rather than maximising gains
for their own group, participants allocated money in a way that ensured a
maximum relative advantage for their own group over the out-group.
The basic theoretical underpinnings of SIT have now been presented and
applied to the minimal group findings, and an explanation of the wider
implications of the theory have also been made clear (for a real-world
application of SIT see Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Williams, 1986; or for
a review of applications to organisations, see Haslam, 2004). Before drawing
the current discussion of SIT to a close, it is important to make clear that the
theory in no way states that in-group bias is an inevitable, nor automatic,
cognitive response to group membership (Haslam, 2004; Hornsey, 2008;
Turner, 1999). Contextual features, such as those outlined above (e.g., the
comparative relevance of the out-group and the dimension for comparison, as
well as perceived legitimacy of status hierarchies) and the contextually defined
pre-existing relationship between various social categories, will help to
determine the existence, nature, and extent of discrimination between groups.
3.5 Self-categorization theory
SIT provided a theoretical framework for explaining inter-group phenomena and
a preliminary explanation of the processes underlying behaviour at the
interpersonal and inter-group extremes of interaction. However, the theory did
not offer an elaboration of the socio-cognitive processes underpinning the shift
along the interpersonal-inter-group continuum, nor did it provide a detailed
analysis of behaviour within a social category, or in other words, intra-group
behaviour. As a result, questions remained unanswered regarding how, when,
and why a person might actually come to define themselves in terms of a
particular social group (rather than as individuals). As a result, John Turner –
one of the original authors of SIT – along with his colleagues, devised self-
categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, &
McGarty, 1994).
While closely linked, and often subsumed under the umbrella heading of
the social identity approach, SCT and SIT are separate theories, although
complementary (Turner et al., 1987). According to SCT, self-categorizations
are cognitive representations which are based on intra-class similarities and
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inter-class differences. People can either self-categorize according to their own
distinct personal identity, or according to any one of a number of social
identities, which are shared with other people who can be either real or
imagined, absent or present. Thus, personal identity is based on a person’s
individual qualities and their differences from other individuals, whereas social
identity is based on similarities with other in-group members and differences
from members of other categories.
While SIT viewed interpersonal and inter-group interaction as polar
opposites, SCT suggests that self-categorizations are structured hierarchically.
At the top of the hierarchy is the class that is all-inclusive – that is, all human
beings – which is also known as the superordinate level of abstraction. At this
level of identification, which can be referred to as human identity, similarities
between humans and their differences (as a group) from alternative species will
dominate the cognitive aspect of the self-concept. The next level down the
hierarchy is the intermediate level, which is also known as social identity. At the
intermediate level, the similarities between people within social groups (of which
there are a potentially infinite number), and their differences from people
belonging to other social groups are important for a person’s cognitive
representation of self. Finally, the subordinate level of abstraction, which sits at
the bottom of the hierarchy, refers to personal identity. At this level, differences
between an individual (in terms of a wide range of personal qualities) and other
in-group individuals are at the forefront of a person’s self-definition. Like SIT,
SCT views the salience of social identity and personal identity as operating on a
continuum. SCT predicts that more than one level of identity, and more than
one category, can be salient at any one time, which contrasts with the bipolar
structure outlined in SIT. However, despite this concept of a multi-layered self,
SCT predicts that one identity (i.e., level and content) will usually prevail. As
pointed out by Turner et al. (1987), the hierarchy refers only to levels of
inclusiveness (from all humans down to the individual alone), rather than being
representative of categories in order of importance with regards to ‘true’
reflections of self.
The basic structure of self-categorisation, according to SCT, has now been
described. However, it is still not clear how people actually come to categorize
themselves in terms of a particular identity, be it social or personal. Based on
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the ideas of Bruner (1957) and Rosch (1978), SCT proposes several interacting
processes underlying categorisation. The first of these is the perceiver’s
readiness to categorise according to a particular identity. Readiness depends
on the perceiver’s past experiences and personal values, as well as their goals,
motives, and needs within a particular context (Turner et al., 1994). The
perceiver is therefore active rather than passive when self-categorising.
SCT proposes that categorization relies on an interaction between the
processes of perceiver readiness and the extent to which a particular category
‘fits’ in a particular context. Fit can be broken down further into two parts. The
first part is termed comparative fit and encompasses the metacontrast principle,
which was central to SCT in its early formulation. The metacontrast principle
refers to the ratio of intra-group differences to inter-group differences. When an
aggregate of stimuli (in this case people) are evaluated by a perceiver, they will
be classified as a group (or an entity), when the average differences between
people within the aggregate are perceived to be less than the average
differences between that aggregate and an alternative aggregate which is being
used as a frame of reference (Turner, 1999; Turner et al., 1987; Turner et al.,
1994). ‘Difference’ will be assessed on a contextually relevant domain. An
important implication of the metacontrast principle is that groups or entities are
highly dynamic and depend on a combination of situational variables and a
perceiver’s subjective interpretation of those variables. Who is included in a
perceiver’s in-group/s, or whether the perceiver believes a group is present at
all, will depend on the comparisons they make and the culturally available
frames of reference.
The second aspect of fit is called normative fit. This refers to the reality of
a situation matching a perceiver’s normative expectations of a social category.
In other words, a person, or a group of people, are more likely to be categorized
as a group when their features (such as their behaviour, appearance or
attitudes) are congruent with the perceiver’s expectations of that particular
group. For example, men displaying behaviours that are understood within a
culture to be normative of men (in contrast to women) are more likely to be
categorized as men, that those who are displaying behaviours that are
incongruent with cultural understanding of ‘manliness’.
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A large body of research has supported the idea of normative fit impacting
upon categorizations (e.g., Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991; Turner et al. 1987).
In one such example, Blanz and Aufderheide (1999) presented participants with
statements that were supposedly made by either a psychology student or a
medical student. The statements related to attitudes towards alternative
medicine. Pre-testing showed that people expected psychology students to be
relatively pro-alternative medicine, and medical students to be relatively anti-
alternative medicine. Therefore, participants were presented with a statement
that was either normative (psychology student pro-alternative medicine/medical
student anti-alternative medicine) or counter-normative (psychology student
anti-alternative medicine/medical student pro-alternative medicine).
Participants were then asked to rate whether the participants’ opinions were
due to their individual personalities or whether they were due to the subject that
they studied. For both psychology students and medical students, participants
attributed the views to individual differences when they were counter-normative,
whereas they attributed their views to their social category membership when
they were normative of that social category. This demonstrated that even when
the possibility to consider behaviour in terms of a social category is present,
people are reluctant to do so unless the behaviour fits in with their own beliefs
about how a member of a particular group should be behaving.
According to SCT, when the processes of perceiver readiness and
category fit make a social identity salient to a perceiver, their self-concept will
become depersonalized. In other words, the perceiver will define themselves in
terms of a social identity (‘we’ and ‘us’) as opposed to their personal identity (‘I’
and ‘me’) (Turner, 1999). Depersonalization is central to SCT as it underlies
group behaviour. It is argued that when depersonalized, people will self-
stereotype according to a prototypical view of both the in-group and out-group.
For example, in a study conducted by Onorato and Turner (2004), male and
female participants were evaluated to assess the extent to which they thought
of themselves as dependant or independent (or in other words, whether they
possessed a dependant or independent self-schema, as defined by Markus,
1977). According to the authors, dependence is thought of as a typically female
trait whereas independence is thought to be a typically male trait. It was found
that making the male identity salient to men and the female identity salient to
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women led participants to rate themselves in a way that was congruent with the
stereotypical view of their gender, even if this view contradicted the participants’
personal self-schemas. To elaborate, male participants with a dependant self-
schema when their personal identity was salient rated themselves as
independent when their male identity was salient, and vice versa for female
participants. Thus, depersonalization led participants to endorse contrasting
views of the self, which were context dependent.
Turner (1999) elaborated on the implications of the depersonalization
process in the following quote: “At certain times the subjective self is defined
and experienced as identical, equivalent, similar to or interchangeable with a
social class of people in contrast to some other class. Psychologically, the
social collectivity becomes self” (p. 12, emphasis added). The importance of
the above quote should not be understated as Turner et al. (1994, p. 456) have
also suggested that the “metacontrast principle is explicit that categorising is
inherently comparative and hence is intrinsically variable, fluid, and relative to
the frame of reference. It is always context dependent”. Therefore, the
distinction between who is ‘self’ and who is ‘other’ is also contextually
determined and subject to change.
To use an anecdotal example, consider a group of football fans watching a
televised match in a pub. If the collective consists of fans of rival teams from
the English Premier league who are playing against each other, self-
categorization processes might lead the individual perceivers to consider
supporters of their own team to be ‘one of us’ and hence a part of ‘self’,
whereas supporters of the of the rival team will become ‘other’. These
disparate social identities – let’s say they are Tottenham Hotspur supporters
and Arsenal supporters – will be made salient by contextual factors such as the
colours worn and chants being vocalised (normative fit). As a result, Tottenham
fans might think of themselves in terms of their historically and contextually
determined similarities to other Tottenham fans and their differences from
Arsenal fans, whilst the Arsenal fans will think of themselves in terms of their
similarities to fellow supporters of their team and their differences from the
opposition. However, a simple shift in context can lead to an important change.
If the same group of people had gathered to watch England play an
international match, a more inclusive social identity (that of England fan) might
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become salient. That is, the England shirts and chants in the context of a
match against another national team will lead all of the fans to think of
themselves in terms of their similarities to other England fans and their
differences from supporters of other national teams. As a result, those people
who had previously been thought of as ‘other’ will now become a part of ‘self’.
Now that the basic principles of self-categorization theory have been
discussed, a clearer picture of the processes underlying group behaviour has
emerged. A combination of a perceiver’s attributes, contextual features, and
the attributes of others present determine whether a person will self-categorize
according to a personal identity or any one of a potentially infinite number of
social identities. Consequently, who is seen as self or other can be highly
variable.
3.5.1 Applications of SCT: Group and ‘individual’ phenomena
The development of SCT has served as the catalyst to a vast and diverse body
of related research. It has been used to explain a range of group processes,
including group cohesiveness (e.g., Turner et al., 1987; see Hogg, 1993, for a
review), group commitment (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997, 1999), minority
and majority influence (e.g., David & Turner, 2001), and group polarization (e.g.,
Hogg, Turner, & Davidson, 1990). However, the theory has also been applied
to diverse areas in which group-level processes were not widely implicated
previously. These include: pro-social behaviour (Levine, Prosser, Evans, &
Reicher, 2005; Stürmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005), coping with stress (Haslam,
O’Brien, Jetten, Vormedal, & Penna, 2005; Haslam, Jetten, O’Brien, & Jacobs,
2004; Haslam & Reicher, 2006), the perceived severity of the hypothetical
symptoms of illness (Levine and Reicher, 1996; Levine, 1999) and the
symptoms of people who were actually ill (St. Claire, Clift, & Dumbelton, 2008).
The ‘personality’ domain provides another example of SCT being applied
to an area of social psychology that was previously dominated by individualistic
theorising. For example, trait theorists describe personality as universally
reducible to a number of factors (clusters of traits) and provide a framework
from which to examine the extent to which individuals differ on each of these
factors (e.g. Costa & McCrea, 1992). Likewise, theories of the prejudiced
personality have tended to take an individualistic stance and also suggest that
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prejudice is an expression of a stable personality trait. One example of this is
the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950), which was outlined earlier in
this chapter. More recent theoretical approaches to the prejudiced personality
include right-wing authoritarianism (RWA: Altemeyer, 1996) and social
dominance orientation (SDO: e.g., Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).
RWA focuses on the covariation of three attitudinal clusters: authoritarian
submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism, whereas SDO
discusses the level of acceptance of inequality between social groups. Like
Adorno et al. (1950), Altemeyer (1996) claimed that a prejudiced personality
stems from childhood experiences, whilst Pratto et al. (1994) attributed SDO to
an evolved, predisposed, biological drive to form hierarchical social systems.
By suggesting that unconscious, socialised, or biological factors underlie
personality, it is implied that it is largely resistant to change. This view has been
challenged by theorists such as Mischel (2004), who has claimed that a
person’s cognitive representation of their self in a particular context will
determine their behaviour in that context (which accounts for variable
expressions of personality, but still implies context dependant consistency).
However, Mischel’s focus remained firmly on the individual perceiver, and
largely ignored the role of group-level processes.
This focus on the individual creates a problem for theories of prejudice –
especially the prejudiced personality. Prejudice involves negative feelings
towards a person or group of people based on their membership of certain
groups, which can in turn lead to discriminatory behaviour against those people.
It is therefore very much a group-based phenomenon, which is sometimes
explained in terms of individual personality traits. Reynolds, Turner, Haslam,
and Ryan (2001) examined the relationship between authoritarianism and
prejudice in a variety of contexts. Participants were asked to complete
measures of RWA and prejudice (in the form the Modern Racism Scale, MRS:
McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981) in one of five conditions: a control
condition (no identity specifically made salient), when self categorized according
to their personal identity, or when self-categorized according to one of three
social identities (nationality, gender, or age). They found that the level of self-
categorization salient to the participants when completing the measures
affected the subsequent relationship between authoritarianism and prejudice.
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To elaborate, while there was a significant positive correlation between RWA
and prejudice in the control condition, and when the participants’ gender and
age were salient, the correlation was far weaker when personal identity was
salient, and non-existent when their national (Australian) identity was salient.
These findings clearly demonstrate the influence that group-based, context-
specific ideologies can exert over the relationship between RWA and prejudice.
This in turn poses serious problems for theorists who view the prejudice as an
individual’s ‘fixed’ personality.
Turner, Reynolds, Haslam and Veenstra (2006) have suggested that SCT
provides the theoretical framework from which to understand these group-based
variations in the relationship between RWA and prejudice, and indeed the
prejudiced personality more generally. Central to this is the idea that when
depersonalized, people are guided by their membership to particular social
categories and their interchangeability with other group members rather than by
their own idiosyncratic motives. Their understanding of what it means to be
English or Australian will vary depending on their existing theories of what each
identity means, and also with whom they are comparing themselves against. In
other words, the finding that RWA was not correlated with prejudice when
participants’ Australian identity was salient can be attributed to the fact that
participants were asked to consider Australians in contrast to Americans. The
social norm of Australians being less prejudiced than Americans then minimised
the relationship between RWA and prejudice (Reynolds et al., 2001).
To do justice to the entire range of applications of SCT would be
impossible within the scope of this discussion. Therefore, a high degree of
selectivity has been required. The reason for revisiting and focussing on the
prejudiced personality was twofold. First, it provided an opportunity to highlight
the powerful challenge that the inception of SCT brought to mainstream social
psychological thought and the subsequent impact that it has had on our
understanding. Second, it is felt that demonstrating the value of applying a
theory which describes social perception in terms of a depersonalized self to an
area previously discussed in terms of individuals’ idiosyncrasies, will highlight
the potential value of applying that same theoretical framework to spatial and
crowding behaviours.
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3.5.2 Applying SCT to crowd behaviour
While the current body of work will attempt to bring a self-categorization
perspective to crowding and spatial phenomena, the application of SCT to
crowd behaviour is by no means novel. A series of laboratory and field studies
spanning more than 25 years have applied social identity principles to many
crowd-related behaviours, some of which will be discussed in the following
section.
As already discussed in this chapter, many of the early group theories
used the crowd as a special case of group behaviour (e.g., Allport, 1924; Le
Bon, 1895/1968). These theoretical approaches to crowd psychology have
been heavily criticised. For example, both Le Bon’s ‘group mind’ approach and
Allport’s individualistic approach have been critiqued for divorcing instances of
crowd behaviour from the social context in which they are observed (see
Reicher, 2001). Reicher (2001) criticised these approaches further for their
implication that people in crowds experience a form of identity loss, and
ultimately become generically destructive.
While both approaches could be dismissed as a product of their time, their
impact – particularly that of Le Bon – should not be understated. Take the
concept of deindividuation (first described by Festinger, Pepitone, &
Newcombe, 1952) as an example. Not to be mistaken for depersonalization
(the shift from personal identity to a social identity that is central to SCT),
deindividuation refers to a situation whereby being immersed in a group or
crowd leads to anonymity, which in turn lowers self-awareness and hence,
behavioural control. In turn, crowd members feel unconstrained by social
norms (such as order and restraint) and instead act ‘anti-normatively’. In other
words, they become more destructive. For example, in a series of studies
conducted by Zimbardo (1969), participants were more likely to administer
‘electric shocks’ to a confederate for longer when they were ‘deindividuated’
(asked to wear lab coats and hoods) as opposed to when their identity was
visible to the others co-present (they wore normal clothes and a name badge).
There have been three elaborations of deindividuation theory following
Festinger et al.’s original formulation (e.g., Diener, 1980; Prentice-Dunn &
Rogers, 1989; Zimbardo, 1969). However, Reicher (2001) has observed that
each of these elaborations share common themes – i.e., they all state that (1)
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only personal identity underpins rational behaviour, (2) the loss of personal
identity (and the standards of rationality that come with it) will therefore
inevitably lead to uncontrolled behaviour, and (3) that being in a large group or
crowd will lead to deindividuation (the loss of personal identity), and hence
facilitate destructiveness. Thus, almost 100 years after first coming to light, Le
Bon’s ideas were still being perpetuated by social psychologists at the forefront
of group and crowd theory.
A laboratory study by Johnson and Downing (1979) challenged the idea
that the loss of individuality, and the anonymity of action, served as precursors
to destructive, anti-social behaviour. In a 2 x 2 design, participants were led to
believe that they were taking part in an experiment in groups of four people.
They were dressed either in ‘anti-social’ costumes (baggy overalls and masks,
which were reminiscent of the costume worn by the Ku Klux Klan, and also the
costumes used by Zimbardo, 1969), or in ‘pro-social’ costumes (nurses’
uniforms), and presented with a task in which they were required to administer
‘electric shocks’ to another person when that person failed to provide the correct
answer during a learning task. Participants were allowed to choose the level of
shock that the other person received. In the ‘individuation’ condition,
participants believed that the amount of shock, and who was administering it,
was visible to all other participants, whereas in the ‘deindividuation’ condition,
the level of shock, and who was administering it was completely anonymous.
The findings raised serious questions for ‘deindividuation’ theory. Firstly,
participants dressed in the Ku Klux Klan-like costume administered higher
levels of shock than those dressed as nurses. Secondly, ‘deindividuated’
participants did not simply administer higher levels of shock than those who
were ‘individuated’. Rather, an interaction between the type of costume worn,
and whether the action was anonymous, was observed. ‘Deindividuation’ led to
more anti-social behaviour when participants were dressed in the anti-social
costume, but led to more pro-social behaviour (i.e., reduced electric shocks,
below the baseline) when they were dressed in the pro-social costume. This
suggests that participants acted according to social cues associated with each
of the costumes, rather than as an effect of being ‘deindividuated’.
Johnson and Downing’s (1979) study provided one example of group-level
social cues influencing behaviour when individuals are ‘deinidividuated’. A
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further example can be found in the first laboratory study designed to test social
identity principles using a deindividuation paradigm (Reicher, 1984a). Reicher
(1984a) recruited science and social science students for the study, which used
a 2 x 2 x 2 design. The participants were told that the study was investigating
attitude-behaviour consistency and that they were either being assessed as a
group or as individuals. For participants in the group conditions, the room was
arranged so that science students sat together at one table, whereas social
science students sat together at another table. For participants in the individual
condition, the chairs were arranged in rows and science and social science
students were intermingled. Participants took part in the study either in their
normal clothes (identifiable) or in baggy overalls and masks (anonymous). The
participants in the group-anonymous condition wore coloured masks (red for
one group, white for the other), whilst all those in the individual-anonymous
condition wore white masks. The participants watched a video of scientists and
social scientists presenting arguments about vivisection, with members of each
group consistently presenting normative arguments (scientists were consistently
pro-vivisection and social scientists consistently anti-vivisection). It was
predicted that group boundaries would be clearest for participants who were in
the anonymous-group condition and so their social identity would be most
salient. Furthermore, it was predicted that due to the increased identity salience
for participants in this condition, they would be most likely to express opinions
and behaviours consistent with their own group’s norms in a subsequent task.
A clear effect of group on attitudes emerged. Science students who took
part in the group condition were more likely to express pro-vivisection attitudes
than those in the individual condition, whereas social science students were
more likely to express anti-vivisection attitudes when they were in a group of
social scientists as opposed to intermingled with scientists and social scientists.
The effect of anonymity was less clear, but still lent support to a social identity
explanation of so-called deindividuation effects. To elaborate, the interaction
between anonymity and immersion in a group was not significant for social
science students. However, for science students, whilst there was not a
significant difference in attitudes towards vivisection for participants in the group
and individual (intermingled) condition when they wore their own clothes,
participants in the group condition expressed stronger pro-vivisection attitudes
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than did those in the individual condition when participants were anonymous.
Therefore, anonymity coupled with a clear physical distinction between the in-
group and the out-group enhanced social identity salience and led to stronger
endorsement of attitudes that were consistent with in-group norms.
Further criticism of ‘deindividuation’ theory came from Postmes and
Spears (1998) who conducted a meta-analysis of 60 studies to establish
whether being anonymous, lacking self-awareness, and being in large groups
(i.e., ‘deindividuation’) leads people to display anti-normative behaviour (usually
administering electric shocks). Their results suggest that in contrast to this, and
in line with Johnson and Downing (1979) and Reicher (1984a), experimental
manipulations of ‘deindividuation’ led to displays of normative behaviour. Of
greater importance, perhaps, was the finding that these ‘deindividuated’
behaviours were not consistent with general social norms – the type that might
govern the behaviour of individuals within a society in general – rather, they
were consistent with the norms that were associated with a particular group
within each study (such as the norm for caring that would be associated with
nurses). This finding was interpreted as evidence in support of the social
identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE; e.g., Reicher, Spears, &
Postmes, 1995).
According to the model, while immersion in a large group can take a
perceiver’s focus away from their individual self, this does not represent a loss
of identity – rather, it underlies the shift from a personal identity to a social
identity. That is, it facilitates the depersonalization process. As a result, people
act in terms of the norms associated with a salient social identity rather than in
an anti-normative fashion.
It could be argued, however, that while experimental studies (such as
those meta-analysed by Postmes and Spears, 1998) allow for control over the
critical independent variables (i.e., the group identity and anonymity), their
potential weakness lies with their lack of external validity. People act in terms of
the norms associated with a particular social group in the controlled laboratory
environment, but what of their behaviour in actual crowd events – the type that
were discussed by Le Bon? Research conducted at various crowd events has
lent further support to the idea that crowds should sometimes be seen as
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meaningful reflections of society as opposed to displays of destructive
irrationality.
Reicher (2001) points to Thompson’s (1971) analysis of the 18th century
food riots in England as the classic example of this. Despite being faced with
starvation, ‘rioters’ did not simply seize grain when supply was at its lowest.
Instead, the ‘riots’ took place when grain supplies were increasing and the
produce was being transported away from the local area to distant
marketplaces (to be sold for maximum profit). Thus, the behaviour of the
crowds represented a conflict between the local people’s perception of what
was moral (to meet the needs of those in the locality) and the principles dictated
by the emergent free market system whereby goods were transported to
location where they could be sold for maximum profit. Rather than simply
taking the grain for personal consumption, the ‘rioters’ sold it locally at
reasonable prices and then handed the money back to the corn merchants –
thus displaying a high degree of rationality, selectivity and fairness in their
behaviour. This rational behaviour in times of desperation demonstrates that
collective ideologies can shape crowd behaviour and is far removed from the
irrational, primitive and destructive actions of the crowd described by Le Bon,
Allport, and deindividuation theorists.
Consistent with the SIDE model, Reicher developed the social identity
model (SIM) of crowd behaviour (e.g., Reicher, 1984b, 1987). As SCT theorists
make the distinction between a simple group and a psychological group, the
SIM approach to crowds makes the distinction between a physical crowd and a
psychological crowd. While a physical crowd is a chance aggregate of
individuals (e.g., commuters travelling to work on a train), a psychological crowd
is meaningful for its members. When describing the psychological group,
Turner (1987, p.1) stated that:
…a psychological group is defined as one that is psychologically significant
for the members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for social
comparison and the acquisition of norms and values…
In the usual terminology, it is a (positive) reference group and not merely a
membership group as defined by outsiders, i.e., it is not simply a group
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which one is objectively in, but one which is subjectively important in
determining one’s actions.
The same principle applies to the psychological crowd. Therefore, based
on the core hypotheses of SCT, it is suggested that in a psychological crowd,
the processes of perceiver readiness and contextual fit lead crowd members to
become depersonalized – that is, to self-stereotype in terms of a salient social
identity – which then serves to shape the actions of the crowd. In other words,
crowd action is the rational expression of a social identity, rather than an
irrational consequence of individual identity loss.
The first study to test the SIM in a field setting was Reicher’s (1984b,
1987) analysis of the St Pauls ‘riot’, which took place in 1980 following a police
raid on a café in Bristol. Reicher’s data-set included the official police report of
the incident, legal documents, a series of media reports, photographs of the
incident, interviews, and notes from conversations with St Pauls residents who
were approached on the street. Reicher noted that rather than experiencing a
form of identity loss, participants in the ‘riot’ described themselves in terms of a
collective identity (St Pauls residents), and that their behaviour was consistent
with that identity. For example, only those who shared the identity became
involved in the ‘riot’, and the people who were seen to best represent the group
identity (namely, older Rastafarians) were the most influential. In addition, the
‘riot’ remained within the geographical boundaries of St. Pauls, and the targets
of the crowd violence were highly selective. For example, it was noted that the
residents of St Pauls shared the collective understanding that as a group, they
were positioned in opposition to the police, and the fact that most of the violent
acts were against the police (both personnel and vehicles) was consistent with
this shared understanding of group relations. Thus, violent acts were not
indiscriminate expressions of a loss of identity, or loss of control, but targeted,
meaningful expressions of a social identity.
By introducing social identity principles to crowd behaviour, the SIM
offered a refreshing alternative to the ‘irrationalist’ approaches to crowd
behaviour. However, the model was not without its limitations. For example,
although the SIM could use social identity processes to account for the limits of
crowd behaviour, it failed to explain the dynamic inter-group processes
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underlying the escalation of crowd ‘disorder’, or the ways in which such
processes could lead to psychological change within the crowd – i.e., how or
why a peaceful crowd might turn violent.
The elaborated social identity model (ESIM; Reicher, 1996; Drury &
Reicher, 2000, 2005; Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998a, 1998b) of
crowd dynamics was developed specifically to account for these deficiencies in
the SIM. The ESIM describes this escalation of violence and psychological
change in terms of several processes. For example, analyses of crowd events
such as football ‘disorder’ (e.g., Stott & Reicher, 1998a) and the ‘poll tax riot’,
which took place in London in 1990 (Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott & Reicher,
1998b), revealed the impact that inter-group dynamics can have on crowd
members’ perceptions and behaviours during collective action. For example, a
great deal of heterogeneity was observed amongst those in the crowds – whilst
a minority of crowd members were intent on conflict and violence, the majority
thought of themselves as ‘moderates’. However, when the police took
indiscriminate, and what the crowd perceived to be illegitimate action against
the crowd due to their perception of them as a homogenous group, there was
an identity shift amongst the crowd members; those who previously self-defined
as moderates became radicalised and joined the minority in their opposition to
the police. Thus, the ESIM suggests that if an out-group, such as the police,
imposes a common fate on a crowd (e.g., football supporters or protesters) –
this will lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy in which a previously heterogeneous
crowd becomes homogenised following a shift in identity and self-perception.
According to Drury and Reicher (2005): “…those within the crowd who advocate
confrontation will no longer be seen as ‘other’” (p. 37). Instead, they will be
seen as interchangeable with self – as members of a single, unified social
category. As a result of this shift from separate identities to a new inclusive
social identity, crowd members can experience a feeling of empowerment.
Their greater numbers and their newfound feelings of consensus and mutual
support can empower the crowd to unite against the out-group. Thus, the ESIM
provides an explanation of the way in which the actions of an out-group can
impact upon (a) the way people see themselves, (b) who they define as a part
of self, and (c) the types of action that they perceive to be appropriate and
achievable.
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This is not the place for an in-depth discussion of the applicability of SCT
to crowd behaviour (see Reicher, 2001 for a detailed discussion). However, this
summary provides an insight into the ways in which SCT has enhanced our
understanding of crowds. It allows for an analysis of crowd behaviour, not as
something irrational or pathological, not as a physical condition that precludes a
loss of identity, but as phenomena which can, under certain circumstances,
facilitate a shift from a personal identity to a relevant social identity. SCT
accounts for the ways in which socially shared meanings can shape the
behaviour of individuals in crowds. It highlights the influence of intra-group and
inter-group processes in crowds, and the influence that crowds can have on
intra-group and inter-group processes. In the following section, it will be
suggested that SCT can transform our understanding of spatiality and crowding
just as it has transformed they way in which we conceptualise crowd behaviour.
3.5.3 Applying SCT to spatiality and crowding
As demonstrated in the previous section, until the development of SCT and its
application to crowd behaviour, social psychological theories of the crowd
tended to focus on either (a) the individual, or (b) a ‘collective consciousness’.
Most theoretical approaches overlooked the interaction between contextual and
individual variables, and simply viewed collective behaviours as the
unconstrained, uninhibited, and pathological release of primitive human
instincts. Importantly, many approaches shared in common the belief that
crowd members had suffered a form of identity-loss and ignored the role that
group-dynamics can play in shaping the action of crowds.
It is easy to find similarities between these aspects of the early theories of
crowd behaviour and some of the early approaches to spatiality and crowding.
Generally speaking, Chapter 2 provides several examples of a hypothesised
link between density and pathology. However, more specific comparisons can
be made between the crowding literature and pre-SIT/SCT psychological
theories of the crowd. We need look no further than just two pages into Insel
and Lindgren’s (1978) book on the psychology of crowding to find evidence to
suggest that the ‘collective mind’ ideas of Le Bon had trickled down into the
crowding literature. Insel and Lindgren (1978, p. 2) warned:
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When a crowd becomes a mob, there is little that an individual caught up in
it can do to stem its headlong rush into fury or panic. To be a member of
an outraged or frightened crowd is to lose one’s identity. Self-control and
common sense melt away before the intensity of the collective feeling.
Crowding, crowdedness, and crowd are therefore potential sources of
anxiety in a world that has much to be anxious about. Hence it is difficult
to view them without some twinges of antipathy, some predisposition to
see them as potential threats to our security, well-being, and perhaps even
survival.
On the other hand, in Freedman’s (1975) density-intensity theory, which
objected to the simple density-pathology link, there was a hint of Allportian
individualism. To illustrate, Freedman’s (1975, p.105) claim that, “…high
density makes other people a more important stimulus and thereby intensifies
the typical reaction to them”, bears a striking resemblance to Allport’s (1924b, p.
295) suggestion that “…the individual in the crowd behaves just as he would
behave alone only more so”.
While these two approaches to crowding reflected the polar opposites of
the individual-group dichotomy in the group and crowd behaviour literature,
other approaches simply reflected the general idea of identity-loss. For
example, a relatively recent book by Ehrenreich (2007) provides a fascinating
account of collective joy throughout history. Her examples of joyful experiences
in crowds are plentiful. Just a few examples include: African tribal dances,
revolutionary crowds, military parades, carnivals, sports events, rock concerts,
and religious rituals.
Ehrenreich’s work should certainly be commended for recognising that joy
that can be experienced in crowds. It should also be lauded for strongly
rejecting the idea that joyful collective experiences are pathological or irrational,
and instead suggesting that they are “…at all times subject to cultural rules and
expectations” (p. 17). However, while she criticises mainstream psychology for
overlooking the collective and focussing on the individual, as is demonstrated in
the following quote: “Psychology, almost by definition, focuses on the individual
self” (p.9), her own attempts at explaining how and why people sometimes
experience collective joy are more than vaguely reminiscent of the ‘identity-loss’
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ideas, which pervaded the early crowd analyses. Rather than explaining the
social psychological relationship between the individual and the collective, and
how this relationship can influence affective responses to density, she describes
collective joy in terms of ecstasy, which by definition can mean to be ‘out of
one’s self’. There are several instances throughout Ehrenreich’s book in which
collective joy is described in terms of ‘self loss’. For example, when discussing
tribal ritual, she comments: “The self-loss that participants sought in ecstatic
ritual was not through physical merger with another person but through a kind of
spiritual merger with the group” (p. 13). Then later, when speculating about why
collective rituals may have eased the depressive symptoms of its participants,
Ehrenreich states that it may be because “…they encourage the experience of
self-loss, that is, a release, however temporary, from the prison of the self, or at
least from the anxious business of evaluating how one stands in the group or in
the eyes of an ever-critical God” (p. 152).
While Ehrenreich’s references to self-loss might ring alarm-bells due to
their resemblance to those theories of crowd behaviour which have limited our
understanding of the phenomena that they seek to explain, her general
approach is too valuable to simply dismiss. In fact, much of her work is
consistent with the current body of work insofar as it recognises the potential for
a positive collective psychology, it rejects the irrationalist approach, it considers
the impact that the group can have on individuals, and it considers the ways in
which cultural norms and society can guide expressions of collective
experience. It simply falls short due to (a) its lack of a developed social
psychological account of the multiplicity of the self – the self as a personal and
social construct, and (b) for explaining ‘collective joy’ in terms of ecstasy, which,
as discussed above implies a loss of self as opposed to a shift in self
perception.
As discussed at length in Chapter 2, explaining variations in personal
space can be a useful way of explaining such variable psychological responses
to crowding. If close proximity is desirable, it will be sought and experienced
positively. If it is aversive, it will be avoided (or experienced negatively when it
is unavoidable). It was demonstrated in section 2.6.1 how some approaches to
personal space take group-level variables into account. For example, they
highlight the impact that culture or gender-specific norms can have on how near
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or far we wish to be from others, or they state that we prefer to be closer to ‘our
own kind’ (e.g., Leibman, 1970). However, the personal space literature falls
short in several ways. These shortcomings were discussed in detail in Chapter
2 (see section 2.6.2). However, the three main criticisms were as follows: (1)
most of the theories linking proximity and psychological responses to crowding
only account for when a crowd will be experienced negatively, while overlooking
the potential positives of crowding, (2) many of the explanatory variables refer
to either (i) fixed ‘personality’ traits, (ii) fixed demographic variables, or (iii) fixed
situational variables and therefore, (3) cannot account for (i) intra-individual or
intra-group variability in personal space and responses to crowding, or (ii) why
crowding might be experienced differently within a specific location (such as on
a train or football terrace).
It is argued here that each of these problems in the personal space (and
hence crowding) literature can be accounted for by SCT. As such, each will be
addressed in turn, below. To begin with, however, let us revisit the core
hypotheses of SCT. As already mentioned in this chapter, SCT suggests that
people can self-categorize according to their own personal identity (i.e., in terms
of their differences from other individuals), or in terms of any one of a potentially
infinite number of social identities (i.e., in terms of their similarities to fellow
category members and differences to members of other categories). The
interplay between contextual variables (comparative and normative fit) and
personal variables (perceiver readiness) will determine whether a personal or
social identity is salient to the perceiver. When a social identity is salient, the
perceiver becomes depersonalized – that is, their self-definition shifts from the
exclusivity of the personal self, to the inclusiveness of the social self. As a
result, those who are perceived as other when a personal identity is salient will
become part of self when a social identity is salient. The same applies to group
relations. Out-group members will be perceived as other. However, if a
contextual shift makes a more inclusive social identity salient, a re-appraisal of
self-other relations can make those who were previously other become a
interchangeable with self. In other words, who is self and who is other is not a
psychological given, but a social psychological construct.
Based on these most basic principles, it becomes easy to see how
personal space can be translated into the terms of SCT. Personal space
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describes the physical boundary between self and other – it is a zone of
selfhood. However, as has just been shown, the depersonalization process can
have important implications for who is viewed as self and who is viewed as
other. If, for example, a person is in a crowd where there are no contextual
cues to a social identity, their personal identity will be salient. Therefore, the
crowd will be a physical crowd that the person is objectively in but not a crowd
that is psychologically important for their self-definition. Thus, all other people
in the crowd will be perceived as other. They will be psychologically distant
from the perceiver, and as such, the perceiver will wish to maintain physical
distance from them. When it is not possible to do so, close proximity to others
in the crowd might be experienced as unpleasant. A good example of this
might be commuters travelling to work on a crowded train.
However, if in a second scenario, that same person is in a crowd with the
same people, in the same physical location, yet contextual cues and perceiver
variables increase the salience of a shared social identity, the other crowd
members will be perceived as self if they are in-group members. In other
words, the crowd will be a psychological crowd – it will be psychologically
important to the perceiver. Therefore, in this scenario, there will no longer be a
strong self-other boundary between the perceiver and the other crowd
members. As the psychological barrier between self and other weakens, the
physical barrier will also diminish. Therefore, the person will seek out closer
proximity to others present (as they are part of self) and more importantly, that
closer proximity to the very same people described in the last scenario will be
experienced positively rather than negatively. For example, in Reicher’s (1984)
analysis of the St Pauls’ ‘riot’ – a crowd event which the media viewed as angry,
violent, and aggressive – the ‘rioters’ talked of intimate physical contact with in-
group strangers. One interviewee remarked: “People were so warm: they said,
“glad to be with you, brother”, and they put their arm around you” (WM 30, as
cited in Reicher, 1984b, p. 16).
The impact of depersonalization on proximity does not end there. It is not
simply a case of equating personal identity with distance and negative
psychological outcomes, and social identity with closeness and positive
psychological outcomes. Imagine a third scenario. This time the same
individual is again in the same crowd, with the same people, and the same
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social identity is salient. If, in this scenario, the other people are perceived as
out-group members, they will again be perceived as others. A good example of
this might be a football supporter travelling home on a train carriage packed full
of supporters of a rival team. However, rather than being other individuals, as
they might be for the commuter in scenario one, this time they will be seen as
other in terms of their membership to a different social group. Therefore, the
perceiver will again feel uncomfortable if those who are psychologically distant
breach the physical barrier between self and other.
Now that the basic application of SCT principles to proximity and crowding
have been outlined, it becomes clear that an SCT approach entails a radical
reconceptualisation of the concept of ‘personal space’. The amount of space
that people desire in various contexts is not simply a personal variable – it
depends on which identity (personal identity or any one of a number of social
identities) is salient in a particular context, and whether the relationship between
self and other is on an inter-personal, intra-group, or inter-group level.
Thus, on a theoretical level, SCT can account for the weaknesses in the
traditional ‘personal space’ literature, which were outlined above. First, it can
account for variable psychological responses to close proximity in one-to-one
interactions, small groups, or crowds, by stating that these responses will
depend on contextually determined self-other relationships. Second, it (i) can
explain intra-individual spatial variations (as demonstrated in the scenarios
above) and (ii) transcends the idea of fixed demographic variables determining
proximity. In fact, this last point is a further strength of the SCT approach – that
is, it does not discount other hypothesised determinants of ‘personal space’,
such as culture and age. An SCT approach to proximity would suggest that the
norms associated with a national identity or a gender identity can influence
‘personal space’. If the contextual backdrop to an interaction makes a national
identity salient to a perceiver, the relevant cultural norms of proximity seeking
will influence how near of far they will want to be from others. However, with an
SCT approach, we now have a theoretical framework which can explain
proximity seeking within a culture. We can explain spatial behaviours, which on
the surface appear anti-normative. The male, English football fans seeking out
and enjoying close proximity on the terraces do so, not because they are
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English or male, but because they perceive fellow supporters of their team as a
part of their psychological self due to their common group membership.
It has now been demonstrated how, in theory, SCT provides the ideal
conceptual framework for explaining proximity preferences and crowding
responses. In the chapters that follow, the extent to which the theory transfers
to practice will be tested in the laboratory and out in the field.
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Chapter 4: Behavioural variations in ‘personal space’ – a self-
categorization approach.
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, it was suggested that the study of psychological responses to
close physical proximity could, and should, be used as a platform from which to
explain the variable responses to physical density that characterise the
crowding literature. This was based on (a) the empirical observation that people
respond negatively when they feel that someone has entered their zone of
‘personal space’, and (b) evidence that a long list of intervening variables can
determine how large or small, a person, or group of people’s ‘personal space’
zone will be in any given context. It can therefore be deduced that close
proximity in a crowd will be experienced negatively when contextually
determined spatial desires exceed the amount of available space.
However, the traditional ‘personal space’ literature was criticised for three
reasons. First, it only explained when close proximity would, or would not, be
avoided or experienced negatively, but provided no explanation as to why close
physical proximity might sometimes actually be sought or experienced
positively. Second, it provided a long list of ‘personal space’ determinants
whilst making little attempt theoretically to link them. And third, as many of the
variables on that treat group memberships as fixed demographic facts (e.g.,
culture, gender, or ‘race’), they cannot explain within-group or within-individual
variations in ‘personal space’.
Chapter 3 identified self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) as
the conceptual framework that can explain variability in ‘personal space’ while
overcoming these weaknesses. The application of SCT to this area of research
was described in detail in Chapter 3 (see section 3.5.3). However, to recap
briefly, a self-categorization approach to ‘personal space’ (and hence crowding)
links physical and psychological proximity. In line with Turner’s (1999. p. 12)
assertion that when depersonalized (self-categorized according to a social
identity) “psychologically, the social collectivity becomes self”, a SCT approach
suggests that the collapse of the psychological barriers between self and
other/s will be reflected by our physical relations to them. If ‘personal space’
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refers to a zone of selfhood, inclusion of other/s into our self-definition should
impact upon our desire for, and response to, their close proximity. We might
seek and enjoy close proximity to others when they are perceived as ‘self’, but
avoid close proximity to those defined as ‘other’, or experience any unavoidable
close proximity negatively.
Importantly, as SCT suggests that our level of self-identity (be it personal,
or one of many social identities) depends on social context (and perceiver
readiness), it can explain why our desires for close proximity, or our responses
to close proximity, are also context dependent. As such, close proximity to
others, possibly even the same others, can in theory, be dependent on the
contextually determined ways in which we perceive ourselves, and our
relationships with others.
There has already been an attempt to show the relation between
contextually determined psychological proximity and ‘personal space’, although
it was from a different theoretical perspective to the current body of work.
Holland, Roeder, van Baaren, Brandt, and Hannover (2004) drew on the self-
construal literature in their attempt to explain the relationship between context,
self/other-perception, and proximity. Self-construal relates to a person’s
understanding of the self and the relationship between the self and other
people. Markus and Kitayama (1991) suggested that self-construal should be
seen as a dichotomy, which distinguishes between the individual self (self-
perception which focuses on individuality and distinctiveness from others) and
the interdependent self (self perception which focuses on closeness to, and
interconnectedness with others). Holland et al. (2004) suggested that the
psychological distinctiveness that dominates the individual self-construal should
be reflected by greater distance in interpersonal interactions, whereas the
psychological closeness that characterises the interdependent self-construal
should be reflected by close physical proximity.
Holland et al. (2004) noted that a great deal of early self-construal
research focussed on cross-cultural differences in independence and
interdependence (with people from ‘Western’ cultures said to score high on
independence (individualism) and people from ‘Eastern’ cultures said to score
high on interdependence (collectivism; Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama,
1991). Therefore, if we applied the early self-construal research to ‘personal
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space’, we would be left with a situation that is similar to the one that currently
exists in the ‘personal space’ literature (e.g., Hall, 1966). In other words, we
would be able to explain cross-cultural variations, but not within-culture or
within-individual variations. Holland et al. (2004) suggested that more recent
developments in the self-construal literature could be used to overcome this
problem. More specifically, they drew on the observation that independence
and interdependence can operate as a function of context, and can therefore
vary within broad cultural groups, or even within individuals (e.g., Gardner,
Gabriel, & Lee, 1999). It follows from this that individuals should seek closer
proximity to others in contexts that make the interdependent self accessible, as
opposed to those which prime the independent self.
Holland et al. (2004) conducted a series of studies to test this idea. In their
first study, participants in an experimental condition were subliminally primed
with the independent self (by having their name momentarily flashed upon a
screen), whereas those in a control condition were subliminally exposed to a
neutral prime (which involved flashing the Dutch word for ‘apple’ upon a
screen). Participants were then asked to wait in a separate room (apparently to
allow the experimenter to set up a second part of the study), which contained a
row of four chairs. A chair at one end of the row had a jacket hanging over it to
give the impression that it had been occupied. It was found that participants
primed with the independent self chose to sit further from the ‘occupied’ chair
than those who had been exposed to the neutral prime. While this implied that
an independent self-construal could have an impact on ‘personal space’, it said
little about the extent to which the two levels of self-construal might differ in their
impact on proximity.
The researchers used the same research paradigm to probe this question
further in a second study. This time, participants were consciously primed with
either the independent self (they were asked to think about their differences
from family members and close friends) or the interdependent self (they were
asked to think about their similarities to family members and close friends). It
was found that participants who had the interdependent self-construal activated
chose closer proximity to the ‘occupied’ chair than did those who had the
independent self-construal activated. This demonstrated that the contextually
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determined and fluid nature of the self (and relationships with others) influenced
proximity behaviours.
This strand of research makes a much-needed contribution to the
‘personal space’ literature by demonstrating how contextual variations can
influence self-other perception, which in turn can influence ‘personal space’.
However, on a theoretical level, it is somewhat limited and does not provide an
adequate framework for understanding the diverse range of spatial and
crowding behaviours.
The first problem relates to the way in which the self-concept is
conceptualised as dichotomous. It simply distinguishes between individualism
and collectivism, but overlooks the potential for people to self-categorize
according to multiple social identities and thus provides no explanation of the
ways in which collectivities (or groups and their identities) might be
distinguished from one another. As a result, there is no scope for determining
when members of particular social categories will be perceived as ‘self’ or
‘other’. This limits the application of self-construal to spatial behaviours. Let us
consider some ‘real-world’ anecdotal examples to illustrate. Following a football
match, rival fans head to the same station to catch a train home. In scenario 1,
having just watched his or her team win the match (let’s call it ‘Team A’), a
single fan joins a carriage packed full of fellow ‘Team A’ supporters, and
although it is crowded, he or she decides to stay on the carriage to join in with
the revelry. In scenario 2, the same fan steps onto the same carriage to find it
packed full of ‘Team B’ supporters, which leads him or her to step back off of
the carriage to avoid close proximity to the crestfallen (and possibly angry) out-
group. In both of the scenarios, the single fan would be self-defined in terms of
a salient group membership – in terms of a collectivity – and the group context
of each scenario would drive their behaviour. If a self-construal account were
accepted, it would have to be assumed that based on their spatial behaviours,
only the fan in scenario 1 would be defined in terms of the collective self,
whereas the fan in scenario 2 would be self-defined in terms of their individual
self, which is counterintuitive. It is more likely that in both scenarios, the fan
would be primed to construe their self in terms of their connectedness to fellow
fans of their team (their in-group), and their distinctiveness from fans of the rival
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team (the out-group), and not in terms of their individualism and distinctiveness
from other individuals.
A second criticism of Holland et al.’s (2004) approach relates to the lack of
clarity regarding the contextual factors that might activate an independent or
interdependent self-construal. In study 1, Holland et al. (2004) subliminally
‘activated’ the independent self-construal, whereas in study 2, they primed
independence and interdependence by asking participants to think about how
different or similar they were to specific people. Thus, they were unclear as to
whether self-construal is activated automatically, whether people are self-
motivated to see themselves as independent or interdependent, or whether it is
a combination of these two processes. In addition, they did not explicitly state
why their methods would lead to the activation of either self-construal, or what
the processes of self-construal might be outside of the experimental
environment. SCT is clear in this regard. It clearly describes the interplay
between contextual and cognitive processes (i.e., category fit and perceiver
readiness), and how these determine whether a personal identity, or any one of
a number of social identities becomes salient. This in turn explains why, and
when, individuals or groups will be seen as self or other, and how close we
might then want to be to them.
Other studies have lent some support to a SCT approach to ‘personal
space’. Glick, DeMorest, and Hotze (1988) found that participants approached
by a stranger at close proximity responded with less anxiety and greater
compliance to a small request (taking part in a survey) when the stranger was
an in-group member as opposed to an out-group member – a difference that
disappeared when the approach distance was ‘far’. In addition, Shah, Brazy,
and Higgins (2004) found that participants expecting to engage in competition
chose to sit nearer to a team-mate (an in-group member) than a competitor (an
out-group member). However, while both of these studies are in line with SCT
principles, they are limited as strict tests of the hypotheses derived from SCT as
they confounded social categorization with other variables. In the case of Glick
et al. (1988), the out-group member who approached the participants was a
‘punk-rocker’. Therefore, the anxiety and reduced compliance at close
proximity may have been the result of a pre-conceived negative evaluation of
‘punks’, rather than an effect of categorization per se. With regards to Shah et
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al.’s (2004) finding, it could be argued that the closer proximity to a team-mate
than a competitor might have been the result of acting in accordance to
competition norms (see also Tedesco & Fromme, 1974), rather than a physical
representation of psychological proximity.
A SCT approach to ‘personal space’ suggests that the mere categorization
of another person as an in-group member will lead to greater proximity than
categorization of that other as an out-group member. Novelli, Drury, and
Reicher (2010, study 1)3 carried out an experiment to test this idea, while also
attempting to overcome the methodological problems that typified the traditional
‘personal space’ research. To date, three main methods have been employed
in research on ‘personal space’ (see Gifford, 1997; Hayduk, 1983). First, there
are simulation methods, in which participants are asked to place miniature
figures on boards as a way of indicating their ‘ideal’ amount of space. The
second method is the ‘stop-distance’ technique in which a researcher
approaches a participant until they are asked to stop. Both approaches are
open to the criticisms (a) that people are aware that ‘personal space’ is being
measured and therefore (b) may be unable or unwilling to indicate how much
space they would seek in a ‘real world’ situation. The third method seeks to
address this criticism by using naturalistic observations of the amount of
‘personal space’ which people maintain. However what is gained in ecological
validity is lost in the ability to manipulate or control critical variables. Novelli et
al. (2010) therefore sought to develop a method of observing ‘personal space’
behaviours, which retains experimental control while leaving people unaware
that their ‘personal space’ was being measured (cf. Mooney, Cohn, & Swift,
1992).
Participants were invited to take part in what they were led to believe was
a ‘communication study’. Based on the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al.
1971), participants were informed about two ‘cognitive categories’: dot ‘over’-
and ‘under-estimators’ – and told that that members of the two categories
differed on a range of cognitive capabilities. Participants were told that they
would be ‘assessed’ to establish which of the groups they belonged to, and then
3 Along with study 1 of the current chapter, this study is included in the following paper: Novelli,
D., Drury, J., & Reicher, S. (2010). Come together: Two studies concerning the impact of group
relations on ‘personal space’. British Journal of Social Psychology, 49, 223-236.
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asked to take part in a discussion with a second participant who had already
been assessed and was due to arrive at the laboratory (there was in fact, no
other participant due to arrive). Participants were led to believe that their
discussion would be in either an interpersonal, in-group, or out-group context.
To achieve this, participants in the group context conditions were provided with
false feedback and told that they were dot ‘under-estimators’. Those in the in-
group condition were told that the ‘other’ was also an ‘under-estimator’, whereas
those in the out-group condition were told that the ‘other’ was an ‘over-
estimator’. Participants in the ‘interpersonal’ condition were not informed of
their own, or the ‘other’ participant’s category membership. Following the
‘assessment’ and feedback phases, the experimenter informed participants that
the ‘other’ was due to arrive at the laboratory and would have to be greeted
outside. The experimenter then left the laboratory and asked the participants to
set up two chairs for their discussion in a way that made them feel most
comfortable. As predicted, participants expecting an in-group interaction
required less ‘personal space’ than those expecting an out-group or
interpersonal interaction. There was no difference in proximity for those
expecting out-group or interpersonal interactions. The finding that participants
sought closest proximity in an in-group context was interpreted as evidence in
support of the idea that people seek out closer proximity to those defined as
self, than to those defined as other. This is because the latter involves a
violation of the self-other boundary, whereas the former does not. It was also
concluded that the lack of a significant spatial difference for participants in the
out-group and interpersonal contexts was due to the fact the anticipated
interactant would have been defined as other in both scenarios.
An (unpublished) analysis of the data in Novelli et al. (2010, study 1)
suggested that group context had a moderating effect on the relationship
between participants’ perceived difference (from their expected interactant) and
‘personal space’. For participants expecting an in-group interaction, as
perceived difference increased, ‘personal space’ decreased, whereas for
participants expecting interaction with an out-group member, an increase in
perceived difference led to an increase in ‘personal space’.
This finding could be interpreted in line with a body of research on
stereotype consensualization (e.g. Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999;
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Haslam, Oakes, Turner, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998; Haslam, Turner, Oakes,
Reynolds, et al., 1998). Haslam and his colleagues have shown that
participants’ stereotypical views of an in-group (Australians) and out-group (e.g.
Americans) can become more consensualized in inter-group as opposed to
intra-group contexts – an effect that is enhanced by group interaction.
According to Haslam et al. (1999), when a social identity becomes salient
(which would be more likely in an inter-group context), the act of self-
stereotyping that follows facilitates in-group consensualization by “(a) enhancing
the perceived homogeneity of that in-group, (b) generating associated
expectations of agreement with other group members on issues relevant to the
shared identity, and (c) producing pressure to actively reach consensus in
dealing with those issues through mutual influence.” (p. 810). Thus, the work of
Haslam and his colleagues adds to the SCT literature by highlighting that within-
group consensus is not simply a product of a shared social identity – it is an
active process, achieved via communication.
When this process is considered in relation to proximity, it follows that an
anticipated difference from an expected interactant should vary in its impact
depending on whether that ‘other’ is an in-group or out-group member. In other
words, when participants expect an in-group member to be relatively different,
they should want to be closer to them in order to communicate with them to
actively reach consensus and minimise the perceived difference. However, if
an out-group member is perceived to be relatively different, their out-group
status would be confirmed, and therefore the willingness to engage with them
would reduce further – as would any proximity.
4.2 The current research4
The study by Novelli et al. (2010) provided an interesting insight into the
impact of categorization on spatial behaviours. However, it was a small study,
with a number of limitations. First, the sample size was uneven across
conditions, as was the number of male participants. Due to the potential
effects of gender on personal space (e.g., Sussman & Rosenfeld, 1982; Uzzell
& Horne, 2006), a single-sex sample would have been preferable. Second,
4 An initial write-up of this study, which is included in Novelli et al. (2010), was written in
conjunction with John Drury and Steve Reicher.
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there is a possible confound in that participants were all ‘under-estimators’ but
in the out-group condition they expected interaction with an ‘over-estimator’. It
is possible that the terms ‘over-’ and ‘under-’ have different evaluative
connotations. Therefore, participants may have wanted to sit further from the
expected out-group interactant due to their evaluation of them as over-
confident, inferior or superior in some other way, rather than due to group
categorization per se. In addition, Novelli et al. (2010, study 1) asked
participants to complete the manipulation checks after they had been told that
no other participants were due to arrive at the laboratory. Therefore, it would be
preferable to conduct a version of the study in which participants are asked to
respond to these items before they are made aware of the deception to ensure
that their responses are robust.
The final limitation of Novelli et al.’s study relates to the (unpublished)
moderating effect of group context on the perceived difference-proximity
relationship. Novelli et al. simply measured perceived difference, which makes
it difficult to conclude with any certainty: (a) the dimension on which participants
were assessing difference, and (b) the extent to which ‘difference’ was in fact a
causal variable.
Thus, the two studies reported in this chapter are designed to overcome
these limitations. Study 1 will use an unconfounded and better experimental
design in an attempt to replicate Novelli et al.’s (2010, study 1) finding that
‘personal space’ can vary along with minimal group context, while also
accounting for potential confounds in the design. In study 2, the possible
moderating effect of group context on the relationship between perceived
difference and ‘personal space’ will be examined in more detail, with ‘difference’
manipulated rather than simply being measured.
4.3 Study 1
4.3.1 Overview
This study replicates Novelli et al. (2010, study 1) with an improved design. The
primary motivation for conducting the study was to establish whether the group
effects on ‘personal space’ hold when accounting for the possible confound of
the ‘other’s’ identity as an over or under-estimator. Therefore, the redundant
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interpersonal condition was not included in the design. There were also a
number of small changes made to the procedure in an attempt to enhance the
salience of the minimal group identity (as the results from manipulation checks
in Novelli et al., 2010, study 1 were unclear). In addition, unlike in Novelli et al.
(2010, study 1), where participants were asked to complete the dependent
measures after they were told that nobody else was due to arrive at the
laboratory, participants were asked to complete the measures of identification
and perceived difference before the deception was revealed to them.
It was predicted that there would be no significant difference in ‘personal
space’ between participants allocated to the ‘under-’ and ‘over-estimator’
categories. In other words, the content of the minimal category membership of
the ‘other’ will have no bearing on ‘personal space’. In line Novelli et al (2010,
study 1), it was expected that participants would require less ‘personal space’
when the ‘other’ belongs to the same minimal category as them (in-group
context) compared with those expecting interaction with an out-group member.
4.3.2 Method
4.3.2.1 Design
A 2 (participant’s category membership: ‘over-estimator’/ ‘under-estimator’) x 2
(‘other’s’ category membership: ‘over-estimator’/ ‘under-estimator’) x 2
(perceived difference: ‘similar’ to ‘other’/ ‘different’ from ‘other’) between
subjects factorial design was used.
4.3.2.2 Participants
Undergraduate students from the University of Sussex were contacted via email
and offered either course credits or £3 in exchange for their participation.
Eighty female participants took part. Their ages ranged from 18 to 44 (M =
20.94, SD = 4.52). Due to possible effects of culture (Evans et al., 2000; Hall,
1966), sex (Sussman & Rosenfeld, 1982) and/or gender orientation (Uzzell &
Horne, 2006) on ‘personal space’, all of the participants were female, native
English speakers.
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4.3.2.3 Dependent measures
Participants responded to each of the questionnaire items using a seven-point
Likert-type scale, which ranged from 1 (‘not at all’) to 7 (‘very much’).
Manipulation check (i): Identification: Three measures of minimal group
identification were adapted from Ellemers, Kortekaas, and Ouwerkerk (1999).
These items were: ‘I identify with other dot under/over estimators’, ‘I am like
other dot under/over estimators’, and ‘Being a dot under/over-estimator is a
reflection of who I am’. As the three items scaled together reliably (α = .80),
their mean was calculated to provide a single score representation of
identification.
Manipulation check (ii): Perceived difference of target to self: Three items
were designed to measure the extent to which participants felt that the ‘other’
participant would be different to them. The first two measures were general
measures of difference, and simply read: ‘I feel as though the other person in
the discussion will be a different type of person to me’ (adapted from Novelli et
al., 2010, study 1) and ‘I feel as though the other person in the discussion will
be a similar type of person to me’ (this item was later reversed). The third
measure was more specific – it read: ‘I expect the other participant in the
discussion will have different views to mine’. The three items did not scale
together to a satisfactory degree (α = .46), and were therefore included in the
analysis as separate items.
Manipulation check (iii): participants’ perceptions: Three questions were
designed to gauge the participants’ perceptions as they took part in the study to
explore whether they (a) understood and believed the cover story about the
‘cognitive categories’ and (b) that they believed that ‘another’ participant was
due to arrive. As minimal groups were used as a basis for identification, it was
also important to determine whether the minimal groups were perceived as
such by the participants. In other words, participants should not have had a
preference for which group they were assigned to. The questions were: ‘Did you
believe that another participant had gone to find their phone and would return to
the laboratory?’, Before I told you which category you belonged to, did you have
preference for the over-estimator or under-estimator group?’, and ‘ When
entering the room, did you notice the badge on other’s jacket?’
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Dependent variable: ‘Personal space’: In line with Novelli et al. (2010,
study 1), ‘personal space’ was operationalised as the distance placed between
the participant’s chair and the chair of the ‘other’ participant. Five measures
were taken from the chairs to allow for various seating orientations. These were
four leg-to-leg measurements and the distance between the middle of the front
edge of the base of the seats of either chair. The mean of the five
measurements was calculated to provide a single numerical representation of
‘personal space’.
4.3.2.4 Procedure
Having agreed to take part in the current study, participants were contacted by
the experimenter via email. The email stated that as the study was
investigating ‘communication styles’, two participants were required to take part.
The content of the email was designed to introduce the participants to the idea
that they would be taking part in the study with another participant.
On arrival at the laboratory, participants were again informed that they
would be taking part in a ‘communication study’, consisting of two parts. They
were told that they would be required to complete several computer-based
tasks for the first part of the study, whereas for the second part, they would be
asked to move to another room, where they would have a discussion with the
‘other’ participant. Participants were informed that the ‘other’ had already
arrived at the laboratory and had begun completing the computer-based tasks.
Participants were then asked to provide written consent before being led to
an area of the laboratory where three experimental cubicles were based. The
participants were told that the ‘other’ was settled in one of the cubicles, and that
they would be situated in the other.
Participants were then led into a cubicle and seated in front of a computer
and handed a written copy of the participant brief. The brief explained that a
series of studies had uncovered several cognitive differences between people
who tended to over-estimate or under-estimate how many dots there were in a
series of patterns (see Appendix 1 for complete brief). These differences
related to analytical problem solving ability, degree of cognitive bias, literacy
skills, mathematical ability, and ‘social competence’. Participants were not told
that either group was better or worse than the other on these cognitive domains,
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or exactly what the known differences comprised of. They were simply
informed that ‘differences’ had been identified. In order to increase the ‘validity’
of the research described, a false reference was included in the participant
brief. In reality, the research described to the participants does not exist. The
written brief also stated that the current study was being conducted to further
investigate the domain of ‘social competence’, and that the specific interest was
to discern whether ‘over’- and ‘under-estimators’’ communication styles differed
when they were interacting with someone who had either the same or different
estimation style to themselves. Prior to leaving the cubicle, the experimenter
told participants that he would calculate the ‘other’ participant’s estimation style
first, as they would finish the computer-based tasks first, and then get them
settled in the discussion room before returning.
The experimenter then left the cubicle while participants provided written
answers to the computer-based tasks, which were presented using PowerPoint
software. The first task was designed to manipulate group membership and
was based on a technique used in the classic minimal group paradigm studies
(Tajfel et al., 1971, and Novelli et al., 2010, study 1). Participants were shown a
series of eight random dot patterns and asked in each case to estimate the
number of dots (see Appendix 2 for an example dot matrix). The second task
was designed to enhance the salience of the group identity, and was adapted
from the study by Novelli et al. (2010, study 1). Participants completed a
questionnaire and were informed that the purpose of the questionnaire was to
assess the extent to which their responses were typical or atypical of dot ‘over’-
or ‘under-estimators’. The questionnaire contained six hypothetical scenarios,
which can be found in Appendix 3. The participants were asked to read each
scenario and choose from a series of responses how they would react if they
were ever to encounter the scenario. The questionnaire also included four filler
questions, which each had four multiple-choice answers (see Appendix 3).
Participants were asked to listen to a song via headphones while completing the
computer-based tasks. This was to ensure that they would not hear anything
that might, or might not, have been happening in the next-door cubicle. A
question that related to the length of the musical piece was included in the
‘typicality’ measure.
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When participants had completed the computer-based tasks, the
experimenter re-entered the cubicle. On doing so, he announced that the
experiment might take a few minutes longer than originally planned because the
‘other’ participant had realised that she had left her mobile phone in the nearby
café, and had subsequently gone to find it. The participant was told that should
the ‘other’ not return when the discussion was due to begin, the experimenter
would walk to the café to see if he could find her.
The experimenter then pretended to conduct a series of calculations
before informing the participant that they were either an ‘over-’ or ‘under-
estimator’, depending on which ‘category’ condition they had been assigned to.
All participants were told that the ‘typicality’ measure indicated that they were
‘typical’ of their group. Participants were then asked to wear a red or blue
badge with either ‘under-estimator’ or ‘over-estimator’ written on it in an attempt
to reinforce the group identity. The experimenter then informed participants that
the ‘other’ participant was in either the same or different cognitive category to
them (to manipulate group context).
Figure 4.1 shows the layout of the ‘discussion room’. The room was set up
to give participants the impression that the ‘other’ had set herself up for the
discussion before rushing off to look for her phone. This was achieved by
placing a chair in the room with a young woman’s denim jacket hanging over
the back of it (with either an ‘over’- or ‘under-estimator’ badge attached to it,
depending on which ‘group’ condition the participant had been assigned to) in
position 1. A bag and a half-full bottle of water were placed on the floor next to
the chair. A copy of the questionnaire that contained the measures was placed
on the ‘other’s’ chair, along with a pen, to create the impression that the ‘other’
had left it there before rushing off to look for her phone.
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Figure 4.1 Room layout (Chapter 4, study 1)
Participants were then asked to follow the experimenter through to the
room where they would be having a ‘discussion’ with the ‘other’ participant. On
arrival, the experimenter stated that as the ‘other’ had not yet returned to the
laboratory, he would walk to the café to see if he could find her. The
experimenter asked the participant to enter the discussion room, take a chair
from the stack at the side of the room and set herself up for the discussion,
however she felt most comfortable. The participant was handed a
questionnaire and asked to complete it when she was settled. As the
participant entered the discussion room, the experimenter left the laboratory
and waited outside for approximately three minutes to allow the participant
enough to time to set up her chair, settle, and fill in her questionnaire. The
experimenter then re-entered the room, revealed the deception to the
participant, and asked her not to move either of the chairs. Before providing a
full debrief, the experimenter asked the participant to answer the three
questions relating to her perceptions of the experimental situation. The
participant was then debriefed, paid, and told that she could leave. When the
participant had left the room, the experimenter measured the distance between
the chairs.
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4.3.3 Results
4.3.3.1 Manipulation checks
(i) Identification: In order to assess whether the minimal group identity had been
successfully imposed on the participants, one-sample t-tests were conducted on
the combined data obtained from the identity measures. High scores would
indicate a high level of identification whereas low scores would indicate low
levels of identification. The mean score on the identification scales (M = 3.58,
SD = 1.33) significantly differed from the mid-point of the scale (4), t (79) = -
2.80, p = .006) which suggests that outwardly at least, participants were
displaying relatively low levels of identification. Importantly however, when
comparing participants in the intra-group conditions (M = 3.60, SD = 1.27) and
those in the inter-group conditions (M = 3.57, SD = 1.40), there was no
significant difference between their levels of identification t (78) = 0.11, p =.91
(ns), r = .01. Therefore, any potential differences in ‘personal space’ between
these groups would not be due to different levels of identification.
(ii) Perceived difference of target to self: In line with SCT, and central to the
experimental design of the current study, out-group condition participants were
expected to perceive the ‘other’ to be more different, and less similar to them,
than those in the in-group conditions. This was not the case when the scores
for two of the items were analysed: ‘I expect the other participant in the
discussion to hold different views to mine’ (in-group M = 4.45, SD = 1.13; out-
group M = 4.68, SD = 1.20), t (78) = -.86, p = .39 (ns), r = .10; ‘I feel as though
the other person in the discussion will be a different type of person to me’ (in-
group M = 4.08, SD = 1.19; out-group M = 3.80, SD = 1.40), t (78) = 0.95, p =
.35 (ns), r = .11. Importantly however, when the scores from the reversed
measure ‘I feel as though the other person in the discussion will be a similar
type of person to me’ was analysed, participants in the in-group conditions (M =
3.70, SD = 0.97) scored significantly lower than those in the out-group
conditions (M = 4.43, SD = 1.15), t (78) = 3.05, p = .004, r = .33 with a medium
effect size. This suggests that in-group participants perceived the ‘other’ to be
less different to them than did the participants in the out-group conditions. This
provides at least some evidence, albeit not entirely consistent, that the out-
group and in-group contexts were successfully manipulated.
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(iii) Participants’ perceptions
Q1: Did you believe that another participant had gone to find their phone and
would return to the laboratory?
All of the participants answered ‘yes’ to this question. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the cover story was successful.
Q2: Before I told you which category you belonged to, did you have preference
for the over-estimator or under-estimator group?
The majority of the participants (70) responded to this question by stating that
they had no preference for which group they would be categorized as members
of. Of the ten who expressed a preference, seven stated that they wanted to be
in the ‘over-estimator’ category, whereas three expressed a preference for the
‘under-estimator’ category.
Q3: When entering the room, did you notice the badge on other’s jacket?
This question was added to establish whether participants were considering the
‘other’s’ group membership when entering the ‘discussion’ room (although,
importantly, the badge was only one of the cues to the ‘other’s group
membership. It was found that 70 participants did notice the other participant’s
badge, whereas 10 did not. This suggests that the participants were
considering the ‘other’s’ minimal group category to some extent.
4.3.3.2 Main effects
(i) ‘Personal space’
Outliers: In order to establish whether or not there were any outliers in the
current data set, the mean ‘personal space’ scores were converted to z-scores.
According to Field (2005), when a z-score is greater than 3.29 it indicates a
significant outlier. This was found to be the case for one participant in the
current study, for whom the mean ‘personal space’ z-score was 3.76. In order
to correct this problem in the data, the mean ‘personal space’ measurement for
the participant who produced the outlying score was converted to the next
highest score in the data set, plus one unit (which in this case was one inch)
(see Field, 2005).
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(a) Group context: Analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect of
group context on ‘personal space’, F (1, 78) = 7.42, p = .008, ή2 = .09.
Examination of the means demonstrates that as hypothesised, participants who
were anticipating an in-group discussion placed the chairs closer together (M =
46.56 inches, SD = 1.19) than did those who were expecting discussion in out-
group contexts (M = 51.15 inches, SD = 1.19).
(b) Minimal group identities: As predicted, analysis of variance revealed no
significant difference in ‘personal space’ for participants assigned to the ‘over-
estimator’ and ‘under-estimator’ identities, F (1, 72) = 0.24, p = .58 (ns), ή2 =
.004 (‘over-estimator M = 48.45 inches, SD = 6.93, ‘under-estimator’ M = 49.30
inches, SD = 8.57). More importantly, there was no significant difference in
‘personal space’ between participants expecting to interact with an ‘under-
estimator’ and those expecting interaction with an ‘over-estimator’, F (1, 76) =
0.28, p = .60 (ns), ή2 = .004 (interaction with an ‘under-estimator’ M = 48.47, SD
= 6.87, interaction with an ‘over-estimator’ M = 49.39, SD = 9.00). There was
however, a significant interaction, F (1, 76) = 7.29, p = .01, ή2 = .09. In line with
the finding that group context significantly influenced ‘personal space’, the
greatest distances were for ‘over-estimators’ expecting interaction with ‘under-
estimators’ and for ‘under-estimators’ expecting interaction with ‘over-
estimators’.
4.3.4 Discussion
Using an improved experimental design, the findings from Novelli et al. (2010,
study 1) were replicated. Participants expecting interaction in an in-group
context required less ‘personal space’ than those expecting an out-group
interaction. There was no difference in ‘personal space’ between participants
expecting interaction with an ‘over-estimator’ and those expecting to interact
with an ‘under-estimator’. Therefore, the alternative explanation for Novelli et
al.’s (2010, study 1) finding – that participants may have been seeking greater
distances from ‘over-estimators’ due to the perceived evaluative superiority of
‘over-estimators’ – has been eliminated. The finding that spatial preferences
can vary as a function of group context highlights that spatiality is something
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that should not necessarily be seen as something that is always ‘personal’, but
as something that can be dependent on self/other distinctions, which can
function at the level of the group as well as the individual.
The three questions designed to probe participants’ perceptions of the
experimental paradigm provided some useful insights. First, as all participants
indicated that they believed that another participant was due to arrive at the
laboratory, and that they had gone to look for a ‘lost’ phone, it can be concluded
that the experimental paradigm had a good degree of plausibility. In addition,
the fact that the majority stated that they had noticed the colour of the ‘other’s’
badge, indicates that they were conscious of the group context of the discussion
that they were about to take part in.
Now that the impact of group relations on ‘personal space’ has been
shown to be robust, the second study to be presented in this chapter provides
an opportunity to test the impact of perceived difference on ‘personal space’
within in-group and out-group contexts.
4.4 Study 2
4.4.1 Overview
The primary objective of Study 2 is to investigate further the extent to which the
group context of an interaction can moderate the relationship between
perceived difference and participants’ spatial preferences. An (unpublished)
analysis of the data from Novelli et al. (2010, study 1) found that participants in
in-group contexts sought less space as perceived difference increased,
whereas those in out-group contexts required more space as they perceived the
‘other’ to be more different from self. As discussed in section 4.1.1, it was
speculated that this finding was in line with the consensualization literature;
participants wanted to be closer to a ‘different’ in-group member as they actively
strove to reach agreement with them, but further from a ‘different’ out-group
‘other’ as their out-group status had been confirmed and hence there was little
point in trying to reach consensus.
The main limitation of Novelli et al.’s finding was that perceived difference
was simply measured, which makes it impossible to determine (a) the domain
on which participants were assessing difference, (b) whether they were in fact
all assessing difference on the same domain, and (c) the causal direction of the
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relationship between ‘difference’ and ‘distance’, seeing as difference was not
manipulated.
The current study seeks to overcome these problems by combining the
experimental paradigm used in Novelli et al. (2010, study 1) and study 1 of the
current chapter, with the one used by Haslam et al. (1999) in a stereotype
consensualization study. Haslam et al. (1999) found that when making a
national identity (Australian) salient, participants expressed a shared
stereotypical view of Australians (the in-group) – an effect that was
strengthened by intra-group discussion. In line with Haslam et al. (1999)
national identities will be used as the basis for categorization, with the in-group
being English and the out-group being American. Perceived difference will be
manipulated on the dimension of stereotypical views of Englishness.
In line with Novelli et al. (2010, study 1), and the consensualization
literature, it was predicted that participants would seek closer proximity to an in-
group other when they believed that other held relatively different, as opposed
to relatively similar, stereotypical views of Englishness (in an attempt to
reconcile this difference). In contrast, it was predicted that participants would
seek greater distance from an out-group other when they believed that their
stereotypical views were relatively different, as opposed to relatively similar
(because this difference would confirm their out-group status). It was predicted
that participants’ desire to reach consensus would mirror their spatial behaviour.
In other words, ‘in-group-different’ participants would express a stronger desire
to reach consensus than ‘in-group-similar’ participants, whereas ‘out-group-
different’ participants would express a weaker desire to reach consensus than
‘out-group-similar’ participants. Finally, in line with Novelli et al. (2010, study 1)
and study 1 of this chapter, it was predicted that participants expecting an in-
group interaction (with another English person) would require less space than
those expecting an out-group interaction (with an American).
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4.4.2 Method
4.4.2.1 Design
A 2 (group context: in-group/out-group) x 2 (perceived difference:
similar/different) between subjects factorial design was used for the current
study.
4.4.2.2 Participants
Sixty-four female, English, undergraduate psychology students whose ages
ranged from 18 to 55 (M = 22.22, SD = 8.27) took part in the study in exchange
for £4 or course credits. As with study 1, a single-gender sample was used (to
eliminate potential gender differences in spatial preferences). When questioned
at the conclusion to the study, three participants stated that they did not believe
that another participant would be arriving at the laboratory and that they did not
expect to interact with anyone. They were therefore excluded from the final
analysis. One participant did not set up the chair for the ‘other’ and therefore
provided no data. Thus, the final sample consisted of 60 participants with an
age range of 18 to 55 (M = 22.07, SD = 8.16).
4.4.2.3 Materials and measures
All of the items were anchored by 1 (not at all) and 7 (very much/very).
(i) Independent variable 1 – Group context and social identity. Manipulation and
manipulation checks: To manipulate group context, participants were simply told
that the ‘other’ participant was English (in-group) or American (out-group). To
check the manipulation of group context, participants responded to the following
two items: I feel as though the other person in the discussion will be a different
type of person to me’ and ‘I feel as though the other person in the discussion
will be a similar type of person to me’ (which was later reverse scored).
Participants were asked to respond to four items in an attempt to enhance
the salience of their English identity. In line with Haslam et al. (1999), they were
asked to list up to three things that they and other English people do relatively
often, relatively rarely, that they generally do well, and that they generally do
badly. In order to assess the participants’ identification, they were asked to
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respond to the single item ‘How important is your nationality to you?’. It was
assumed that a score significantly above the mid-point of the scale would be
indicative of relatively high national identification. Following Haslam et al.
(1999), a single-item measure was considered sufficient for the following
reasons: (1) to maximise simplicity, and (2) to make the measure as
unobtrusive as possible to reduce reactivity.
(ii) Independent variable 2 – ‘perceived difference’. Manipulation and
manipulation check: As this study was designed to examine physical orientation
during the consensualization process, stereotypical views of the in-group, or in
other words, English people (assessed using the Katz-Braly, 1933, checklist),
were used as the domain on which to manipulate perceived difference. While
participants’ stereotypical views of the out-group could have been used, with the
same processes expected (see Haslam et al., 1999), in-group stereotypical
views of the in-group were used to retain consistency with Haslam et al. (1999).
To assess the effectiveness of the manipulation, participants were asked to
respond to the item ‘When you discuss the selection of five English traits in the
next phase of this study, how much do you expect to agree with the other
participant?’ (adapted from Haslam et al., 1999).
(iii) Behavioural measures – spatial preferences (dependent variable 1):
Participants’ spatial preferences were measured in exactly the same way as in
study 1 (see section 4.3.2.3).
(iv) Self-report measure to investigate desire to reach consensus (dependent
variable 2): Desire to reach consensus was measured using the item ‘When you
discuss the selection of five English traits in the next phase of this study, how
much do you want to agree with the other participant?’ (adapted from Haslam et
al., 1999).
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4.4.2.4 Procedure
Figure 4.2 Room layout (Chapter 4, study 2)
When invited to participate in the study, potential participants were informed
that the study was investigating the views of Englishness held by English and
American people. The initial recruitment email stated that the American quota
of participants had been filled, but that more English participants were needed.
The instructions stated that the study took place over two phases – the first via
email, and the second in the laboratory. Having expressed an interest in
participating and agreeing a time in which to take part, participants were sent
phase one of the study, which was a copy of the Katz-Braly (1933) checklist,
along with instructions stating that participants should pick the 20 adjectives
from the 84 in the checklist (see Appendix 4 for the full list of traits) which best
describe the traits of English people in contrast to people from America. They
were asked to return the 20 adjectives to the experimenter via email. The
instructions also stated that the participant would take part in the study with
another participant, and that their responses to phase one would be compared.
For phase two, participants arrived at the laboratory at the designated time
and were greeted by the experimenter. The laboratory contained two desks,
which were located to one side of the room (see Figure 4.2), and a stack of four
chairs which were located in position ‘S’. When the participants entered the
room, the experimenter took a chair from the stack, placed it in position ‘P’ and
asked the participant to take a seat.
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Two sets of materials for the study were placed on clipboards on table A.
A badge was placed on top of the materials. The participant’s badge was
always blue with ‘English’ written on it, whereas the ‘other’s’ was either a blue
‘English’ badge or a red badge with ‘American’ written on it, depending on the
group context. The experimenter approached the two sets of materials and
asked for the participant’s name. When she had replied, the experimenter
stated that the ‘other’ participant had just emailed to say that she might arrive at
the laboratory five or ten minutes late. The participants were assured that this
should not impact too greatly on the time that they would spend in the
laboratory, and that they should still be able to leave within half an hour as
originally planned as the experiment tended not to take as long as originally
stated. They were then told that the study consisted of an individual phase and
then a group phase, which would involve discussion with the second participant.
Having signed a consent form, participants were handed their pack of
materials and told that they could start the individual phase while waiting for the
second participant to arrive, and that the ‘other’ could then catch up. They were
instructed to work through the materials in the following order. First, they
completed the social identity enhancement task (that is, three things that they
an other English people do often, rarely and well). They then turned to a sheet
of paper containing the 20 words they had picked to describe English people in
contrast to Americans, where they found the following instructions:
Below are the 20 traits you initially selected to describe English people in
contrast to Americans. Go back over the words and mark with an ‘X’ the
five words which seem to you most typical of people from England in
contrast to Americans.
When the participants had picked five words, they then turned to the next
sheet, which contained the following instructions:
You will now be asked to discuss your five adjectives with the second
participant, who is English/American [deleted by experimenter as
appropriate]. The other participant picked 1/17 [deleted by experimenter as
appropriate] of the same traits as you from the original checklist when
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describing English people in contrast to Americans. Before the discussion,
please complete the questionnaire which can be found on the following
page.
For participants in the in-group conditions, the instructions stated that the ‘other’
was English, whereas those in the out-group conditions were told the ‘other’
was American. For each of these groups, those in the ‘similar’ conditions were
told that the ‘other’ had picked 17 of the same traits as them from the original
checklist, whereas those in the ‘different’ conditions were told that the ‘other’
had picked 1 of the same traits as them to describe English people in contrast
to Americans. Finally, participants completed a questionnaire containing the
manipulation checks and consensus measures, as well as an item which asked
them to state how many of the same traits they and the other participant had
picked from the original checklist (this was to ensure that they had noticed the
‘difference’ manipulation). During this phase of the study, the experimenter sat
in position ‘E’ with his back to the participants.
When the participants had completed the tasks, they were given their
national identity badge and asked to wear it. The experimenter then stated that
he had hoped that the ‘other’ would have arrived before the participant
completed the individual phase and that as she still had not arrived, he was
going to see if she was waiting for him in the reception area, which was located
along the corridor. As he was just about to leave the room, the experimenter
asked the participant to arrange the room for the discussion by taking a chair
from the stack and setting it up for the ‘other’. They were asked to do so in a
way that made them feel comfortable. The experimenter then left the room for
one minute before re-entering, revealing the deception and fully debriefing the
participants.
4.4.3 Results
4.4.3.1 Manipulation checks
(i) National identification: A one-sample t-test revealed that the mean score on
the measure designed to measure the participants’ English identity was
significantly greater than the mid-point of the scale (M = 4.48, SD = 1.50, t (59)
= 2.49, p = .02) suggesting a successful manipulation. There was no difference
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in identification between participants in the in-group (M = 4.73, SD = 1.41) and
out-group conditions (M = 4.23, SD = 1.57), F (1, 56) = 1.70, p = .20 (ns), ή2 =
.03, nor between those in the ‘similar’ (M = 4.60, SD = 1.61) and ‘different’
conditions (M = 4.37, SD = 1.40), F (1, 56) = 0.37, p = .55 (ns), ή2 = .01. There
was no interaction between group context and ‘difference’ on identification, F (1,
56) = 2.18, p = .15 (ns), ή2 = .04. These findings suggest that any variation on
the dependent variables will not be due to differences in social identification.
(ii) Perceived difference, national identity: The two items designed to measure
perceived difference (one reversed item) scaled together reliably (α = .77) and
were therefore combined to produce a composite measure of perceived
difference. In line with SCT, participants should score higher on this general
measure of perceived difference when the expected discussion was with an out-
group, rather than an in-group ‘other’. However, there was no difference
between participants in in-group (M = 4.13, SD = 1.18) and out-group contexts
(M = 3.88, SD =1.26), t (58) = 0.79, p = .22 (ns), r = .10, which raises some
concerns as to the extent to which group context was successfully manipulated.
(iii) Expected consensus: In order to assess the extent to which participants
expected the ‘other’ to be similar or different to them in their stereotypical views
of English people in contrast to Americans, their mean scores on the item
‘When you discuss the selection of five English traits in the next phase of this
study, how much do you expect to agree with the other participant?’ were
examined. As predicted, participants in the ‘similar’ conditions (M = 5.07, SD =
0.94) expected to agree with the ‘other’ more than those in the ‘different’
conditions (M = 3.07, SD = 1.20) to a highly significant degree and with a large
effect size, t (58) = 7.17, p < .001, r = .69.
When comparing the ‘similar’ and ‘different’ groups on the measure of
difference used to examine the manipulation of group context, the same pattern
of results emerged. Participants in the ‘similar’ conditions (M = 3.47, SD = 1.01)
expected the ‘other’ to be more similar to them than did those in the ‘different’
conditions (M = 4.55, SD = 1.18) again to a significant degree and with a large
effect size, t (58) = -3.83, p < .001, r = .45.
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4.4.3.2 Main effects and interactions
Figure 4.3 The effect of group context and perceived difference on ‘personal
space’.
(i) Spatial preferences: When converted to z-scores, two cases exceeded 3.29,
suggesting that they are significant outliers (Field, 2005). Both of these cases
were in the ‘inter-group-different’ condition. To correct for this problem, both
scores were converted to the next highest score in the data set plus one unit
(inch).
Main effects: As predicted, and in line with study 1, participants who were
anticipating discussion with an in-group member required less space (M =
42.13, SD = 7.46) than those expecting discussion with an out-group member
(M = 45.64, SD = 10.67). However, this difference was not significant, F (1, 56)
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= 2.30, p = .136, ή2 = .04. When comparing the ‘personal space’ of participants
in the ‘similar’ and ‘different’ conditions, those expecting discussion with a
similar ‘other’ placed the chairs closer together (M = 42.98, SD = 8.89) than did
those who were expecting to have a discussion with a different ‘other’ (M =
44.78, SD = 9.76), although to a non-significant degree, F (1, 56) = 0.60, p =
.44, ή2 = .01.
Interactions: In general support for the hypothesis, there was a significant
interaction, F (1, 56) = 4.64, p = .036, ή2 = .08. As displayed in Figure 4.3,
participants anticipating a discussion with an in-group member required less
space when the ‘other’ was perceived as relatively different (M = 40.53, SD =
5.03) as opposed to relatively similar (M = 43.72, SD = 9.19, t (28) = 1.18, p =
.25 (ns)) in terms of their stereotypical views of Englishness, although not to a
significant degree. In contrast, those expecting a discussion with an out-group
‘other’ required more space when they perceived the ’other’ to be relatively
different (M = 49.03, SD = 11.54) as opposed to relatively similar (M = 42.25,
SD = 8.83, t (28) = -1.81, p = .08), to a marginally significant degree. Simple
effects analysis reveals that as a result of this interaction, while there was not a
significant difference in the spatial preferences for in- and out-group participants
when they felt that they would be similar to their interaction partner (F (1, 56) =
0.20, p = .65), in-group condition participants required significantly less space
than out-group conditions participants when they felt that their views of
Englishness would differ from their interaction partner’s (F (1, 56) = 6.74, p =
.01).
(ii) Self-report data: Consensus: Contrary to hypothesis 2, there was no
difference in desire to reach consensus (assessed using the item ‘When you
discuss the selection of five English traits in the next phase of this study, how
much do you want to agree with the other participant?’), between participants
expecting a discussion in an in-group context (M = 4.57, SD = 1.10) and those
expecting an out-group discussion (M = 4.63, SD = 1.19), F (1, 56) = 0.05, p =
.824, ή2 = .00. Likewise, there was no difference between those in the ‘similar’
(M = 4.73, SD = 0.98) and ‘different’ (M = 4.47, SD = 1.28) conditions, F (1, 56)
= 0.81, p = .744 (ns), ή2 = .01. It was predicted that the desire to reach
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consensus results would mirror participants’ ‘personal space’ requirements. In
other words, group context was expected to moderate the relationship between
perceived difference and desire to reach consensus, with an increase in
difference leading to a greater desire to reach consensus for participants
expecting an in-group discussion, but a decrease in desire to reach consensus
for those expecting a discussion in an out-group context. This prediction was
not supported, F (1, 56) = 1.27, p = .265 (ns), ή2 = .02.
Alternative analyses were conducted to explore these results further.
Repeated measures t-tests were carried out in order to establish whether there
were significant differences between the extent to which participants expected
to agree with the ‘other’, and the extent to which they wanted to agree with
them. To lend further support to a consensualization explanation, it was
expected that participants in the in-group-‘different’ condition would have scored
significantly higher on the desire to reach consensus scale than they did on the
expected consensus scale, whereas for those in the out-group-‘different’
condition there would either be no difference, or a decrease between the scores
on the two scales. This prediction was only partially supported. In actual fact,
for participants in both of these conditions, participants scored significantly
higher on the ‘want to agree’ scale than they did on the ‘expect to agree’ scale
(in-group-‘different’: expect to agree M = 2.87, SD = 1.06, want to agree M =
4.27, SD = 1.33, t (14) = -3.00, p = .009, r = .63; out-group-‘different’: expect to
agree M = 3.27, SD = 1.33, want to agree M = 4.67, SD = 1.23, t (14) = -5.96, p
< .001, r = .85.
4.4.4 Discussion
One of the reasons for conducting study 2 was to attempt to replicate the finding
that when a social identity is made salient, people require less space when an
expected interaction is with an in-group ‘other’ as opposed to an out-group
‘other’ (Novelli et al., 2010, study 1, and study 1 of the current chapter). In
support of previous research, it was found that participants arranged the chairs
so that they were an average of 3.5 inches closer to their expected interactant
when the context was in-group as opposed to out-group. Although this finding
was non-significant, the difference between the in- and out-group distances was
only 1 inch smaller than that observed in study 1. It should be noted, however,
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that the p-value reported was two-tailed, even though the hypothesis was one-
tailed. A one-tailed p-value would have yielded a marginally significant result,
thus supporting the hypothesis. Thus, in short, the pattern of the main effects
was exactly the same in studies 1 and 2.
Despite the finding that spatial preferences varied as a function of group
context, some of the manipulation checks raised some doubts regarding the
extent to which group context had in fact been successfully manipulated. It is
likely that this reflected a weakness with the measurement items used. The
items designed to measure the manipulation of group context simply asked
whether participants believed that the ‘other’ would be a different or similar type
of person to them. As participants had only just been told that the ‘other’ was
similar or different to them in terms of their stereotypical views of Englishness, it
could be that they responded to these items in terms of this level of difference
rather than in terms of group memberships. This view is supported by the fact
that participants in the ‘similar’ conditions consistently scored higher than those
in the ‘different’ conditions on the items that were actually designed to measure
group context. Any replication of the current study should use items specifically
designed to measure the manipulation of group context.
The primary motivation for conducting this study was to investigate the
processes underlying the relationship between perceived difference and spatial
preferences in greater detail. When perceived difference and group context
were manipulated so that participants were expecting a discussion with either
an in-group (English) or an out-group (American) member, who was perceived
to hold either similar or different stereotypical views of Englishness as them,
their spatial preferences mirrored the (unpublished) pattern observed in
previous research (Novelli et al., 2010, study 1). As expected, perceived
difference led to a decrease in ‘personal space’ for those in in-group contexts
(although this was decrease was non-significant, perhaps due to the loss of
power associated with reducing the N to 15 in each cell), but to a (marginally
significant) increase for those in inter-group contexts. It should be
acknowledged, however, that the absence of a group-level ‘personal space’
effect for participants in the ‘similar’ conditions, was not expected. Based on
SCT, the spatial difference between in-group and out-group participants should
be significant regardless of perceived difference, due to the fact that in-group
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members would still be perceived as self, whereas out-group members would
still be seen as other. Although this finding is not easily explained, one possible
interpretation might be that the history of alliance and cooperation between
England and the United States, coupled with the manipulated perception of
similarity might have weakened the psychological boundary between self and
other to some extent, hence leading to a relaxation of the physical self-other
boundary.
Despite this unexpected finding, it was hypothesised that the moderation
effect that was observed might be explained in terms of the stereotype
consensualization literature (e.g. Haslam et al., 1998; Haslam et al., 1999).
According to Haslam et al. (1998), “when people perceive themselves to share
group membership with another person in a given context they will both expect
to agree with that person on issues relevant to their shared identity, and also be
motivated to strive actively to reach agreement on those issues” (p. 758,
emphases in original). Thus, it was hypothesised that a manipulated difference
in stereotypical views (of the in-group) in an in-group context would conflict with
the expectation of agreement. Participants would subsequently move closer to
a ‘different’ in-group member as they actively strove to remedy the situation that
they were faced with. It was also hypothesised that in contrast, participants
might expect to disagree with an out-group member and would therefore be
satisfied with any imposed difference. As they would then have no inclination to
strive for agreement, they might then seek greater distance from the out-group
‘other’ who they were about to engage in discussion, due to the fact that their
out-group status had been confirmed. This was shown to be the case.
However, to strengthen a consensualization explanation of these findings,
it would be expected that participants’ self-reported desire to reach consensus
would have reflected their spatial preferences; those in the ‘in-group-different’
condition should have wanted to reach agreement more than those in the ‘in-
group-similar’ condition, whereas those in the ‘out-group-different’ condition
should have wanted to reach agreement less than those in the ‘out-group-
similar’ condition. This prediction was not supported. An alternative analysis
was therefore conducted: participants’ expected agreement and desire to reach
agreement scores were compared with repeated tests. In line with a
consensualization approach, it would be expected that participants expecting a
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discussion with an in-group member who was perceived to hold different views
to them would want to agree with the ‘other’ significantly more than they
expected to agree with them. This was indeed the case. However, for the
second part of this hypothesis to be true, participants expecting a discussion
with an out-group member who was perceived to hold different views of
‘Englishness’ to them, should have expressed either a) no difference between
the extent to which they expected and wanted to reach agreement, or b) their
level of desire to reach agreement should have been significantly lower than the
level to which they expected to agree. This was not found to be true; as was
the case for participants in the ‘in-group-different’ condition, participants in the
‘out-group-different’ condition wanted to agree with the ‘other’ significantly more
than they expected to do so.
So, if desire to reach agreement with a different ‘other’ is the same for
participants in both in-group and out-group contexts, how can the proximity
difference between these conditions be explained? It is suggested here that
this finding is a methodological artefact. It could be that participants were
reacting to the experimental situation and responding in what they felt was a
socially desirable manner. To elaborate, participants were expecting an
imminent discussion with a second participant, and regardless of the group
context of that discussion, they may have felt uncomfortable with (a) expressing
a desire to disagree with the second participant, and (b) the thought of actually
having a disagreement in such a novel and observed experimental context, thus
motivating them to express a desire to reach consensus.
Such an explanation fits with a recently published series of studies
conducted by Goff et al. (2008). In a similar vein as much of my own work,
participants were asked to set up chairs for an anticipated discussion. All of the
participants were white and their expected discussion partners were either white
or black. It was found that when the discussion topic related to ‘racial’ profiling
(a topic which could evoke fear in the white participants that they might appear
racist) participants sought greater distance from their black partners than from
their white partners. These spatial differences were not observed when the
discussion topic related to love and relationships.
The authors explained these findings in terms of stereotype threat. The
distancing from black discussion partners when the discussion topic was ‘racial’
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profiling was positively correlated with the activation of a white racist stereotype.
This led the authors to suggest that fear of appearing racist led participants to
distance themselves from their black discussion partners – an ironic effect
which could in fact lead the participants to appear to be more racist.
In light of this research, it could be suggested that the results observed in
the current study operated on two levels – one for those expecting an in-group
interaction, and another for those expecting an out-group interaction. For
participants expecting a discussion with an in-group member who differed from
them in their stereotypical views, the closer proximity may have been due to the
consensualization process outlined above. However, the spatial preferences of
participants expecting a discussion with an out-group member (who they
differed from) may have resulted from processes similar to those observed by
Goff et al. (2008). Prior to becoming aware that they would be discussing their
stereotypical views of Englishness with another person, participants were asked
to pick traits which best described English people in contrast to Americans. As
many participants had picked traits which showed English people in a positive
light, they may have feared appearing anti-American in their discussion with an
American participant who disagreed with their views. This in turn may have
motivated them to express a desire to reach consensus, while also seeking
greater distance from the American ‘other’, with both responses being employed
to avoid appearing anti-American.
Of course, such an explanation is speculative at present, and future
researchers are encouraged to investigate it thoroughly, as further investigation
of these processes is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, if this
explanation were to be supported, the initial hypothesis put forward in this
chapter would have to be altered. It was predicted that participants would seek
greater distances from a ‘different’ out-group ‘other’ simply because their out-
group status had been confirmed. However, if the results should be understood
in terms of Goff et al.’s (2008) work, then distance from the out-group member
might concern the avoidance of negative portrayal of the in-group in a
potentially confrontational inter-group context. Of course, an alternative
explanation might be that depending on the content of the discussion and the
particular identities, either of these processes might become operational.
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To summarise these findings, the single most important thing to emerge
from this study is that regardless of the fact that the behavioural and self-report
measures used in the current study did not correspond with one another, this
does not necessarily contradict a consensualization explanation of the
participants’ behavioural approach to the discussion. Haslam et al. (1998)
suggested that people actively strive to agree with a person with whom they
share a social identity when discussing issues that a central to that identity.
Therefore, the closer proximity to an in-group ‘other’ who differed in their
stereotypical views of Englishness, and greater distance sought from an out-
group ‘other’ who differed in their stereotypical views may shed some light on
the active behavioural process that facilitates intra-group consensualization.
4.5 General discussion
Taken together, the results from these studies support the argument that, when
defined in terms of group memberships and hence depersonalized, participants
are more comfortable with less ‘personal space’ from an in-group member than
an out-group member (or a non-group member, as was the case in Novelli et
al., 2010, study 1).
Participants in these studies required approximately 10% more space in an
in-group context than in an out-group context in study 1, and approximately 8%
more space in study 2 (possibly because the groups used were national
identities, with a history of amicable relations between English people and
Americans). If these differences are summed to account for spatial preferences
in large crowds of people, it becomes apparent that there may well be a large
difference in the amount of space required for an in-group crowd, a crowd made
up of different groups of people, or a crowd which consists a large number of
individuals, to feel comfortable.
This has important practical implications. Several mathematical models of
crowd-flow have been designed to assist building and public space planners
with their designs (e.g. Helbing, Farkas & Vicsek, 2000; Pan, Han, Dauber &
Law, 2007). While these models are mathematically sophisticated, they have
tended to treat the spatial preferences of a crowd as a constant – they lack a
psychological model of spatial preferences in crowds (Still, 2000). Along with
Novelli et al. (2010, study 1), the studies described in the current chapter
126
suggest that such an approach is flawed, and that the impact of group relations
on spatial preferences should be incorporated into these mathematical models;
an approach already advocated by crowd-flow researchers (e.g., Langston,
Masling, & Asmar, 2006; Smith, James, Jones, Langston, Lester, & Drury,
2009).
The second set of findings to emerge from this chapter relates to the
moderating effect of group context on the relationship between perceived
difference and personal space. As discussed at length in section 4.4.4,
perceived difference had a contrasting effect on distance for participants in
intra-group and inter-group contexts, with the former seeking closer proximity,
and the latter seeking greater distance when the ‘other’ was perceived to hold
different stereotypical views of Englishness. This finding is consistent with the
consensualization literature, as it may be a reflection of the behavioural process
which facilitates intra-group consensus. The implication of this finding is that
‘similarity’ and ‘difference’ should not necessarily been seen solely as
antecedent of group formation. Instead, the impact of perceived difference from
those defined as in-group members might lead to increased displays of physical
intimacy, rather than a re-categorization of those people as out-group members.
The theoretical implications of the findings discussed in this chapter do not
end there. The fact that spatial preferences can vary as a function of group
context should not necessarily be seen as just another addition to an already
long list of categorization effects. Instead, it should be seen as a hint towards
an interplay between psychological and physical proximity. It can be seen as a
demonstration of the group existing not only in the mind as a cognitive
representation, but also in space, as a physical unit. Therefore, the evidence
that categorization of other people as part of the self affects our physical
relations with those people raises questions regarding the extent to which the
nature of our physical relations feeds back and impacts upon or self-
categorizations (see Cassidy et al., 2007). This question will be probed further
in Chapters 7 and 8.
To summarise, then, the results of these studies suggest that in line with
Novelli et al. (2010, study 1), we are more comfortable with close proximity to
in-group members than we are with close proximity to out-group members. This
finding, which has been interpreted in line with the principles of SCT, provides a
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first step to understanding how contextual variables might impact upon, (a) the
perceived relationship between self and others (i.e., how close we are to them
on a psychological level), (b) the extent to which our physical proximity is
influenced by our psychological proximity, and can therefore, (c) explain within-
group and within-individual variations in spatial behaviours, and hence
crowding. While this chapter provides a powerful insight into the impact of
group-relations on the behavioural dimension of spatiality, and in doing so, hints
strongly at the impact that group relations might have on the experience of
close proximity, the following chapter will seek to probe the impact of group
relations on the experiential dimension of ‘personal space’ in greater detail.
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Chapter 5: Group context and the experience of proximity – A
self-categorization approach
5.1 Introduction
The studies presented in Chapter 4 (and Novelli et al., 2010, study 1) have
demonstrated the impact that group relations can have on proximity-seeking
behaviours. When asked to arrange chairs for a discussion, participants
expecting interaction with an in-group member placed the chairs closer together
than did those expecting interaction with an out-group member. This
unobtrusive behavioural measure provided an important first step towards
demonstrating the strength of applying SCT to so-called ‘personal space’. That
is, participants’ perception of in-group members as ‘self’ and out-group
members as ‘other’ was reflected in the physical distances that they sought
from them. This finding has highlighted that the spatial preferences of a single-
gender, Western sample can vary along with the group context of an interaction.
As participants were randomly assigned to conditions, and all of the participants
took part in the study in the same laboratory environment, this finding has
accounted for several of the weaknesses associated with the traditional
‘personal space’ literature – i.e., intra-individual, intra-demographic, and within-
location variations in proximity can now be explained using a unified theoretical
framework rather than in terms of disjointed intervening variables.
The studies described also provided a preliminary solution to another of
the problems associated with the traditional approach to ‘personal space’.
While the traditional approach explained why close proximity might be
experienced negatively (due to a person’s accepted zone of ‘personal space’
being breached), it did not account for those instances in which physical
closeness might be experienced positively or even sought out. A SCT
approach would suggest that close proximity to individuals in one-to-one
interactions, small groups, or large crowds should be experienced more
positively when those individuals are in-group members (self), and more
negatively when they are out-group members (other). This is because close
proximity to out-group others involves a violation of the self-other boundary,
whereas close proximity to those perceived as self would involve no such
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violations. As participants were asked to set the chairs up at a distance which
made them feel most comfortable, this suggestion, has in part, been supported.
However, this finding emerged when participants were given freedom to choose
their interaction distance. As such, questions still remain regarding how group-
relations might impact on the subjective experience of close proximity when
interaction distance is a function of circumstance as opposed to free choice.
Research investigating the impact of group-relations on the experience of
close proximity is sparse. There is, however, a small body of work that
suggests that belonging to a psychological group can impact upon the crowding
experience. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (section 2.4), Schultz-Gambard (1977)
found that even though high density generally led to negative psychological
responses from their participants (they felt more stressed and rated the room as
more unpleasant, less comfortable, and less cosy) they felt more positive
towards other group members when they felt that they belonged to a common
group. A SCT approach to spatiality and crowding would interpret this finding in
terms of the common group identity leading to a perceptual shift towards
inclusiveness. As such, the other people co-present would be perceived as self
and subsequently viewed more positively.
Other work supports this general view. For example, using a 2 x 2 design,
Webb, Worchel, Riechers, and Wayne (1986) examined the effects of group
categorization and interaction distance on perceived crowding in small groups.
Participants took part in the study in groups of six people who were arranged in
a circle formation. For groups in the ‘near’ conditions, the front corners of the
chairs were touching, whereas for groups in the ‘far’ conditions, a gap of half a
metre was left between the front corner of the chairs. All of the participants
were told that they should imagine that they were employees of a large
company, brought together to work on a project. In the ‘group categorisation’
conditions, participants were asked to wear lab-coats; two wore red coats (said
to represent the marketing division), two wore blue coats (said to represent the
research development division) and two wore white coats (said to represent the
personnel department). Participants in the ‘no group categorisation’ conditions
were simply told that they should imagine that they were each from a different
division from within the company. Webb et al. (1986) found that participants in
the ‘near’ condition felt more crowded than those in the ‘far’ condition.
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However, they also found an interaction between distance and ‘group context’.
Participants in the ‘categorisation’ and ‘no categorisation’ conditions did not
differ in their reported feelings of crowdedness when the interaction distance
was ‘far’. However, when the interaction distance was ‘near’, participants in the
‘categorised’ condition felt less crowded than did those in the ‘non-categorised’
condition
Although this finding is consistent with SCT, Webb et al.’s methodology
raises more questions than it answers, while their interpretation of their results
is open to debate. On a methodological level, as all of the participants were told
that they worked for the same company, it seems strange that the researchers
should conclude that only those who wore lab-coats would have been
categorised according to a common group membership – especially seeing as
they did not report results of a manipulation check to support this conclusion.
With regards to their interpretation of their results, Webb et al. suggested that
their findings should be considered in terms of deindividuation theory. In other
words, they suggested that participants in the ‘group categorisation’ conditions
(those wearing lab-coats) might have become less self aware due to their
‘submergence’ in the group (cf. Diener, 1980). A deindividuation approach
simply implies a loss of personal identity, and in doing so, seeks to explain
group processes solely in terms of individuals and an ‘all-or-none’ account of
identity (the problems associated with such an approach to group and crowd
processes were outlined in detail in Chapter 3, section 3.5.2). Webb et al. did
not use measures of self-awareness in their design to support their
deindividuation interpretation of their results, thus weakening their claims
further. It is argued here that an understanding of group processes based on
shifts in, rather than loss of identity, would provide a clearer understanding of
Webb et al.’s results.
Drawing on SCT, Webb et al.’s findings could be interpreted in one of two
ways. The first interpretation would focus on intra-group processes and
suggest that as all of the participants were told that they worked for the same
company, participants in all of the conditions would have self-categorised
according to a common group identity (the company). However, for participants
in the ‘group categorisation’ conditions, the lab-coats (company uniforms) may
have served to enhance the salience of the group identity, thus increasing
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psychological proximity between the group members, and decreasing feelings
of crowdedness in the physically close condition.
The second interpretation would focus on both intra-group and inter-group
processes. As participants in the ‘no group categorisation’ conditions were told
that they were each from different divisions from within the company, they may
have felt that they belonged to different groups and hence perceived others co-
present as ‘other’. However, participants in the ‘group categorisation’ conditions
were divided into three divisions, with two participants in each. Therefore, each
participant might perceive at least one other person as a common category
member, and hence a psychological extension of self. If this interpretation is
correct, it follows that for participants in the ‘near’ conditions, those in the so-
called ‘no group categorisation’ condition would be sitting adjacent to two
people perceived as other (two out-group members), whereas those in the so-
called ‘group categorisation’ condition would be sitting adjacent to one person
perceived as other (an out-group member), and one person perceived as self
(an in-group member). It therefore makes sense that participants in the ‘no
group categorisation’ condition would feel more crowded than those in the
‘group categorisation’ condition. Of course, it is impossible to decipher which of
these retrospective accounts is correct simply from Webb et al’s (1986) paper.
The important point, however, is that both are consistent with SCT, and that
both of these alternative accounts interpret the results in terms of group
processes, as opposed to a theory that frames the self in purely individualistic
terms. This seems sensible when the nature of the experimental design is
considered.
While the work of Schultz-Gambard (1977) and Webb et al. (1986)
provides indirect support for a SCT approach to the experience of close
proximity, an unpublished study by Fenn (2006) directly tested the applicability
of SCT to this dimension of spatiality. As part of an undergraduate project
supervised primarily by John Drury, and also by myself, Fenn (2006) adapted
the ‘personal space’ paradigm, which I designed and applied in Chapter 4 of
this thesis and in Novelli et al. (2010). We felt that Fenn’s undergraduate project
provided a good opportunity to conduct some pilot work for the experiments
presented in this chapter.
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Female students from a grammar school in Dorset, England, were
informed of the ‘differences’ between the so-called cognitive categories of dot
‘over-’ and ‘under-estimators’ (which are actually minimal categories – see
section 3.3). They were told that a simple test would establish which of the
categories they belonged to. Having been ‘assessed’, participants were
randomly assigned to a minimal category and told that they would be involved in
an interview style role-play with another participant who was either an in-group
member or an out-group member. The other participant was actually a
confederate. The distance between the participants’ chair and that of the
confederate was either 34 inches (in the ‘near’ condition) or 54 inches (in the
‘far’ condition). These distances were based on the mean proximity
preferences for participants in expecting discussion with an in-group member
(38.60 inches) or out-group member (48.00 inches) in Novelli et al. (2010, study
1). In other words, the ‘near’ distance was four inches closer than the mean in-
group ‘personal space’ in Novelli et al. (2010, study 1) while the ‘far’ distance
was six inches further than the mean ‘personal space’ for participants in the out-
group condition.
The participant and confederate were then allocated to the interviewer and
interviewee roles. Although this was made to appear random, the confederate
always played the role of the interviewer. The interview, which focussed on the
interviewees’ future aspirations, was carried out for three minutes before the
experimenter intervened, stating that enough information had been collected.
Participants and the confederate were then asked to complete a questionnaire
containing measures of their experience, which were designed by Fenn for the
purpose of the study. The measures related to aspects of experience such as
how relaxed and at ease the participants felt during the interview, as well as
how much they enjoyed it and whether they would be willing to participate in a
follow-up study.
Main effects of interaction distance and group context were observed.
With regards to interaction distance, it was found that participants in the ‘far’
conditions had a significantly more positive experience than those in the ‘near’
conditions. With regards to group context, participants interacting with an in-
group member had a significantly more positive experience than those
interacting with an out-group member. However, the most interesting finding to
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emerge was that participants in the out-group-‘near’ condition scored lowest on
the experience scale – i.e., they had the least positive experience of the
interview. In line with SCT, this finding was interpreted as evidence in support
of the idea that the experience of close proximity can depend on the group
context of an interaction. That is, whether an interactant is perceived as self or
other can impact on how we experience close proximity to them.
Fenn’s (2006) study provided an interesting insight into the possible effects
of group context and interaction distance on participants’ subjective experience.
However, a potential confound in the experimental design should be
acknowledged. When briefed on the differences between ‘over-’ and ‘under-
estimators’, participants were told that one group tended to perform better than
the other in multiple-choice exams. Thus, it becomes difficult to conclude with
certainty that participants in the out-group ‘near’ condition had the most
negative experience simply because they were asked to interact at close
proximity to a person perceived as other. It could instead be argued that
participants may have felt uncomfortable with such close proximity because
they perceived the confederate to be inferior or superior in their ability to
perform well in multiple-choice examinations. An attempt will be made to
overcome this potential methodological weakness in the experimental design of
the studies described in this chapter.
5.2 Study 3
5.2.1 Overview
This study follows Fenn’s (2006) pilot research. The primary objective is to
establish whether the effects of group context and expected interaction distance
on participants’ subjective experience will hold when a better, unconfounded
experimental design is used. To improve the design, and hence eliminate the
potential for group-categorisation to be confounded with perceived
superiority/inferiority, participants will simply be informed of cognitive
differences between the minimal groups used (as was the case in Chapter 4,
study 1 and also in Novelli et al., 2010), rather than being told that one group is
‘better’ than the other on a particular domain.
The names assigned to the minimal groups in the current study also
differed from those used by Fenn (2006), Novelli et al. (2010, study 1), and
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Chapter 4, study 1. In each of those studies, the minimal groups were named
as dot ‘over-estimators’ and dot ‘under-estimators’. However, for the purpose of
the current study, the brief simply stated that people could be divided into two
cognitive categories based on their ‘estimation style’ – i.e., the cognitive
categories were not named. Participants were informed that the categories
would be represented by a colour – either red or blue. This was to eliminate
any possibility that naming the categories as dot ‘over’ and ‘under’ estimators
may have confounded the experimental design (see Chapter 4, section 4.2)5.
The measures of subjective experience used for the current study also
differed from those used by Fenn (2006). Fenn (2006) conceptualised
‘subjective experience’ in terms of participants’ enjoyment, relaxation, and
spatial requirements, as well as their willingness to take part in a follow-up
study, how at ease they felt, and how friendly the other participant was
perceived to be. There is some inconsistency between these ad hoc items. For
example, one item probed perceptions of confederate friendliness, which is in
fact a measure of other-perception, whereas another probed participants’
spatial requirements. These two dimensions of experience seem fairly far
removed from one another. Therefore, a more consistent measure of subjective
experience will be used in the current study. As discussed in the preceding
chapters, close physical proximity can sometimes be associated with joyful
affective responses (e.g., at sports stadiums and nightclubs), whereas at other
times, it can be associated with negative affective responses (e.g., on public
transport or in shopping malls). As such, participants’ subjective affective state
will be the primary dependent measure in the current study, and will be gauged
using an established measurement scale.
A secondary dependent measure will be participants’ expressed desire for
closer proximity to their expected interactant. Although this should be seen as
an additional measure of subjective experience, using a measure of desired
proximity also provides an opportunity to consolidate the behavioural results
obtained in chapter 4 with a self-report measure. In the studies described in the
5 This study was conducted before the results of Chapter 4, study 1 had been obtained and
analysed fully. Therefore, questions still remained regarding whether participants in Novelli et
al. (2010, study 1) sought greater distances from out-group members (who were dot ‘over-
estimators’) because of perceived arrogance, inferiority/superiority etc., rather than because of
group categorisation per se. These concerns later proved to be unfounded, and as such,
removing ‘under-estimator’ and ‘over-estimator’ tags from the groups was unnecessary.
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previous chapter, group context was manipulated and then participants were
allowed to place the chairs wherever they pleased. As a result, participants
sought closer proximity to in-group members than they did to out-group
members. Like the studies described in the previous chapter, group context
will be manipulated in this study. However, participants will not be given
freedom to choose their interaction distance. It will therefore be interesting to
obtain a self-report measure of desired proximity to establish whether effects of
group context and interaction distance emerge.
A final methodological difference between the current study and that
conducted by Fenn (2006) related to the participants’ interaction partner. Rather
than using a confederate to play the part of the other participant so that the
actual participants experience close proximity to another person, the empty
chair approach that was developed in Novelli et al. (2010) and in Chapter 4 of
this thesis was used. In other words, participants simply anticipated interaction
with an in-group or out-group member, and then experienced close proximity to
an empty chair, thus providing a sterner test of the hypotheses.
Several hypotheses were formulated. The first set of hypotheses related
to the measures of subjective affective experience. First, it was predicted that
participants expecting interaction with an in-group member would report higher
levels of positive affect and lower levels of negative affect than those expecting
interaction with an out-group member. In line with Fenn’s (2006) pilot work, it
was predicted that participants expecting interaction at close proximity to an
out-group member would report the lowest levels of positive affect and the
highest levels of negative affect due to their close physical proximity to
someone defined as ‘other’. Second, it was predicted that participants
expecting interaction in the ‘close’ conditions would report lower levels of
positive affect and higher levels of negative affect than those expecting
interaction in the ‘far’ conditions. This prediction is not derived from SCT – it
simply comes from the fact that the distance used in the ‘near’ condition was
closer than any of the mean distances observed in Chapter 4 (and Novelli et al.,
2010).
With regards to the measure of desired proximity, it was first predicted that
participants expecting interaction in the ‘close’ conditions would express a
weaker desire to be seated closer to their expected interactant than would
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participants in the ‘far’ conditions. Again, this was due to the fact that the
distance used in the ‘close’ condition was closer than any of the mean distances
observed in the studies preceding this one (i.e., Chapter 4, studies 1 & 2;
Novelli et al., 2010). Second, it was predicted that participants in the out-group
conditions would express a weaker desire to be seated closer to their expected
interactant than would the participants in the in-group conditions. Desire for
closer proximity was expected to be lowest for participants expecting interaction
with an out-group member at ‘close’ proximity, and highest for participants
expecting interaction with an in-group member in the ‘far’ condition.
5.2.2 Method
5.2.2.1 Design
A 2 (group context: in-group/out-group) x 2 (interaction distance: ‘near’/’far’)
between subjects factorial design was used.
5.2.2.2 Participants
Undergraduate students at the University of Sussex were contacted via email
and offered either course credits or £3 in exchange for their participation. Forty
students, whose ages ranged from 18 to 42 (M = 21.23 years, SD = 3.98), were
recruited. As was the case for the studies described in Chapter 4, the sample
comprised of female native English speakers due to the potential effects of
culture (see Evans et al., 2000; Hall, 1966), sex (see Evans & Howard, 1973)
and/or gender (see Uzzell & Horne, 2006) on ‘personal space’.
5.2.2.3 Dependent measures
Participants responded to the measures of identification, perceived difference
and desired proximity using a seven-point Likert-type scale, which ranged from
1 (‘not at all’) to 7 (‘very much’).
Manipulation check (i): Identification: Participants’ identification with the
minimal group categories was measured using the same three items that were
used in Chapter 4, study 1 (adapted from Ellemers et al., 1999). However, the
wording was adjusted slightly to account for the fact that the cognitive
categories were no longer referred to as dot ‘over’ and ‘under-estimators’. The
adjusted items were as follows: ‘I identify with other people who are in the same
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group as me’, ‘I am like other people who are in the same group as me’, and
‘The group I belong to is a reflection of who I am’. As these items scaled
together reliably (α = .75), their mean was calculated and used to represent
participants’ identification with the minimal group.
Manipulation check (ii): Perceived difference of target to self: Perceived
difference was measured using the same three items that were used in Chapter
4, study 1 (see section 4.3.2.3). It was found that the two measures of
‘difference’ and the reversed measure of ‘similarity’ scaled together reliably (α =
.72) and were therefore included as a composite measure of difference.
Dependent variable (i): Subjective affective experience: Participants’
levels of positive and negative affect were assessed using the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) scales (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988)
(see Appendix 5). Participants rated their positive and negative feelings and
emotions at that moment on a scale that ranged from 1 (‘very slightly or not at
all) to 5 (extremely). The positive affect items (α = .88) were summed to obtain
a single-score representation of positive affect and the negative affect items (α
= .83) were summed in order to gain a single-score representation of negative
affect.
Dependent variable (ii): Desired proximity: A single item was administered
to participants to gauge their desired proximity to the ‘other’ participant. This
item was: ‘Would you prefer to be closer to the other participant?’
5.2.2.4 Procedure
The experimental paradigm was very similar to the one used in Chapter 4, study
1 (see section 4.3.2.4). As such, a detailed description will not be repeated
here. However, there were some changes, which will be outlined below.
First, as the cognitive categories were no longer referred to as dot ‘over-’
and ‘under-estimators’, the participant brief was adjusted accordingly (see
appendix 6). In addition, the format of the estimation tasks differed slightly from
Chapter 4, study 1. Rather than allocating participants to groups based on their
dot-estimation score and then assessing their ‘typicality’ using their responses
to the multiple choice questions, participants were told that their ‘cognitive style’
and ‘typicality’ would be assessed using a single score that would be calculated
following their completion of both of these tasks/measures.
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The next set of procedural changes were minor. As the minimal groups in
the current study were represented solely by a colour, the badges were not
labelled. All of the participants were told that they were in the category
represented by the colour blue, and therefore asked to wear a blue badge. As
was the case in Chapter 4, study 1, the ‘discussion’ room was arranged so that
it looked as though the ‘other’ participant had left her personal belongings on a
chair before rushing off to look for her mobile phone. The ‘other’s’ personal
artefacts were the same as those used in the previous study. Again, the
‘other’s’ jacket had a badge representing the minimal group attached to it. The
badge was blue when participants anticipated interaction was with an in-group
member and red when the expected interaction was with an out-group member.
The final change to the procedure relates to the way in which the chairs in
‘discussion’ room were set up. In Chapter 4, study 1 and Novelli et al. (2010),
just the ‘other’s’ chair was arranged and the participant was asked to take their
own chair from a stack at the side of the room. However, as interaction
distance was used as an independent variable in the current study, two chairs
were arranged to manipulate the distance at which the actual participants
expected to interact with the fictional ‘other’. The chairs were arranged so that
they were either ‘close to’ or ‘far away’ from one another. It could of course, be
argued that obtaining objective measures of ‘close’ and ‘far’ distances could be
troublesome. Therefore, the distances obtained from Chapter 4, study 1 were
used as guidelines.
The mean proximities obtained from the in-group participants in Chapter 4,
study 1 were used as guidance for the ‘close’ distance. First, the mean
distances placed between the nearest front legs of the chairs (M = 24.46
inches, SD = 6.68), the furthest front legs of the chairs (M = 47.74 inches, SD =
6.94), and the middle of the front edge of the seats (M = 34.46 inches, SD =
5.68) by in-group participants were calculated. Then, the mean of the standard
deviations of these three distances was calculated (M SD = 6.43) and
subtracted from each of the three distances obtained. These distances were
then rounded to the nearest half an inch. It was felt that subtracting the mean
standard deviation from mean intra-group distance from Chapter 4, study 1
(which was the closest mean distance) would provide a ‘close’ interaction
distance. The final ‘near’ distances were as follows: distance between nearest
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front legs = 20 inches; distance between the furthest front legs = 41.5 inches;
distance between the middle of the front edge of the seats = 28 inches.
The mean distances from the participants expecting an out-group
interaction in Chapter 4, study 1 were used as guidelines to obtain a ‘far’
distance in the current study. First, the mean distances between the nearest
front legs of the chairs (M = 31.58, SD = 9.75), the furthest front legs (M = 51.64
inches, SD = 7.45), and the middle of the front edge of the seats (M = 38.96
inches, SD = 7.59) for out-group participants were calculated, as was the mean
standard deviation (M SD = 6.26). The mean of the standard deviations was
then added to each of the above mean distances – which were then rounded up
to the nearest half an inch – to provide three new ‘far’ distances. These
distances were as follows: distance between the nearest front legs = 38 inches;
distance between the furthest front legs = 58 inches; distance between the
middle of the front edge of the seats = 45 inches.
5.2.3 Results
5.2.3.1 Manipulation checks
Identification: A one-sample t-test was conducted to examine whether
participants displayed a clear acceptance or rejection of the minimal group
identity. It was found that the mean level of identification (M = 4.08, SD = 1.05)
did not significantly differ from the mid-point of the scale, t (39) = 0.50, p = .62
(ns). Although this suggests that participants did not outwardly reject the
minimal group identity, it also suggests that the manipulation did not induce
identity very well. Importantly, there was not a significant difference in
identification for participants expecting interaction with an in-group member (M
= 4.05, SD = 0.98) and those anticipating interaction with an out-group member
(M = 4.12, SD = 1.14), t (38) = -0.20, p = .84 (ns), r = .03. Therefore, any
between-condition differences on the dependent measures cannot be attributed
to differences in levels of identification.
Perceived difference of target to self: In line with SCT principles,
participants expecting an inter-group interaction perceived the ‘other’ to be
significantly more different from them (M = 4.87, SD = 0.96) than did
participants who were expecting an intra-group interaction (M = 4.12, SD =
1.08), t (38) = -2.16, p = .037, r = .33, with a medium effect size. This at least
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provides some evidence to suggest that the group context of the anticipated
interactions was successfully manipulated.
5.2.3.2 Experience measures: Main effects and interactions
Table 5.1 shows the means and standard deviations for the three dependent
variables (positive affect, negative affect and desired proximity) for participants
expecting interaction with either an in-group member or out-group member at a
‘close’ or ‘far’ interaction distance. A 2 x 2 multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) was conducted to assess the effect of group context and interaction
distance on these dependent variables. Using Pillai’s trace, it was found that
the MANOVA revealed significant multivariate main effects for group context, F
(3, 34) = 4.63, p = .008, ή2 = .29, and interaction distance, F (3, 34) = 7.19, p =
.001, ή2 = .39, but no interaction between these two independent variables, F
(3, 34) = 0.28, p = .84 (ns), ή2 = .02.
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Table 5.1
Means and standard deviations for participants expecting discussion with an in-
group or out-group members at ‘close’ or ‘far’ interaction distances (study 3).
Experimental condition
In-group In-group Out-group Out-group
Dependent variable ‘Close’ ‘Far’ ‘Close’ ‘Far’
Positive affect
M 29.10 29.40 30.30 29.30
SD
7.06 5.99 7.96 6.27
Negative affect
M
12.40 13.90 12.50 16.00
SD
3.34 4.72 3.66 4.59
Desired proximity
M 2.40 4.20 1.40 3.20
SD
0.97 1.81 0.70 1.40
Note: desired proximity relates to participants’ desire to be closer to their discussion partner.
Separate univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAS) were conducted to
examine the effects of group context and interaction distance on each of the
dependent variables. With regards to positive affect, the main effects of group
context, F (1, 36) = 0.06, p = .80 (ns), ή2 = .002, and interaction distance, F (1,
36) = 0.03, p = .87 (ns), ή2 = .001, and also the interaction between these two
variables, F (1, 36) = 0.09, p = .77 (ns), ή2 = .002, were not significant.
Therefore, the hypothesised effects of group context and interaction distance on
positive affect were not supported. Likewise, the hypothesised effects of group
context and interaction distance on participants’ self-reported levels of negative
affect were not supported by the data. While the main effect of group context
on negative affect was non-significant, F (1, 36), 0.71, p = .40 (ns), ή2 = .02,
there was a marginally significant effect of interaction distance, F (1, 36) = 3.68,
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p = .06, ή2 = .09. Contrary to expectations, participants in the ‘far’ condition
reported higher levels of negative affect than participants in the ‘close’
condition. Finally, with regards to desired proximity, there were significant main
effects of both group context, F (1, 36) = 6.00, p = .02, ή2 = .14 (with a medium
effect size), and interaction distance, F (1, 36) = 19.44, p < .001, ή2 = .35 (with a
large effect size) on participants’ desire to be closer to their expected
interactant. As expected, participants anticipating interaction with an out-group
member expressed a weaker desire to be closer to the ‘other’ than did those
expecting to interact with an in-group member, while those expecting interaction
in the ‘close’ conditions expressed a weaker desire for closer proximity than did
those in the ‘far’ condition. There was no interaction between the two
independent variables, F (1, 36) = 0.00, p = 1.00 (ns), ή2 = .000. Interestingly,
however, and in line with an SCT approach to spatiality, the findings reveal that
participants in the out-group ‘close’ condition expressed the weakest desire for
closer proximity, whereas those in the in-group ‘far’ condition expressed the
strongest desire to be closer to their expected interaction partner.
5.2.4 Discussion
The main reason for carrying out the current study was to investigate the
potential effects of group context on participants’ subjective affective experience
when they had no control over the amount of space between themselves and
their expected discussion partner. Contrary to expectations, there was no effect
of group context on positive or negative affect, regardless of the distance at
which the expected interaction was to take place. This finding could be
interpreted as evidence to suggest that affective responses to close proximity
do not vary as a function group relations – at least when an interaction is on a
one-to-one basis in the sterile laboratory environment. However, alternative
explanations should first be considered. First, only a small sample (40) was
recruited, resulting in only ten participants per cell, and reducing the power of
the experimental design. Second, unlike the study conducted by Fenn (2006),
in which a confederate was used, participants in the current study anticipated
interaction with another person. As a result, they simply sat next to an empty
chair. Whilst sitting next to the chair, they were asked to complete the
questionnaire containing measures of the dependent variables. The first set of
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items in the questionnaire was the PANAS, and as such, it could be argued that
participants may not have had time to give their discussion partner, or the group
context of their interaction much thought when reporting their affective state.
This study did find a marginally significant effect of interaction distance on
participants’ reported negative affect. In contrast to expectations, higher levels
of negative affect were reported for participants in the ‘far’ conditions than for
participants in the ‘close’ conditions. This finding was not expected, and is not
easily explained. Perhaps participants interpreted the excessive interaction
distance as a violation of a conversation norm, which in turn made them feel
uneasy about the discussion that they were anticipating. Interaction distance
had no impact on reported levels of positive affect.
It was also hypothesised that desired proximity – which can be seen as an
alternative measure of subjective experience – would vary as a function of
group context and interaction distance. As expected, participants expecting
interaction at ‘close’ proximity expressed a weaker desire to be closer to their
discussion partner than did those expecting interaction in the ‘far’ conditions.
However, more importantly, and in line with the observations made in Chapter 4
– and hence a SCT approach to spatiality – participants anticipating interaction
with an in-group member wanted to be seated closer to their discussion partner
than did those anticipating interaction with an out-group member. Of the four
conditions, participants in the in-group-‘far’ condition expressed the strongest
desire for closer proximity, which supports the view that people seek out
relatively closer physical proximity to those defined as self when they find
themselves ‘far’ away from them. In contrast, participants in the out-group-
‘close’ condition expressed the weakest desire for closer proximity, which lends
support to the idea that the desire to seek closer physical proximity to someone
defined as other diminishes when asked to interact at a distance which might
already be perceived as ‘too close’. Unlike the measures of affect, the
measures of desired proximity were completed towards the end of the
questionnaire and actually involved participants thinking about their physical
relationship with their discussion partner.
While this study has confirmed the hypothesis that psychological proximity
can influence participants’ desire for physical proximity, its failure to find an
effect of group relations on the subjective affective experience of close proximity
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will be addressed in the following study. To address the possibility that (a) the
use of an empty chair and (b) asking participants to complete the measures of
affect before they had an opportunity to think at any length about the nature of
their relations to the person with whom they were about to interact, may have
(c) resulted in a test of the hypotheses that was simply too demanding, a
confederate will be used in study 2.
5.3 Study 4
5.3.1 Overview
This study again sought to measure experiential outcomes of group context and
proximity manipulations. As discussed above, rather than simply expecting an
interaction with another person and then waiting next to that person’s empty
chair, participants in the current study were involved in an interaction (in the
form of an interview-style role-play) with a confederate before being asked to fill
in the measures of the dependent variables.
There were some slight adjustments to the measures of the dependent
variables. As was the case in study 3, participants’ subjective affective
experience was of interest. However, some of the measures of subjective
experience used by Fenn (2006) – which do not relate to affect, but to the actual
positive experience associated with the interaction with the confederate – were
included as dependent measures in the current study. These items were
included in order to establish whether Fenn’s (2006) findings could be replicated
when the outcome measures focussed on specific measures of experience, or
whether diverse measures would uncover similar results. The items adapted
from Fenn (2006) will be referred to as measures of subjective positive
experience. As was the case in study 3, participants’ desired proximity was also
measured.
It was predicted that participants would have a more positive experience in
terms of (1) their subjective experience, and (2) their subjective affective
experience, following interaction with an in-group, as opposed to an out-group
confederate. It was predicted that these effects would be stronger when the
interaction distance was ‘close’ as opposed to ‘far’. It was also expected that
due to the extremely close proximity imposed in the ‘close’ condition,
participants would express a weaker desire for closer proximity when ‘close’ to
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as opposed to ‘far’ from the confederate. However, it was predicted that, in line
with SCT principles, participants in the in-group conditions would express a
greater desire for closer proximity than would participants in the out-group
conditions. In line with study 3 and consistent with SCT, it was again predicted
that participants in the out-group-‘close’ condition would express the weakest
desire for closer proximity, whereas desire to be closer to the confederate would
be highest for participants in the in-group-‘far’ condition.
5.3.2 Method
5.3.2.1 Design
This study used a 2 (group context: in-group/out-group) x 2 (interaction
distance: ‘near’/‘far’) between subjects factorial design.
5.3.2.2. Participants
The current study was advertised via email to undergraduate students from the
University of Sussex. They were offered either £3 or course credits in
exchange for their participation. Sixty female participants whose ages ranged
from 18 to 45 (M = 20.88, SD = 4.19) took part in the study. A male
undergraduate psychology student worked as a confederate for the duration of
the study.6
5.3.2.3 Dependent measures
Manipulation check (i): Identification: The three measures of identification
used for study 1 in this chapter (from Ellemers et al., 1999) were also used for
the current study. These items scaled together reliably (α = .78) and were
therefore combined to create a composite measure of identification.
Manipulation check (ii): Perceived difference of target to self: Again, the
three measures of perceived difference used for study 3 were used for the
current study. They scaled together (α = .61) and were combined to create a
single-score representation of perceived difference.
6 Although there are possible effects of male-female interactions on personal space (see
Hayduk, 1983), it is felt that as the same confederate was used for the duration of the study,
any between-condition variations on the dependent variables will be due to the experimental
manipulations, and not the confederate’s gender.
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Dependent variable (i): Subjective positive experience: Four of the
measures used by Fenn (2006), plus one additional item (which was designed
for the current study) were used. The items, which were anchored by 1 (‘not at
all’) and 7 (‘very much so’) were as follows: ‘I enjoyed taking part in the
interview’, ‘I felt at ease during the interview’, ‘I would be willing to take part in a
follow-up study at a later date’, ‘I felt relaxed during the interview’, ‘I had difficult
relaxing during the interview’ (later reversed), and ‘I felt uncomfortable during
the interview’ (later reversed). These items were found to have a good level of
internal consistency (α = .86) and were therefore combined.
Dependent variable (ii): Subjective affective experience: Three items were
used to measure participants’ affective response during their interaction with the
confederate. The items were taken from the Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). It was felt that the complete version of
the PANAS was perhaps inappropriate as items measuring affective dimensions
such as inspiration, guilt, and attentiveness, would not be relevant. Therefore,
the affective dimensions that were felt to be most appropriate for a novel
context (excitement, interest, and nervousness) were included. The item
relating to nervousness was reverse scored. In order to retain consistency with
the subjective positive experience measures, the scales ranged from 1 (‘not at
all’) to 7 (‘very much so’), as opposed to the 1-5 response scale used in the
PANAS. Cronbach’s alpha approached an acceptable level for these items (α =
.59).
Dependent variable (iii): Desired proximity: Two items were used to
assess the extent to which participants wished to be seated closer to the
confederate. The first simply read: ‘I would have preferred to have been sitting
closer to the other participant’, whereas the second, which was later reverse
scored was: ‘I would have preferred to have been sitting further away from the
other participant’. Both items were on scales from 1 (’not at all’) to 7 (‘very much
so’). These items scaled together reasonably well (α = .66) and were combined
to produce a composite measure of desired proximity.
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5.3.2.4 Procedure
The experimental paradigm used for this study was similar to that used for study
3, although there were some alterations due to the presence of the confederate.
In an attempt to prevent participants from becoming suspicious, the confederate
arrived at the laboratory after the participants. Participants (and the
confederate) were informed of the differences between the two cognitive
categories (represented by the colours red and blue) on a range of cognitive
categories, and told that the current study was being conducted to assess the
social performance of category members when interacting with a member of
either their own or the other cognitive category.
Participants were told that category membership was determined by
performance on a range of numerical and social estimation tasks (the dot
patterns and typicality measures used in the previous studies; see Appendix 3).
When the participants had completed the tasks, they were asked to follow the
instructions provided, which would allow them to assess which of the cognitive
categories they belonged to. To do so, each participant was instructed to
perform a series of calculations derived from their answers to the estimation
tasks. They were instructed that a final score below 750 was indicative of
membership of the category represented by the colour blue, whilst a score
exceeding 750 indicated that they belonged to the category represented by the
colour red. This ‘self-assessment’ was used to prevent the participants
becoming suspicious of the allocation to categories. Depending on which
category they ‘belonged’ to, participants were asked to wear either a red or blue
badge in an attempt to strengthen identification (as the manipulation of identity
was weak in the previous study).
The confederate waited for the participants to announce which group they
belonged to, and then depending on the randomly assigned group context of
the interaction, he declared his category membership (as either an in-group or
out-group member). At this stage, the participant and the confederate were
informed that they would be having a ‘social interaction’ (in the form of an role-
play interview) with each other in an adjacent room. They were told that the
interview would be about a short piece of music. Allocation to the roles of
interviewer and interviewee appeared to be random, but was fixed so that the
confederate was always the interviewer.
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Having been assigned to the roles, the confederate was handed a written
instruction sheet (a series of questions relating to the music), and instructed to
take a seat on a specific chair in the adjacent room. The participant was handed
a separate instruction sheet (simply stating that she would be asked some
questions relating to a piece of music) and asked to take a seat on a second
chair. The chairs were set up either ‘close’ to, or ‘far’ from each other. As was
the case in study 3, the distances were derived from those obtained in Chapter
4, study 1. For the ‘close’ condition, the mean in-group distances from Chapter
4, study 1, minus one standard deviation and an additional ten inches was
calculated. For the ‘far’ condition, the mean out-group distance from Chapter 4,
study 1, plus one standard deviation and an additional ten inches was used.
The additional ten inches at both distances was used to make the distances
more ‘extreme’ to establish whether the use of more ‘extreme’ distances
strengthened the impact of group context on participants’ experience.
Having listened to a piece of music for one minute, the confederate asked
the participants several questions about the piece of music (e.g., ‘How long do
you think the piece of music lasted for?’ and ‘Which instrument was most
prominent?’). When the questioning was complete, the participant and the
confederate were asked to complete a questionnaire containing the measures
of interest. Participants were then debriefed.
5.3.3 Results
5.3.3.1 Manipulation checks
Identification: As the mean score on the composite measure of
identification was near to the mid-point of the scale (4) (M = 4.02, SD = 1.09), t
(59) = 0.18, p = .88 (ns), which ranged from ‘not at all’ to ‘very much’, it can be
suggested that the minimal identity was neither strongly accepted, nor rejected.
Hence, as was the case in the previous study, the manipulation of identity was
not as effective as intended. Importantly, there was no difference in
identification between those interacting with in an in-group member (M = 4.02,
SD = 0.93) and those interacting with an out-group member (M = 4.02, SD =
1.25), t (58) = 0.00, p = 1.0.
Perceived difference of target to self: There was no difference in
perceived difference to self for those in the in-group (M = 4.08, SD = 0.92) and
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out-group (M = 4.04, SD = 0.83) conditions, t (58) = 0.15, p = .88, r = .02, which
raises some concern regarding the extent to which group context was
successfully manipulated, at least based on the self-report measures.
5.3.3.2 Experience measures: Main effects and interactions
Table 5.2
Means and standard deviations for participants expecting discussion with an in-
group or out-group members at ‘close’ or ‘far’ interaction distances (study 4).
Experimental condition
In-group In-group Out-group Out-group
Dependent variable ‘Close’ ‘Far’ ‘Close’ ‘Far’
Subjective positive
experience
M 5.01 5.31 4.56 5.20
SD 0.80 1.30 1.44 1.11
Subjective affective
experience
M 4.40 4.62 3.73 4.02
SD 1.07 1.32 1.00 1.15
Desired proximity
M 3.57 4.27 2.93 4.93
SD 1.18 0.73 1.12 0.70
Note: desired proximity relates to participants’ desire to be closer to their discussion partner.
The means and standard deviations for the three dependent variables
(subjective positive experience, subjective affective experience, and desired
proximity) are displayed in table 5.2. A 2 x 2 multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) examined the effects of group context and interaction distance on
the dependent variables. Pillai’s trace did not reveal a significant multivariate
main effect for group context, F (3, 54) = 1.68, p = .18 (ns), ή2 = .09, although
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this effect reaches marginal significance with a two-tailed test (p = .09). Pillai’s
trace was found to be significant for interaction distance, F (3, 54) = 10.09, p <
.001, ή2 = .36, and the interaction between the two independent variables
reached marginal significance, F (3, 54) = 2.40, p = .08, ή2 = .12.
Separate ANOVAs were conducted on each of the dependent variables to
investigate these effects further. Starting with participants’ subjective positive
experience, contrary to expectations, there was no effect of group context, F (1,
56) = 0.84, p = .36 (ns), ή2 = .02, or interaction distance, F (1, 56) = 2.32, p =
.13 (ns), ή2 = .04 (although this p-value would have approached significance
with a one-tailed test). There was no interaction between group context and
interaction distance for this dependent variable, F (1, 56) = 0.32, p = .57 (ns), ή2
= .01.
For the second dependent variable – positive affective experience – in line
with expectations, there was a significant effect of group context, F (1, 56) =
4.61, p = .04, ή2 = .08, which perhaps explains why the MANOVA results were
suggestive of an overall effect of group context (albeit rather weakly). As
predicted, participants who interacted with an in-group confederate reported
higher levels of positive affect than did participants who interacted with an out-
group confederate. There was no effect of interaction distance on affect, F (1,
56) = 0.75, p = .39 (ns), ή2 = .01. It was hypothesised that the effect of group
context on subjective affect would be stronger when the interaction distance
was ‘close’ as opposed to ‘far’. However, the interaction between the
independent variables was not significant, F (1, 56) = 0.01, p = .91, ή2 = .00.
Finally, as expected, analysis of variance revealed a significant effect of
interaction distance on participants’ desire to be closer to the confederate, F (1,
56) = 29.88, p < .001, ή2 = .35, with participants in the ‘far’ conditions
expressing a stronger desire to be closer than participants in the ‘close’
conditions. Although a main effect of group context on desired proximity was
expected, this was not supported, F (1, 56) = 0.01, p = .95, ή2 = .00. There was
however a significant interaction between group context and interaction
distance on participants’ proximity preference, F (1, 56) = 6.93, p = .01, ή2 = .11.
Simple effects analysis reveals that as a result of this interaction, when
participants had interacted with the confederate at close proximity, those in the
out-group condition expressed a marginally significantly weaker desire for
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closer proximity than did participants in the in-group condition, F (1, 56) = 3.29,
p = .07. This result was expected and supports a SCT approach to the
experiential dimension of ‘personal space’. However, rather unexpectedly,
when the interaction distance was ‘far’, participants in the in-group condition
expressed a marginally significantly weaker desire to be closer to the
confederate than did those in the out-group condition, F (1, 56) = 3.64, p = .06.
5.3.4 Discussion
The current study was conducted to further investigate the impact of group
relations on participants’ experience of close physical proximity, using an
alternative experimental design to that used in study 3. In line with Fenn’s
(2006) pilot study, participants interacted at either a ‘near’ or ‘far’ distance with a
confederate who was framed as either an in-group member or an out-group
member. It was found that the group context of the discussion and the distance
at which it took place did not have significant effects on participants’ subjective
positive experience. There was, however, a significant effect of group context
on participants’ subjective affect. As predicted, participants who had interacted
with an in-group member reported higher levels of positive affect than those
who had interacted with an out-group member. Contrary to expectations,
interaction distance did not have a significant impact on participants’ subjective
affect. Thus, whilst these findings suggest that group relations can impact upon
the way we feel when we interact with a person with whom we have no history
of interaction, they tell us little about the way in which physical distance can
influence this relationship between psychological proximity and the way we feel.
However, it was found that in line with earlier findings (this chapter, study 3;
Chapter 4, studies 1 and 2; Novelli et al. 2010, study 1), participants’ desire for
closer proximity varied as a function of group relations. When participants were
asked to interact at close proximity to the confederate, those in the in-group
condition expressed a stronger desire for closer proximity than did those in the
out-group condition. As desired proximity is suggestive of participants’ level of
comfort, it can be seen as a proxy measure of experience, and as such, this
finding at least points to the idea that unavoidable close proximity to an out-
group member – someone defined as other – is more likely to be experienced
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negatively (because it is a violation of the self-other boundary) than close
proximity to an in-group member – someone defined as self.
In contrast to expectations, and in contrast to the findings of the first study in
this chapter, the opposite effect was found when the interaction distance was
‘far’. Participants in the out-group condition expressed a marginally significantly
stronger desire for closer proximity than did those in the in-group condition.
This finding is not easily explained and can only be interpreted speculatively.
One possible explanation could be that participants may have felt awkward and
uncomfortable when they were (a) told that they belonged to a different
cognitive group to the confederate, and (b) were then asked to interact at an
unusually far distance from him. As a combined result of this imposed
psychological distance and anti-normative physical interaction distance,
participants may have been more likely to attempt to minimise the discomfort
that they had just experienced by stating that they would have preferred to have
been seated closer.
Although the design of this study was an improvement on that used by Fenn
(2006), it did have some slight weaknesses, which require some
acknowledgement. First, the confederate was aware of the condition to which
the participants were assigned, thus opening the study to the criticisms that that
the confederate’s behaviour may have led the participants to display demand
characteristics. Ideally, both the confederate and the participant would have
been unaware of the experimental context. However, such a design would
have been difficult to administer when the study’s objectives are considered.
For example, participants were asked to wear group badges in an attempt to
enhance the salience of the minimal group identities and hence the group
context of the interaction. This would not have been possible of the confederate
was unaware of the condition to which participants had been assigned. It was
also felt that the experimental cover story would be more believable if
participants were able to self-assess their category membership (and believe
that the confederate was doing the same thing) rather than both the participant
and confederate being assigned to a group by the experimenter, which may
have aroused some suspicion. As none of the participants became aware of
the deception involved in the study, this technique proved to be a success.
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Whilst it is important to acknowledge this potential criticism of the study
design, it is also important to stress that this issue is not simply an afterthought.
As the study was designed with this issue in mind, it was carefully planned to
ensure that there was little opportunity for the confederate to adapt his
behaviour depending on the condition – i.e., so that he did not act in a friendlier
manner or appear to be more approachable to in-group members than to out-
group members. The entire interaction between the confederate and the
participants was fully scripted from beginning to end. The confederate was
asked not to go beyond the script, and to ensure that his behaviour was
consistent across all trials.
The second potential weakness relates to the measures of affect. The affect
scale was based on two measures of positive affect and one measure of
negative affect, which was later reversed. These three items were combined to
produce a measure of ‘positive affect’. However, with hindsight, it is clear to
see that an even number of positive and negative items, each feeding into
separate tests of positive and negative affect would have provided much
clearer, more accurate, and more reliable tests of affect. Therefore, in order to
probe further the possible impact of group relations on subjective affect that was
hinted at in this study, future researchers should consider using better
measures of both positive and negative affect.
5.4 General discussion
The two studies presented in this chapter offer limited support to a SCT
approach to the experiential dimension of ‘personal space’. In study 3,
participants in minimal groups anticipated an interaction with either an in-group
member or an out-group member at a ‘near’ or ‘far’ distance. Although marginal
effects of interaction distance on affect emerged, the group context of the
interaction did not have a significant effect on participants’ subjective affective
state. Study 4 used a similar design. However, rather than simply anticipating
interaction and hence sitting next to an empty chair, participants interacted with
a confederate who was framed as an in-group or out-group member.
Participants’ positive experience associated with the discussion did not differ
across conditions. However, it was found that participants who had interacted
with an in-group confederate reported higher levels of subjective positive affect
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than did those who had interacted with an out-group confederate. However, as
was the case in study 3, subjective affect did not vary as a function of
interaction distance.
Although on the surface the studies presented in this chapter did not offer
strong support for a SCT approach to the experiential dimension of ‘personal
space’, they did provide further evidence to suggest a link between
psychological and (desired) physical proximity – i.e., the behavioural dimension
of ‘personal space’. In study 3, participants in both the ‘near’ and ‘far’
conditions expressed a stronger desire to be closer to an in-group member than
to an out-group member, whilst the same was found for participants in the ‘near’
condition in study 4. Not only do these findings lend further support to the
results presented in Chapter 4 and also in Novelli et al. (2010, study 1), they
also point to the suggestion that participants may have felt more comfortable
with the thought of closer proximity to an in-group member than to an out-group
member. In doing so, these findings provide some support to the hypothesised
relationship between identity, group relations, proximity and experience.
This evidence in support of the SCT approach to the experiential
dimension of ‘personal space’ is, however, weaker than predicted. As already
noted, the self-report measures of experience did not vary as a function of the
interaction between group context and interaction distance. This raises the
question of why the laboratory studies discussed in the current chapter have
tended to find strong support for the SCT approach to the behavioural, but not
the (self-reported) experiential dimension of ‘personal space’.
One possible explanation might lie with the contextual nature of the
experiments. Firstly, the groups used were minimal (and in fact the
manipulations of group context were weak) and therefore relatively meaningless
to the participants. It could be that proximity to in-group and out-group
members in socially meaningful contexts, where there is a history of interaction,
might be more emotive for those involved. Secondly, while the interactions in
study 3 were only anticipated (they did not actually take place), the interactions
with a confederate in study 4 were only on a one-to-one basis. As such, any
‘personal space’ violations in the out-group condition, or close proximity to
someone who was perceived as a part of self in the in-group condition, would
have only involved one person. While this may have been enough to evoke
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variations in spatial preferences (as was the case in Chapter 4), it may not have
been enough to evoke an affective response. However, in a dense crowd,
close proximity would be to several other people. If those other people were
out-group members, a perceiver’s ‘personal space’ would be violated by several
‘others’, and from all directions – from in front, behind, and to the sides. It
would therefore be expected that the negative experience associated with
‘personal space’ violations would be greater when the violations are made by
many others, as opposed to just one. Likewise, if the others present in the
crowd were in-group members, close proximity would not be solely to one other
person perceived as self, as it was in the laboratory studies described in the
previous chapter. Instead, the perceiver would be surrounded by several
people who would be defined as self, and as a result, any potential positive
feelings of warmth, comfort or intimacy, and so on, that might come from
proximal relations to those defined as self, would be magnified.
With these issues in mind, the chapters that follow will begin to investigate
the impact of identity processes and group relations on the behavioural and
experiential dimensions of ‘personal space’ and crowding in situations that go
beyond one-to-one interactions, starting with an investigation of exposure to
density in imagined crowds in the studies presented in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6: Psychological responses to imagined crowding
6.1 Introduction
The preceding chapters have provided some support for a SCT approach to
behavioural variations in ‘personal space’, and hence provide a partial
theoretical explanation of variable responses to crowding. Specific evidence for
this support comes from the observation that participants (1) sought closer
physical proximity to in-group members than to out-group members when given
freedom to choose an interaction distance, and (2) expressed a stronger desire
for close proximity to in-group members than to out-group members when the
interaction distance was fixed. These variations in actual and desired physical
proximity were attributed to the variable nature of self-other relations described
by SCT. In short, SCT suggests that when a person is depersonalized (self-
categorized according to a social identity), other in-group members are
perceived as a psychological extension of self, whereas out-group members are
perceived as separate from self. That is, they are perceived as ‘other’. It has
been hypothesised in this thesis that this increased psychological proximity to
in-group members and psychological distance from out-group members should
be reflected in our preferences for physical proximity to them. This hypothesis
has been supported.
However, it is also important to underline the fact that these behavioural
variations in proximity seeking behaviours are not simply a physical
phenomenon. Whether someone wants to be near to, or far from another
person or group of people, should be seen as a reflection of comfort, which is a
psychological construct – an experiential construct. Indeed, the traditional
approach to ‘personal space’ and its application to crowding (see Chapter 2,
section 2.6), explicitly linked behaviour and experience when it proposed that
physical violations of ‘personal space’ (the self-other boundary) in crowds
should be experienced negatively. An SCT approach to ‘personal space’ and
crowding would follow the same line of reasoning. However, SCT predicts that
the perception of close proximity (in one-to-one interactions, small groups, and
most importantly, in large crowds) as a violation of the self-other boundary will
depend on how we categorize ourselves, and whether others around us in a
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crowd are in fact perceived as self or other. When close physical proximity is
on an interpersonal level, or to one or more out-group members (i.e., other/s),
the perceiver’s ‘personal space’ will be violated, and the resulting experience
might be one of discomfort, annoyance, hostility, and so on. However, when
close physical proximity is to one or more in-group members (i.e., self), there
will be no violation of so-called personal space, and as such, rather than
experiencing the negative consequences such as those listed above, perceivers
may in fact experience the close proximity positively – as warm, enjoyable, or
even exciting.
In the preceding chapters, the traditional approach to ‘personal space’ was
criticised for overlooking such potential for close proximity to be experienced
positively, and instead focussing on when it might evoke negative or neutral
responses. Therefore, if the above hypothesis is supported, one of the major
weaknesses inherent in the traditional approach to ‘personal space’ will have
been addressed.
The studies discussed in Chapter 5 were designed to address this very
issue. It was predicted that participants who were asked to interact at close
proximity to an in-group member would report higher levels of positive affect
than those asked to interact with an out-group member, while the opposite
pattern was expected for subjective negative affect. While the studies provided
some evidence in support of group relations impacting upon the experience of
proximity (insofar as participants wanted to be seated closer to in-group
members than to members of an out-group) there were only limited variations in
the self-reported measures of affect.
It was speculated that these limited findings might have been due to the
contextual nature of the experiments, and in particular, the fact that (a) the
social groups were minimal (and hence, novel and relatively meaningless to the
participants), and (b) the interactions and anticipated interactions were with just
one other person. As such, any subsequent welcome or unwelcome close
proximity would have been to one person, and from only one angle, rather than
to many people and from several angles, as would be the case in small groups
or large crowds (see Chapter 5, section 5.4 for a more detailed explanation). It
can therefore be predicted that any experiential effects of close proximity may
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be more pronounced in larger, more realistic crowds or situations of physical
density.
The current chapter can be seen as an initial test of this hypothesis.
However, the potential link between physical and psychological proximity in
physically co-present crowds will not be examined until the following chapter.
This chapter will focus on whether the hypothesised relationship between social
identity, physical proximity and affective responses to crowing will emerge when
the presence of others is simply imagined.
Previous work has indicated that psychological phenomena, which are
usually associated with physical co-presence in groups and crowds, can also
emerge when those groups or crowds of people are visualised. For example,
Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, and Darley (2002), demonstrated that the
bystander effect (Darley & Latanè, 1968, Latanè & Darley, 1968) – where
helping behaviour is inhibited by the presence of others – occurred after
participants were asked to imagine being immersed in a group, an effect that
Garcia et al. (2002) called the implicit bystander effect.
In their first study, Garcia et al. (2002) asked participants to imagine eating
dinner at a restaurant with one friend or with thirty friends. Participants were
then asked to estimate how much money they would donate to charity in a
hypothetical scenario. It was found that participants who had imagined being
with one friend donated more money than those who had imagined being with
thirty friends, or those who were asked to estimate their charitable donation in a
control condition (where there was no mention of dining out at a restaurant).
This effect was replicated when participants imagined being with a friend in
either (a) an empty cinema, or (b) a crowded cinema, surrounded by strangers.
Those who had visualised the crowded scenario pledged less money to the
hypothetical charity that did those who had imagined being seated with just their
friend. Indeed, these effects also emerged when the helping behaviour was
real. When asked to state how much time they would be willing to pledge to the
experimenter by taking part in a separate experiment, participants who were
previously asked to imagine being in a restaurant with ten friends were willing to
give less time than those who had imagined being in a restaurant with just one
friend, or those who had not been asked to visualise a restaurant scene at all.
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These effects emerged even though the visualised group or crowd did not
relate to the helping situation (i.e., imagining being in a crowded cinema or
restaurant should have no bearing on the amount of time that people are willing
to pledge to take part in psychological research). Garcia et al. (2002) claimed
that rather than the context of the visualised situation per se impacting upon
helping behaviour, participants who had imagined being in a large group or
crowd became less self-aware and less accountable for their actions, and as a
result, felt less inclined to offer help in a subsequent task.
Levine, Cassidy, and Jentzsch (in press) observed that in making these
claims, Garcia et al. were drawing on concepts that were central to
deindividuation theory (cf. Zimbardo, 1970). As discussed at length in Chapter
3, in its original formulation, deindividuation refers to a situation whereby
individuals immersed in groups or crowds experience anonymity – a loss of
identity – and with this anonymity comes a sense of diffused responsibility or
accountability, which in turn can lead to displays of anti-normative behaviour –
such as not helping those in need. Thus, Garcia et al.’s suggestion that
visualising immersion in a group of people – be they friends or strangers –
diminished participants’ desire to offer help, was to suggest that their apathy
was an anti-normative consequence of deindividuation.
Levine et al. (in press) challenged Garcia et al.’s claim. They argued that
rather than interpreting the implicit bystander effect in terms of the identity-loss
that is central to the original formulation of deindividuation theory, it should
instead be understood in terms of the principles that are central to the social
identity approach to group and crowd behaviour. Specifically, they point to the
social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE: e.g., Reicher et al., 1995),
which suggests that immersion in a group or crowd can facilitate a shift from a
personal identity to a more inclusive level of social identity, rather than a simple
‘loss of self’ to the collective (see Chapter 3, section 3.5.2 for more on the SIDE
model). Following this shift, subsequent behaviour will reflect the norms
associated with the relevant social identity and the contextual backdrop, as
opposed to being anti-normative, as suggested by deindividuation theory. If this
approach is correct, the priming of physical co-presence should not inevitably
inhibit helping behaviour, as suggested by Garcia et al. (2002). Instead, helping
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behaviour should sometimes increase – especially when helping is a normative
action for a particular social identity, within a particular context.
Levine et al. (in press) adapted Garcia et al.’s (2002) experimental
paradigm to test the social identity approach to implicit bystander effects. One
of the major findings to emerge was that in replication of Garcia et al. (2002),
the imagined presence of others could sometimes inhibit helping behaviour –
e.g., when surrounded by ten or thirty friends as opposed to one friend in a
restaurant, participants were less likely to pledge their time to help in a
psychology experiment (a measure also employed by Garcia et al.). However,
when the visualised scene involved students instead of friends, participants
offered significantly more of their time (they were more helpful) as the number
of people co-present increased. According to Levine et al. (in press), this effect
can be explained in terms of the increased salience of the student identity that
comes from visualising a large group of students as opposed to a small group.
With this increased student identity salience comes an increased sense of
commitment to the university, and hence, participants were more likely to offer
more of their time to the university’s Psychology Department. Levine et al.
therefore demonstrated that the nature of helping behaviour that follows the
imagined immersion in a crowd is variable, and operates as a function of social
identity processes.
While these findings divert slightly from the issues that are central to this
chapter, they demonstrate that Garcia et al.’s paradigm is robust. That is,
regardless of the nature of helping behaviours that were observed following the
imagined immersion in a crowd, the fact is that psychological phenomena
usually associated with physical co-presence emerged when the presence of
others was simply imagined. This finding opens up an interesting avenue for
the current body of work. If, as predicted, social identity processes can impact
upon our experience of close proximity in crowds, and more specifically, on our
affective response to such close proximity, then it is possible that these effects
will also emerge when immersion in a crowd is imagined. This line of reasoning
forms the basis of the two studies that will be described below.
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6.2 Study 5
6.2.1 Overview
This study uses an adapted version of the Garcia et al. (2002) paradigm to test
whether affective responses to imagined close physical proximity in crowds
operate as a function of context, and more importantly, as a function of the
extent to which participants identify with those in the imagined crowd scenarios.
It has been highlighted previously that the traditional ‘personal space’ approach
to crowding cannot account for why crowding might be experienced differently
within a specific location. One example of this is on a busy train carriage. As
already discussed in this thesis (see Chapter 3, section 3.5.3), close proximity
to strangers on a busy train carriage might be expected to evoke a negative
affective response when those strangers are perceived as ‘other’ – e.g., when
the train is filled with commuters on their way to work – a context in which cues
to a shared social identity might be sparse. However, if contextual variables
were to act as cues to a shared social identity, those same strangers might be
perceived as in-group members – as a part of self. Examples include fellow
supporters of a football team, co-protestors returning home from a
demonstration, or fellow fans of a particular band. Accordingly, any close
proximity might give rise to a positive affective response.
Therefore, a train carriage will be used as the backdrop to the visualised
scenarios in the current study. Participants will be asked to imagine being (a)
alone on an empty carriage (no crowd), (b) surrounded by commuters on a
packed carriage while on their way to work (interpersonal/no social identity
crowd), or (c) surrounded by fellow fans of their favourite band on a packed
train carriage having seen the band play a concert. The hypotheses are as
follows: with regards to negative affect, and in line with the theoretical
propositions outlined above and in Chapter 3, it is predicted that mean
subjective negative affect will be higher for participants who visualise close
physical proximity to commuters than for participants who visualise being either
on an empty carriage or surrounded by in-group members. This is because the
first scenario involves a breach of the self-other boundary, whereas the latter
two do not. There is no reason to believe that negative affect will vary between
those who visualise the empty carriage and those who visualise being
surrounded by in-group members. With regards to positive affect, it is predicted
162
that mean subjective positive affect will be higher for participants who visualise
close physical proximity to people who they perceive as an extension of self
(those who imagine being surrounded by fans of their favourite band) than it will
be for participants who visualise either being alone on the carriage or being
surrounded by commuters (those perceived as other). It is difficult to make a
clear prediction regarding potential differences in positive affect between the no
crowd condition and the interpersonal (commuter train) condition. On the one
hand, it could be predicted that as neither scenario involves close physical
proximity to those defined as self, there will be no variation in positive affect.
On the other hand, however, it could be suggested that close proximity to those
defined as other might lead to lower levels of positive affect than imagining
being alone. Therefore, this part of the analysis should be seen as exploratory.
6.2.2 Method
6.2.2.1 Design
There were three levels to the independent variable (visualisation context): no
crowd, commuter crowd (interpersonal context condition), and concert reveller
crowd (in-group crowd).
6.2.2.2 Participants
Undergraduate psychology students were contacted via email and offered the
opportunity to take part in the study in exchange for course credits. Sixty
participants, with an age range of 18 to 44 (M = 20.00, SD = 5.00) returned a
completed copy of the materials and were therefore included in the final sample.
Of the final sample, 56 were female and 4 were male.
6.2.2.3 Dependent measures
Manipulation check (i): Identification: For participants who had imagined
being on the train carriage in the in-group and interpersonal contexts,
identification with fellow crowd members was measured using three items. Two
were adapted from Ellemers et al. (1999) and were as follows: ‘I identified with
the other people who were present on the train in my visualisation’, and ‘I am
like the other people who were present on the train in my visualisation’. The
third item – ‘I felt strong ties with the other people who were on the train in my
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visualisation’ – was adapted from Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1997). These
items were not included for participants in the ‘no crowd’ condition. As these
items scaled together extremely well (α = .93), their mean score was calculated
and used to represent participants’ identification with other crowd members.
Manipulation check (ii): Perceived difference of self to other crowd
members: Perceived difference was measured using a single item, which was
designed for the purpose of this study: ‘In my visualisation, the other people on
the train were different types of people to me’. Again, this item was included in
the questionnaire completed by participants in the in-group and interpersonal
conditions, but not by participants in the ‘no crowd’ condition.
Manipulation check (iii): Visualisation clarity: Participants’ ability to
visualise the scenarios was assessed using two items which were designed for
the purpose of this study. These items were as follows: ‘I found it easy to
imagine being on the train’, and ‘When visualising the train, I could imagine the
carriage in great detail’. These items scaled together well (α = .74) and were
combined to obtain a composite measure of visualisation clarity.
Dependent variable: Subjective affective experience: As was the case in
Chapter 5, study 1, participants’ subjective levels of positive and negative affect
were measured using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS)
(Watson et al., 1988) (see appendix 5). The positive items (α = .83) and the
negative items (α = .83) each scaled together well. Accordingly, the ten items
on the positive scale were summed to provide a single-score representation of
positive affect, whereas the ten items on the negative scale were summed to
provide a single-score representation of negative affect. Higher scores indicate
more positive mood and more negative mood, respectively.
6.2.2.4. Procedure
In line with Levine et al. (in press), prospective participants were invited to take
part in what they were led to believe was a study investigating how images are
conjured in the mind. Having expressed an interest in taking part in the current
study, prospective participants were sent a consent form via email. When
participants had completed and returned the consent form, they were forwarded
a copy of the study materials. As there were three levels of the independent
variable, three versions of the materials were used. Participants were assigned
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to conditions on a random basis and then sent the pack of materials that
corresponded with the condition they had been assigned to. Participants were
instructed to work through the pack of materials in the order in which they were
presented, and to complete the questionnaire alone. Participants were then
provided with instructions to the visualisation task, which were as follows:
Below you will find a scenario. Please read through it carefully and then
imagine yourself in that scenario. You should really try to imagine that you are
there. If you find it easier to close your eyes to do this, then feel free to do so.
Visualise the scenario in as much detail as possible. When you feel as though
you have visualised the scenario in as much detail as possible, please turn over
and take a couple of minutes to write down anything from the visualisation that
you think might be important.
Participants in each of the conditions were then asked to imagine that they
were travelling on a train carriage. In the ‘no crowd’ condition, the scenario was
as follows: ‘…you are standing in a train carriage. You are on your way to work
and the train is empty. There are no people in front of you, behind you, or to
your sides’. In the ‘in-group crowd’ condition the scenario was: ‘… you are
standing in a crowded train carriage. You are part of a group that has just been
to see your favourite band play a concert. The train is packed full with fellow
fans of your favourite band. There are people in front of you, behind you, and to
your sides’, whereas the scenario in the interpersonal condition was: ‘…you are
standing in a crowded train carriage. You are on your way to work and the train
is packed full with commuters, also on their way to work. There are people in
front of you, behind you, and to your sides’.
When participants had made notes on their visualisation, they were
prompted to complete the PANAS. Finally, participants completed the
measures of social identity and perceived difference (in the in-group and
interpersonal conditions), as well as the measures of visualisation clarity (in all
conditions). When the study materials had been completed and returned to the
researcher, participants were sent a full debrief, via email.
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6.2.3 Results
6.2.3.1 Manipulation checks
Identification: One-sample t-tests revealed that mean identification was
significantly higher for participants who had imagined being in a crowded train
carriage in an in-group context (M = 5.42, SD = 1.12) than for those who had
imagined being in a crowded carriage in an interpersonal context (M = 3.33, SD
= 1.41; t (19) = -2.11, p = .05). This suggests a successful manipulation of
identification.
Perceived difference of self to other crowd members: An independent t-
test revealed that the mean scores for participants in the interpersonal and in-
group conditions on the item designed to measure perceived difference were
different, to a highly significant degree, t (38) = 3.45, p = .001. As intended,
participants who had visualised the crowded train carriage in an interpersonal
context perceived fellow crowd members to be more different from self (M =
4.75, SD = 1.77) than did participants who had visualised the in-group crowd (M
= 2.90, SD = 1.62).
Visualisation clarity: Analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that between-
condition differences in visualisation clarity were not significant, F (2, 57) = 2.35,
p = .10 (ns), ή2 = .08. Therefore, any potential main effects can be attributed to
the experimental manipulations as opposed to variations in participants’ ability
to visualise the scenarios. The mean visualisation clarity scores were
significantly above the mid-point of the scale for participants in all three of the
conditions (control condition M = 5.17, SD = 1.21, t (19) = 4.36, p < .001;
interpersonal context condition M = 5.70, SD = 1.21, t (19) = 6.30, p < .001; in-
group context condition M = 6.03, SD = 1.33, t (19) = 6.80, p < .001). This
suggests a good degree of visualisation clarity for participants in each of the
conditions.
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6.2.3.2 Dependent variables: Main effects
Table 6.1
Means and standard deviations for participants who visualised a train carriage
in no crowd, interpersonal crowd, and in-group crowd contexts.
Experimental condition
Dependent variable No crowd Interpersonal context In-group context
Positive affect
M 25.25 24.20 28.90
SD 1.49 1.49 1.49
Negative affect
M 14.70 17.85 14.55
SD 1.14 1.14 1.14
Subjective affective response: Table 6.1 shows the mean scores and standard
deviations for the two dependent variables (subjective levels of positive and
negative affect). A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was
conducted to assess the effect of the independent variable (visualisation
context) on these dependent variables. In order to retain consistency with
Chapter 5, Pillai’s trace was used to test the multivariate effects. This yielded a
significant result, F (2, 56) = 2.48, p = .05, ή2 = .08. Separate one-way analyses
of variance (ANOVAs) were therefore conducted on each of the dependent
variables to further investigate this significant multivariate effect.
Starting with subjective positive affect, there was a marginally significant
difference between the conditions, F (2, 57) = 2.76, p = .07, ή2 = .09. Planned
contrasts revealed that as predicted, mean positive affect was marginally
significantly higher for participants who had visualised being on a train carriage
when immersed in an in-group crowd compared to those who had visualised
being immersed in a crowd in an interpersonal context, or on an empty carriage,
t (57) = -2.29, p = .03, r = .32. There was no difference in mean positive affect
between participants who had imagined the empty train carriage and those who
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had visualised being immersion in a crowd in an interpersonal context, t (57) = -
0.50, p = .62 (ns), r = .06.
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) also revealed a marginally significant
between-condition difference in subjective negative affect, F (2, 57) = 2.67, p =
.09, ή2 = .09. Again as expected, planned contrasts revealed that mean
negative affect was higher for participants who had visualised the crowded
commuter train (interpersonal context) compared with those who had visualised
the empty train carriage, or those who imagined being immersed in a crowd of
in-group members, t (57) = -2.31, p = .03, r = .32. There was no difference
between the no crowd condition and the in-group crowd condition in their mean
levels of subjective negative affect, t (57) = -0.09, p = .93 (ns), r = .01.
6.2.4 Discussion
The primary hypotheses for study 5 were supported. First, negative affect was
significantly higher for participants who had visualised immersion in a commuter
crowd than it was for those who had visualised standing on an empty train
carriage, or those who had imagined being immersed in an in-group crowd.
According to a SCT interpretation, this is due to the violation of the self-other
boundary in the commuter crowd condition – a violation that was absent from
the other two scenarios, and as a result, participants in these conditions did not
show a difference in their subjective negative affect. With regards to the second
dependent variable – positive affect – participants who had imagined being on a
crowded train carriage, surrounded by in-group members, subsequently
reported higher levels of positive affect than did those who had visualised being
on either an empty train carriage, or surrounded by a group of commuters, with
whom identification was low. In line with SCT, it is suggested that this effect
was due to participants in the in-group condition visualising close physical
proximity to people who would be perceived as a part of self. As a result, even
though the others co-present were strangers (just as they were in the commuter
crowd condition) their close proximity would be welcomed and enjoyed. No
clear predictions were made regarding potential differences in positive affect
between the no-crowd and commuter crowd conditions. On the one hand, it
was suggested that there should be no difference between participants in these
conditions, as neither group would be imagining close proximity to those defined
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as self. On the other hand, it was predicted that positive affect might be lower
for those who had visualised the commuter carriage, as they would have
imagined close proximity to people perceived as other. As no difference was
found between these conditions, the first suggestion was supported.
This study lends further evidence to suggest that Garcia et al.’s (2002)
paradigm is robust. In fact, it goes a step further by demonstrating that the
imagined presence of others is not limited to subsequent helping behaviours – it
can also impact upon our affective state. Most importantly, however, this study
shows that with regards to imagined crowding, there is not a generic negative
response to density and close proximity. It was not the case that simply
imagining being surrounded by people in a crowd led to negative
consequences. Instead, the type of crowd led to either an increase in positive
affect or an increase in negative affect.
As already discussed in this chapter, it is hypothesised that these variable
responses to imagined close proximity in crowds is due to variations in the
extent to which participants identified with the others co-present in their
visualisations. Although the manipulations of identity and difference were
successful, it is impossible to be sure that identity processes were responsible
for the variations in affect. This is due to the fact that other factors inherent in
the scenarios could be seen as potential confounds. For example, the
increased negative affect in the commuter scenario could have simply been a
result of the participants thinking about being on their way to work, whereas the
increased positive affect in the band scenario might have simply been a result
of the participants thinking about seeing their favourite band, which might be
associated with positive feelings.
One way of countering this suggestion would be to run a mediation
analysis, with levels of identification and perceived difference as the proposed
mediators between the experimental conditions and affect. However, seeing as
participants in the ‘no crowd’ condition did not fill in measures of identification or
difference, this is not a viable option. An alternative approach is to run a
second study in which the backdrop of the visualisation scenario is held
constant. That is, all participants could be asked to imagine exactly the same
scene, and immersion in exactly the same crowd. This would then allow for an
assessment of the extent to which natural variations in identification are
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associated with (a) desired proximity in the crowd (with desire for greater
distance being associated with greater discomfort), and (b) subjective affective
response. As such, study two will take this correlational approach as it will help
to verify that the variations in affect found in study 1 were due to identity
processes, as opposed to potential confounds in the experimental design.
6.3 Study 6
6.3.1 Overview
Study 6 seeks to further examine the impact that immersion in a visualised
crowd can have on participants’ subjective affective state. The context of the
visualisation will be held constant for all participants to allow for a stricter test of
the relationship between social identification, crowding, and affect. A packed
train carriage will be used as the backdrop for this study, as was the case for
study 1. All participants will be asked to imagine that they are working as
summer interns, and have been asked by their boss to attend an England
football match at Wembley Stadium. They will be asked to imagine that on their
way to the match, they find themselves on train carriage packed full with
England supporters who are chanting loudly. They will be asked to imagine that
they are in close proximity to the fans from the front, back, and to their sides. It
is hypothesised that the extent to which participants identify with the other
crowd members will be significantly positively correlated with their subjective
levels of positive affect. In other words, as participants identify more with the
others co-present, they will report higher levels of positive affect. It is also
predicted that identification will be significantly negatively correlated with (a)
subjective negative affect, and (b) desire for greater distance (desired
proximity). In other words, as identification increases, participants will report
lower levels of negative affect, and will require less ‘personal space’.
Two mediation models will also be tested in the analysis for study 6. It is
predicted that desired distance will be significantly positively correlated with
negative affect and significantly negatively correlated with positive affect. That
is, as participants wish to have more ‘personal space’ (feel less comfortable
with close proximity to the other crowd members) they will feel, or at least
report, higher levels of negative affect and lower levels of positive affect. At first
glance, this hypothesis seems to be in line with the density-pathology
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hypothesis that was discussed, and critiqued, in previous chapters. However, it
is also predicted that social identification will mediate this proposed relationship.
In other words, the relationship between close physical proximity in a crowd and
(a) increased negative, and (b) decreased positive affect, will become non-
significant when social identification levels are accounted for. This hypothesis
is based on the assumption that close proximity will lead to these affective
responses as participants’ identification with those others co-present
diminishes. So, as the crowd members are perceived as other to a greater
extent, their close physical proximity will be seen increasingly as a violation of
the self-other boundary, and as a consequence, participants will feel greater
levels of negative affect and lower levels of positive affect.
6.3.2 Method
6.3.2.1 Design
A correlational design was used for the current study.
6.3.2.2 Participants
Fifty-three participants took part in the study. Their ages ranged from 18 to 48
(M = 26.00, SD = 9.00). Of the final sample, 34 were female and 19 were male.
Participants were not paid for taking part in the study.
6.3.2.3 Measures
Manipulation check: Visualisation clarity: Visualisation clarity was measured
using the same two items that were designed for study 5 (see section 6.2.2.3).
Variable 1: social identification: Social identification with the visualised crowd
was measured using an adapted series of items compiled by Leach et al.
(2008). Leach et al.’s identity scale is designed to measure five identity
components: (i) group solidarity, (ii) identity centrality, (iii) individual self-
stereotyping, (iv) perceived in-group homogeneity, and (v) identity satisfaction.
However, only the items which are designed to measure identity centrality (3
items), group solidarity (3 items), and individual self-stereotyping (2 items) were
used to measure social identification in the current study because these items
look specifically at participants’ identification with the crowd, rather than their
perception of the crowd or their feelings associated with being in the crowd
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(which might confound with the measures of affect). Therefore, the perceived
in-group homogeneity items and identity satisfaction items were omitted from
the scale. The final list of eight adapted items was: ‘I will often think about the
fact that I was amongst the people who I was with in my visualisation’ (adapted
from Cameron, 2004), ‘The fact that I was in the group of football fans in my
visualisation is an important part of my identity’ (adapted from Luhtanen &
Crocker, 1992), ‘Being in the group of football fans in my visualisation is an
important part of how I see myself’ (adapted from Doosje, Branscombe, Spears,
& Manstead, 1998, Ellemers et al., 1999, and Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), ‘I felt
a bond with the group of football fans who were in the train carriage with me in
my visualisation’ (adapted from Cameron, 2004, and Doosje et al., 1998), ‘I felt
solidarity with the group of football fans who were in the train carriage with me
in my visualisation’ (adapted from Leach et al., 2008), ‘I felt committed to the
group of football fans who were in the train carriage with me in my visualisation’
(Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995), ‘I have a lot in common with the football
fans who where on the train carriage with me in my visualisation’ (adapted from
Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997), and ‘I am similar to the football fans on the
train carriage with me in my visualisation’ (Doosje et al., 1995, and Spears et
al., 1997). Participants responded to these items using a seven-point Likert-
type scale, which ranged from 1 (‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’). The
items scaled together well (α = .88) and were combined to obtain a composite
measure of social identification with the crowd.
Variable 2: Desired distance: Three items of desired distance were designed for
the purpose of this study, which were responded to on the same 7-point scale
as the items above. They were: ‘I would have preferred to have been standing
further away from the football fans on the carriage in my visualisation’, ‘I would
have preferred to have been standing closer to the football fans on the carriage
in my visualisation’ (reverse scored), and ‘I would have liked more space on the
train carriage in my visualisation’. As the response scale ranged from 1
(‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree’), higher scores indicate a desire for
more space. As there was a good level of internal consistency between the
items (α = .71) they were combined to obtain a single-score representation of
desired distance.
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Variables 3 and 4: Positive and negative affect: Participants’ subjective positive
and negative affect were measured using the PANAS (Watson et al., 1988).
Again, the positive items (α = .78) and the negative items (α = .81) each scaled
together well. Therefore, the positive affect items were summed to obtain a
single-score representation of positive affect, whereas the negative items were
summed to represent negative affect. Higher scores indicate higher levels of
positive and negative affect.
6.2.3.4 Procedure
The procedure for study 6 is virtually identical to that of study 5. However,
rather than contacting prospective participants by email, they were approached
by the researcher outside the University of Sussex Library. The reason for
approaching participants in person as opposed to via email was to ensure that
each participant’s data was independent (this is virtually impossible when
materials are sent out and returned at a later date). Only people who were
sitting alone were approached to ensure that participants did not confer with
one another when completing the tasks. The researcher waited with each
participant while they completed the measures, before fully debriefing them.
6.3.3 Results
6.3.3.1 Manipulation check
Visualisation clarity: A one-sample t-test revealed that the mean visualisation
clarity score was above the mid-point of the scale, to a highly significant degree,
t (52) = 7.67, p < .001. This suggests that participants were able to visualise
the crowded carriage with a good degree of clarity.
6.3.3.2 Correlations
Table 6.1 shows the means and standard deviations for the four variables
measured after the visualisation task. The correlations between these variables
are also displayed. As can be seen, an increase in social identification with the
England supporters on the train carriage was associated with higher levels of
positive affect following the visualisation task. Social identification was also
associated with a significantly reduced desire for greater physical distance from
those present in the crowd as well as significantly lower levels of subjective
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negative affect following the visualisation task. This therefore provides support
for the first set of hypotheses that were outlined in section 6.3.1.
Table 6.2 Social identification, desired distance, and subjective affect:
Means, standard deviations and correlations
Variable 1 2 3 4
M SD
1. Social identification 2.55 1.16 - -.60*** .41** -.53***
2. Desired distance 5.56 1.14 - -.27* .45**
3. Positive affect 26.79 6.67 - -.40**
4. Negative affect 18.89 5.99 -
Note: * = p < .06, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001
6.3.3.3 Simple mediation analyses
The simple mediation models presented below are assessed using the
guidelines set out by Preacher and Hayes (2004). Preacher and Hayes’s
(2004) non-parametric bootstrapping approach is preferred to (a) the Baron and
Kenny (1986) and (b) the Sobel (1982) methods for testing mediation effects,
for the following reasons. As noted by Preacher and Hayes (2004), the Baron
and Kenny (1986) method does not involve a formal significance test of
mediation. Instead, it states that if the direct effect of the predictor variable on
the outcome is zero when the mediator is included in the formula, perfect
mediation has occurred. Baron and Kenny do point to the Sobel (1982) test as
a way of assessing partial mediation, but it is not central to their own statistical
approach. While the Sobel (1982) test could be used in combination with the
Baron and Kenny (1986) approach in the current analysis, Preacher and Hayes
(2004) note that the Sobel (1982) test is unreliable because it has low power
when the sample size is small, it comes with an increased risk of both Type I
and Type II errors, and it assumes that the distribution of the variables is normal
– an assumption that is often not met in small samples. As the Preacher and
Hayes (2004) method is non-parametric, it makes no such assumptions, and
provides a more powerful test. It is therefore the preferred method for the
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analyses that follow. The analyses will be based on 5,000 bootstrap samples
and conducted using the SPSS macro devised by Preacher and Hayes (2004).
Model 1: Social identification as mediator of the relationship between
desired distance and negative affect.
Figure 6.1. Social identification as a mediator of the relationship between
desired distance and subjective negative affect. Values represent β weights * <
.05 ** < .01, *** <.001.
Figure 6.1 shows the first simple mediation model. First, as stated in section
6.3.3.2, as participants’ desire for greater distance from the crowd increased,
there was a tendency to identify less with the crowd members. In addition,
when controlling for desired distance, the proposed mediator, which was social
identification, was significantly negatively correlated with negative affect. That
is, higher identifiers tended to report lower levels of negative affect. With
regards to the mediation analysis, the total effect of desired distance on
negative affect was highly significant (depicted by path C). In other words, a
desire for more space in the crowd was associated with higher levels of
subjective negative affect. However, the direct effect of desired distance on
negative affect when controlling for social identification (depicted by path C’ ) is
non-significant, which according to the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach,
suggests full mediation. This view is supported by bootstrap analysis. The
lower limit of the 99% bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect is
0.233, whereas the upper limit is 2.822. As this range does not contain zero, it
suggests – with an extremely high degree of confidence – full mediation.
Social
identification
Desired distance Negative affect
a = -0.60*** b = -2.13*
C =2.33*** (C’ = 1.05)
175
Model 2: Social identification as mediator of the relationship between
desired distance and positive affect.
Figure 6.2. Social identification as a mediator of the relationship between
desired distance and subjective positive affect. Values represent β weights * <
.05 ** < .01, *** <.001.
The second simple mediator model is depicted in Figure 6.2. The only change
from model 1 to model 2 is the outcome variable, which in this case in positive
affect. The total effect of desired distance on positive affect (depicted by path
C) is significant in a negative direction. This means that an increase in
participants’ desire for more space is associated with a decrease in subsequent
levels of subjective positive affect. As mentioned previously, social
identification (the proposed mediator) is negatively correlated with desired
distance. When desired distance is held constant, social identification is
positively correlated with positive affect: as identification with the crowd
increases, so too does positive affect. The direct effect of desired distance on
positive affect (depicted by path C’) becomes non-significant when the mediator
is included in the model. This suggests mediation according to the Baron and
Kenny (1986) approach. The conclusion that social identification fully mediates
the relationship between desired distance and positive affect is supported by
the bootstrap analysis. The lower limit of the 95% confidence interval is -2.58,
whereas the upper limit is -0.12, and therefore does not contain zero.
6.3.4 Discussion
The hypotheses for study 6 were supported. Having visualised immersion in a
crowd of football supporters on a busy train, participants’ desire for physical
distance was related to the degree to which they identified with the crowd. To
Social
identification
Desired distance Positive affect
a = -0.60*** b = 2.23*
C =-1.57* (C’ = -0.22)
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be more specific, an increase in identification was associated with a lower
desire for greater distance from the others present on the train. This supports
an SCT approach to spatiality.
The primary motivation for conducting this study was to provide a stricter
test of the impact that identity processes can have on participants’ affective
state following visualised immersion in a dense crowd. While identification
varied between the conditions in study 1, as did subjective affect levels, it was
impossible to rule out other aspects of the scenarios influencing these
variations. In the current study, however, the backdrop to the physical proximity
in the crowd was held constant. It was found that desired distance – or in other
words, responses to physical density – were associated with participants’
subsequent subjective affect; as participants wanted more space on the busy
carriage, they reported higher levels of negative affect, and lower levels of
positive affect. However, these effects became non-significant when
participants’ social identification with the crowd was held constant. In other
words, the relationship between desired distance and affect depended on the
extent to which participants identified with the England fans that were present in
the visualisation. Those who wanted more space tended to identify less with
the crowd (and therefore may have felt their close proximity to be a violation of
the self-other boundary) and as a result reported higher levels of negative affect
and lower levels of positive affect. Of course, due to the correlational design of
this study, these findings could be interpreted as those who wanted less space
tended to identify more with the crowd and may have therefore welcomed the
close proximity of the England fans, and as a result, they felt higher levels of
positive affect and lower levels of negative affect. Either way, it is possible to
conclude that the findings of this study offer further support to a SCT approach
to ‘personal space’ and responses to situations of crowding.
6.4 General discussion
The studies presented in this chapter offer strong support for a SCT approach
to the imagined experience of close proximity in crowds. In study 5, participants
reported higher levels of positive affect when they had imagined being on a train
carriage surrounded by in-group members (when on the way home from a
concert), and higher levels of negative affect when they had imagined being on
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a crowded train carriage where there were no cues to a shared social identity
(when on the way to work). In study 6, which used a correlational design, the
contextual backdrop to the crowding scenario was held constant to counter any
suggestion that variations in affect in study 5 might have been due to qualitative
differences between the scenarios. It was found that participants’ social
identification with the crowd was correlated with their desired proximity to the
crowd members. As identification decreased, desire for greater distance
increased. This finding is in line with the SCT approach to ‘personal space’ that
has been discussed in previous chapters – it demonstrates a relationship
between psychological and physical distance. Importantly, a significant
relationship between desired distance and affect was also uncovered.
Participants who desired greater distance, and therefore felt more
uncomfortable with the close proximity in the crowd, reported higher levels of
negative affect and lower levels of positive affect. However, this effect was fully
mediated by the extent to which participants identified with the crowd. This
therefore supports the suggestion that the effect of close proximity on
experience largely depends upon whether the close proximity is to those we
identify with (who are defined as self) or those who we do not identify with (who
are defined as other).
Not only do these findings lend further support for a SCT approach to
spatiality and crowding, they also add further weight to the criticisms levelled at
some of the earlier crowding theories discussed in Chapter 2. For example, the
general density-pathology approach (e.g., D’Atri, 1975; Griffitt & Veitch, 1971;
Insel and Lindgren, 1978) suggested that exposure to physical density should
be associated with negative outcomes. This study has shown that to the
contrary, with regards to imagined crowds at least, exposure to physical density
can be associated with variations in both positive and negative outcomes.
Similarly, as discussed at length in Chapter 2., the traditional ‘personal space’
approach to crowding could only account for when close proximity would be
experienced neutrally or negatively, but said nothing about when it might be
experienced positively. It also only provided a long list of intervening variables,
which might influence these limited variations in personal space. These
included broad group variables, such as culture (Hall, 1966), situational
variables, such as whether an interaction takes place inside or outside
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(Cochran, Hale, & Hissam, 1984), and interpersonal variables, such as whether
close proximity is to a friend or a stranger (Sundstrom & Altman, 1976). In the
current study, participants were all from the same cultural background (they
were all British students), they all visualised a crowd in the context of a train
carriage, and they all imagined close proximity to strangers. Therefore, the
finding that proximity preferences still showed variations, and that there was
variation is positive affect as well as negative affect, is problematic for the
traditional approach to ‘personal space’. Indeed, as alluded to above, the fact
that desired proximity and affect were related to social identification,
demonstrates again the benefits associated with a unified SCT approach to
personal space and its application to crowding.
Before drawing this chapter to a close, it is important to be very clear with
regards to the limitations of studies discussed. The studies were based on an
adapted version of the Garcia et al. (2002) visualisation paradigm. Therefore,
what the findings do show is that (a) the paradigm can be used to investigate a
range of potential effects associated with physical co-presence – not just the
bystander effect, and (b) that SCT principles can be applied to the experience of
crowding, when the crowd is imagined. However, unlike the Garcia et al.
(2002), and Levine et al. (in press) studies which used the visualisation
technique to investigate an effect that had been previously examined out in the
field, the current chapter used the visualisation paradigm to test the potential
relationship between density, identity, and affect, prior to establishing whether
these effects do in fact exist in crowds and small groups. The previous
chapters used one-to-one interactions to hint at the fact that they exist in larger
settings, but this is yet to be proven. Therefore, it would be premature to
suggest that the current chapter offers conclusive support for a SCT approach
to spatiality and crowding – it simply provides strong support for a SCT
approach to visualised spatiality and crowding, which can be seen as a next
chapter in the theoretical story that is unfolding. The following chapters will
follow up this finding, first in the field (Chapter 7), and then in small groups in a
controlled laboratory environment (Chapter 8).
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Chapter 7: Introducing a two-way embodiment model of social
identity processes (1). Identity, physicality and ‘collective joy’:
A field study
7.1 Introduction
The personal space approach to crowding suggests that when a perceiver feels
that their zone of ‘personal space’ is intruded upon, they will either (a) physically
withdraw from the situation, or if withdrawal is not possible, they will (b)
experience discomfort. The strength of this approach is that it takes into
account the physical and social relations between the perceiver and the others
co-present in the crowd, rather than simply focussing on individual personality
variations (e.g., Freedman, 1975) or relying on complex interactions between
several intervening variables (e.g. Rosenthal & Mayer, 1983) when explaining
variable responses to crowding.
However, as discussed throughout this thesis, there are several major
weaknesses with the traditional ‘personal space’ approach. For example, it can
only account for when close proximity will be avoided or experienced negatively
(i.e., as uncomfortable or stressful – such as on a packed commuter train), but
does not provide an explanation as to why people sometimes seek out close
proximity to others and then experience that close proximity positively (i.e., as
warm, exciting and enjoyable – as might be the case on a packed football
terrace, in a nightclub or concert, or with relevance to this chapter, at a
demonstration). Another problem with the traditional approach is that is relies
on a long list of intervening variables to explain why and when close proximity
might be perceived as an intrusion, and in doing so, cannot explain intra-
cultural, intra-individual, or within-location variability in responses to crowding.
I have argued that in light of these weaknesses, the concept of ‘personal
space’ should be radically reconceptualised (see also: Novelli et al., 2010).
Rather than seeing our desire for physical proximity as operating solely as a
function of broad cultural norms, static interpersonal relationships, or as a
function of fixed situational variables (such as whether an interaction takes
place indoors or outside), it should instead be seen as a reflection of our
psychological proximity to those people with whom we are interacting. When
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interacting with those perceived as self (i.e., other in-group members), we might
seek out and enjoy close physical proximity to them. However, when interacting
with those perceived as other (i.e., other individuals when we are self-
categorized according to our personal identity, or out-group members when
self-categorized according to a social identity) we may seek a spatial distance
that reflects our psychological distance, or if any physically close proximity is
unavoidable, we might experience this incongruence between our psychological
and physical distance as stressful or unpleasant.
The studies described in previous chapters have tested, and to some
extent supported, the idea that participants’ proximal desires can operate as a
function of psychological proximity. While much of this support came from
laboratory studies in which participants anticipated one-to-one interactions, the
previous chapter provided evidence to suggest that affective response to
imagined close proximity in a crowd is also largely dependent upon the extent to
which we identify with those others present. The obvious (and critical) next step
is to investigate the impact of social identity processes on the experience of
crowding in a physically co-present crowd. As discussed earlier (Chapters 1 and
5), although the empirical work in this thesis uses paradigms that look at both
inter-individual interactions and large crowds (real and imagined), it is predicted
that the same processes will operate in both. If anything, it is suggested that
the impact of group relations on spatial and experiential outcomes to emerge
form the inter-individual paradigm will be magnified in the studies of large
crowds. If a person perceives other crowd members as out-group members or
simply as other individuals, they will experience violations of the self-other
boundary by several people defined as ‘other’ and from all angles. However, in
an in-group crowd, a person will be surrounded by not one – but several people
defined as self – people with whom they share a sense of belonging and
solidarity, thus intensifying the positive collective feeling.
Several studies, which investigated the psychological impact of crowding,
were discussed in Chapter 2. It became evident that an asymmetry exists
between the observational evidence, which suggests that crowding responses
can be positive (e.g., Durkheim, 1995/1915; Ehrenreich, 2007; Malbon, 1999;
Morris, 1981) and the empirical work, which has largely focussed on the
negative outcomes. Much of this empirical work has been conducted in
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contexts where there is no reason to predict that anything other than
participants’ personal identities will be salient – e.g., on commuter trains (Evans
& Wener, 2006), at railway stations during rush-hour (Mackintosh et al., 1975),
or in retail outlets, such as supermarkets (Aylott & Mitchell, 1998) and shoe
shops (Mackintosh et al., 1975). Therefore, the primary focus of the study
described in the current chapter is to provide empirical evidence to highlight the
potential for a high-density crowd, and more specifically, a high-density crowd
whose members are united by a sense of shared social identity, to be the
vehicle for collective joy.
There is already some suggestive evidence in support of this view. For
example, Cassidy et al. (2007) have shown that attendees at the Magh Mela – a
densely populated Hindu festival – reported extremely high levels of general
positivity, despite the lack of basic sanitary facilities and physical space that
resulted from the crowded environment. This finding was attributed to the
religious identity that united the pilgrims in the crowd. In addition, Neville and
Reicher (2008) have provided qualitative data which suggests that Scottish
football fans experienced an enhanced sense of enjoyment when watching a
football match in close physical proximity to fellow fans of the Scotland national
team.
While these studies provided a first step towards illustrating the link
between social identity and positive psychological outcomes in physically co-
present crowds, the study described in this chapter aims to go beyond this
preliminary work by quantifying this proposed link between social identity and
collective joy. More specifically, the study will investigate the extent to which
crowd members who possess a stronger sense of shared social identity will
seek closer proximity to those around them by physically immersing themselves
in the crowd (positioning themselves in a more central physical location) and
how being at the physical core of a crowd that is psychologically central to self,
might in turn facilitate feelings of collective joy.
However, it is important to stress that this hypothesised link between
psychological and physical processes in crowds should not be seen as a static
one-way relationship. It would go against observation and theory to suggest that
people are simply drawn together because they share an identity, and that the
process ends there. Physicality in a crowd is not always a case of simply being
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close to, or sharing a space with those others present. On many occasions it is
also a case of acting with them, often in synchrony – moving, chanting, walking,
swaying, dancing and clapping. Therefore, to overlook the potential role that
such synchronised physical co-action might have on social identity would be to
overlook a potentially fascinating insight into the embodied, two-way nature of
group formation: while social identity processes might physically draw us
together, being together in space, and keeping together in time, might feed back
and further strengthen the bonds between us.
For example, McNeill (1995) discussed several examples of the important
role that synchronised movement has played in binding groups throughout
history (e.g., in community dances, religious rituals, and political ceremonies).
McNeill (1995) offered an evolutionary explanation of this phenomenon,
suggesting that synchronised movement can lead to a positive collective
experience which helps us to bond in groups – a process he called ‘muscular
bonding’. However, the problem with relying on a post-hoc evolutionary
account of synchronicity, identity, and group bonding is that the perceptual
processes linking these variables remain a mystery. Acting as one with the
group might increase our chances of perpetuating our genes due to the fact that
we no longer operate as individuals, vulnerable to physical attacks, starvation,
or being exposed to the elements; but how does synchronicity alter the way that
we categorize others and ourselves?
SCT provides an alternative theoretical framework that can be used to
understand the relationship between synchronised movement and group
formation. According to SCT, ‘factors which enhance the salience of ingroup-
outgroup categorisations tend to increase the perceived identity (similarity,
equivalence, interchangeability) between self and ingroup members and so
depersonalize individual self-perception’ (Turner, 1987, p. 50, emphasis in
original). Turner (1987) went on to argue that ‘the depersonalization of self-
perception is the basic process underlying group phenomena’. It can therefore
be argued that synchronised action – such as a group of people moving, singing
or chanting as a coherent unit – could operate as a possible criterion for
depersonalization and the shared sense of social identification that goes with it.
This potential for physical co-ordination to increase social identification can be
used to gain a better understanding of the joyful responses that we so often
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observe at crowded events: we enjoy close physical proximity to others in a
crowd when they are perceived as an extension of self.
7.2 Study 7
The current research, then, has several objectives. First, in order to build on
the laboratory work described in the previous chapters, the link between social
identity and physicality in the crowd will be examined out in the field. Physicality
can be broken down into two constituent parts, with the first relating to
proximity, which will be defined in terms of perceived centrality in the crowd,
and the second relating to synchrony. By examining these two aspects of
physicality, it is hoped that the reciprocal relationship between social identity
and collective participation will become clearer. As noted by the Prayag Magh
Mela Research Group (2007), there is a large body of research examining the
antecedents of collective participation, of which a sense of shared social
identification is one. However, the Prayag Magh Mela Research Group also
noted that there is hardly any research investigating how collective participation
can change the ways in which we see the people around us and ourselves.
The current study seeks to address this gap by demonstrating that being
together in space, and then keeping together in time (or in other words, the
constituent parts of physicality) can facilitate the depersonalization process and
hence strengthen the bond between crowd members. It is predicted that an
outcome of this interplay between the psychological and physical in crowds is
the collective joy that is so often overlooked by psychology. However, it is
important to stress whilst the design of the study allows for a quantitative
assessment of being together in space, hypotheses relating to the synchronous
element of physicality are based on the assumption that a period of marching,
chanting and playing musical instruments will involve ‘keeping together in time’
– thus providing an opportunity to take a preliminary look at this dimension of
physicality.
7.2.1 Study overview
The study described in this chapter was a cross-sectional field study conducted
at a national march and rally, which took place in central London on November
3rd 2007. The event was organised by UNISON (Britain’s largest public sector
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union) and was intended to be a platform from which supporters of the National
Health Service (NHS) could express support for, and solidarity with the NHS,
which has been largely owned and run by the public sector since its launch on
July 5th 1948 (UNISON, 2007). It was hoped that the British government would
take note of the anti-privatisation stance of those involved. It was estimated by
UNISON (2007) that approximately 7,000 people took part.
This study provides an opportunity to build on observational, laboratory,
and anecdotal evidence by quantitatively testing the suggestion that
participating in a crowd event can be associated with ‘collective joy’. Two
mediation models will be tested, which are both in line with a SCT approach to
crowding. The first relates to the extent to which the relationship between
psychological proximity and ‘collective joy’ is mediated by physical proximity. It
is predicted that the psychological process of depersonalization (self-
categorizing according to a social identity) will lead to a positive crowd
experience; the more ‘at one’ that the demonstrators feel with their fellow crowd
members, the more positive their experience of being amongst them will be.
However, it is argued that the depersonalization process will also motivate the
demonstrators to seek a physical location in the crowd that they perceive as
more central, and that this perceived centrality will account for their positive
collective experience. Measures of subjective centrality/proximity will be
preferred to an objective measure for the following reasons: (a) the hypothesis
is focussed on the relationship between participants’ perceptions of
psychological and physical proximity, and (b) any measure of ‘objective’
physicality would be based on estimations made by four researchers, whose
perceptions of participants’ location might vary to some extent, and thus be
unreliable as a measure.
The second mediation model will switch the predictor and mediator
variables from the first model. In other words, the indirect effect of physical
location in the crowd on positive experience will be tested, with the
psychological process of social identification as the proposed mediator. It is
predicted that when the demonstrators perceive their location in the crowd as
more central, they will have a more positive crowd experience. However, it is
also suggested that physical centrality will be associated with an increased
sense of psychological ‘oneness’, or in other words, demonstrators who are at
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the physical core of the crowd will identify with their fellow crowd members to a
greater extent, which in turn will lead to a more positive crowd experience.
These two mediation models will form the core analyses for the current
chapter. However, as the demonstration was structured in three phases (see
below), with a mile-long march between the two data collection points, it will
also be possible to tentatively examine the role of synchronised movement –
the second proposed aspect of physicality – on the demonstrators’ social
identification and their levels of collective joy. This is based on the assumption
that as the demonstrators march from one part of the demonstration to the next,
they will to some extent, keep in time with one another (this is made more likely
by the fact that the demonstrators chanted and played musical instruments
while they marched). It is predicted that this synchronised movement between
phases one and three will lead to increases in both social identification and self-
reported positive experience. However, it is also predicted that any increase in
positive experience will be mediated by an increase in social identification. In
other words, as the demonstrators engage in synchronised movement – as they
act as a more coherent unit – they will identify more with each other as NHS
supporters. This increased sense of social identification will then lead to a more
positive experience of being in the crowd, as other crowd members come to be
increasingly defined as self.
7.3 Method
7.3.1 Phases of data collection
The demonstration was designed to take place in three phases. Phase one
was the assembly at Temple Place, Victoria Embankment, London, from 11am
until 12.30pm. Phase two consisted of a mile-long march along Victoria
Embankment and then through Westminster. The final phase was a rally, which
took place at Trafalgar Square from 1.30pm onwards. Data collection was
focussed on phases one and three.
7.3.2 Participants
Four researchers approached demonstrators and asked them to take part in a
questionnaire survey on participant perceptions of large-scale demonstrations.
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In total, 112 demonstrators agreed to take part and made up an opportunity
sample (58 female, 54 male). Ten people declined to complete the
questionnaire, but did not provide a reason for doing so. The ages of the final
sample ranged from 14 to 67 (M = 39.22, SD = 13.42). Data was collected from
56 demonstrators during each phase (phase one: 28 male, 28 female; age
range = 14 to 67, M = 37.00, SD = 15.00; phase three: 26 male, 30 female; age
range = 19 to 63, M = 41.00, SD = 11.00). It is difficult to conclude with
certainty that the sample was demographically representative of the crowd as a
whole, due to the large number of people present. However, based on reviews
of photographs taken on the day, the sample does appear to broadly represent
the gender balance and age range of those present.
7.3.3 Measures
Unless stated otherwise, the items used a response scale, which ranged from 1
(not at all) to 7 (very much).
Variable 1: Social identification7: Participants’ social-identification as NHS
supporters was measured using adapted items from Ellemers et al. (1999).
These were: ‘I identify with other people who are at this NHS demonstration’, ‘I
am like other people who are at this NHS demonstration’, and ‘Being a
demonstrator on this march is a reflection of who I am’, as well as an additional
item – ‘Being a part of this crowd is important to me’ – which was designed for
the purpose of this study. The items scaled together reliably (α = .78) and were
therefore combined to provide a composite measure of identification.
Variable 2: Positive experience: Four items were designed to measure
participants’ positive experience. The first three were: ‘I am glad to be part of
this crowd’, ‘I feel happy’, and ‘I am proud to be part of this crowd’. The fourth
measure was ‘I am not enjoying this event’, and used a response scale ranging
from 1 (completely agree) to 7 (completely disagree) (α = .66). The mean of
7 Previous chapters have used Leach et al.’s (2008) multi-component measure of identity as this
is thought to be the most comprehensive measure. However, the current study was conducted
prior to the publication of Leach et al.’s (2008) paper.
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these items was calculated to obtain a composite measure of positive
experience.
Variable 3: Perceived location in the crowd: The following three items were
used to measure participants’ perceived location in the crowd: ‘I am right in the
middle of the crowd’, ‘I am away from the middle of the crowd’ (later reverse-
coded), and ‘I am in the thick of things’ (α = .73). Again, these three items were
combined to obtain a single-score representation of perceived location.
7.3.4 Procedure
Four researchers arrived at the demonstration assembly point at approximately
11.30 a.m. and immersed themselves in the gathering crowd of demonstrators.
For phase one of the data collection, demonstrators who were waiting for the
march to begin were approached and asked to fill in a questionnaire. When
approaching small groups of demonstrators within the crowd, only one member
of the group was asked to complete the questionnaire in order to avoid non-
independence of responses. They were asked to complete the items alone.
Having completed the questionnaire, participants were provided with a full
written debrief.
The march through Westminster began after one hour of data collection.
The researchers marched with the demonstrators until they reached Trafalgar
Square. At this point, the researchers again immersed themselves among the
protestors to begin collecting data during the third phase of the demonstration.
The data collection procedure for phase three also lasted for one hour and was
exactly the same as that carried out during the first phase.
7.4 Results
Bootstrapping procedures with bias corrected and accelerated confidence
intervals were used to test the mediation models discussed below, as the use of
the Sobel (1982) test and the Baron and Kenny (1986) method to determine the
significance of mediator variables is thought to be unreliable when using smaller
samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; see Chapter 6, section 6.3.3.3 for more
detail). The analyses were based on 5,000 bootstrap samples and conducted
using the SPSS macro devised by Preacher and Hayes (2004).
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A note on perceived location: Prior to reporting the mediation models, it is
important to note that the researchers each estimated the demonstrators’
location in the crowd (on a scale which ranged from 1 (periphery) to 7 (centre)).
A significant positive correlation was found between the researcher and
demonstrator perceptions of location, β = 0.22, t = 2.22, p = .03, r = .21.
Although it could certainly be argued that the researchers’ estimates may not
have been entirely objective, or accurate, this finding at least points to an
objective confirmation of the demonstrators’ location in the crowd.
7.4.1 Model 1: Perceived location in the crowd as a mediator of the
relationship between social identification and positive experience
Figure 7.1 Perceived location in the crowd as a partial mediator of the
relationship between social identification and self-reported positive experience.
Values represent β weights * < .05 ** < .01, *** <.001.
As shown in Figure 7.1 (above), the total effect of social identification on
positive experience associated with being in the crowd is highly significant, c =
0.54, t = 8.29, p < .001. The direct effect of social identification is also highly
significant, c’ = 0.50, t = 7.42, p < .001, which indicates that any mediation
effects will be partial. With a point estimate of .04 and a 95% BCa bootstrap CI
of 0.003 to 0.092 (as these values do not contain zero, the effect is significant),
perceived location in the crowd is indeed a significant partial mediator of the
effect of social identification on positive experience of being in the crowd.
Perceived
location
Social
identification
Positive
experience
a = 0.38** b = 0.10
C =0 .54*** (C’ = 0.50***)
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Closer examination of the a and b paths reveals that, as expected, social
identification was associated with a more positive experience and this effect
was partially mediated by the demonstrators perceiving their physical location to
be more central.
7.4.2 Model 2: Social identification as a mediator of the relationship
between perceived location in the crowd and self-reported positive
experience
Figure 7.2 Social identification as a mediator of the relationship between
perceived location in the crowd and positive experience. Values represent β
weights * < .05, ** < .01, *** <.001.
Figure 7.2 (above) shows that the total effect of perceived location in the
crowd on positive experience is highly significant, c = 0.22, t = 3.51, p < .001.
The direct effect of perceived location is not significant, c’ = 0.10, t = 1.80, p =
.08 (ns), which suggests that with a point estimate of .12 and a 95% BCa
bootstrap CI of 0.052 to 0.215, social identification fully mediated the effect of
perceived location in the crowd on positive experience. The direction of the
relationships shown in Figure 7.2 shows that the demonstrators who perceived
their location in the crowd to be more central expressed higher levels of social
identification as NHS supporters, and this in turn led to a more positive crowd
experience.
Social
identification
Perceived
location
Positive
experience
a = 0.25** b = 0.50***
C =0 .22*** (C’ = 0.10)
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7.4.3 Model 3: The effect of ‘synchronised movement’ on social
identification and self reported positive experience.
Figure 7.3 Social identification as a mediator of the relationship between phase
of demonstration and self-reported positive experience. Values represent β
weights * < .05, ** < .01, *** <.001.
In order to tentatively examine the effect of ‘synchronised movement’ – the
second proposed aspect of physicality – on the demonstrators’ reported levels
of social identification and positive experience, the mean scores for each of
these variables during phase one were compared with the mean scores during
phase three (using independent t-tests). Social identification differed
significantly between phases one and three, t (110) = -2.26, p = .01, r = .21.
Investigation of the means reveals that social identification was higher for the
demonstrators during phase three (M = 6.14, SD = 0.89) than it was for the
demonstrators during phase one (M = 5.69, SD = 1.20), as predicted. Self-
reported levels of positive experience differed significantly between the phases
to a highly significant degree, t (110) = -3.76, p <.001, r = .33. Again, there was
an increase from phase one (M = 5.76, SD = 1.03) to phase three (M = 6.39,
SD = 0.71), as hypothesised.
Figure 7.3 shows an elaboration of the relationship between these three
variables. As can be seen, there is a highly significant total effect of phase on
Social
identification
Phase Positive
experience
a = 0.45* b = 0.50***
C =0 .63*** (C’ = 0.40**)
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positive experience, c = 0.63, t = 3.76, p < .001. The direct effect is somewhat
reduced, but still significant, c’ = 0.40, t = 2.92, p = < .01. This indicates that
any mediation effects will be partial. With a point estimate of .22 and a 95%
BCa bootstrap CI of 0.038 to 0.476, social identification partially mediated the
relationship between phase and positive experience. The direction of the a and
b paths shows that moving from phase one to phase three was associated with
an increase in social identification, which in turn was associated with a more
positive crowd experience.
7.5 Discussion
As hypothesised, high levels of ‘collective joy’ were reported at the NHS
demonstration under investigation. Mediation models 1 and 2 support a SCT
approach to this positive crowd experience. Model 1 shows that participants
who identified more as NHS supporters had a more positive experience and
that this relationship was partially mediated by their location in the crowd. That
is, higher identifiers positioned themselves in a location which they perceived as
more central, and this in turn was associated with a more positive experience.
This finding is in line with the evidence presented in previous chapters, which
suggests that social identification has an influence over our desire for, and
experience of, close physical proximity to in-group members (see also Novelli et
al., 2010).
However, model 2 revealed that the relationship between physical
proximity and positive experience was fully mediated by the demonstrators’
level of social identification. In other words, a more central location, and hence
closer physical proximity to crowd members, was associated with higher levels
of social identification with those crowd members, which in turn was associated
with a more positive experience.
Of course, due to the correlational design of the study, it would be
impossible, and indeed misleading to interpret either of the models as causal. It
is not the case that the first model highlights that social identification caused
participants to seek closer proximity, which then caused them to have a more
positive experience. Nor is the case that model 2 describes perceived physical
location as a cause of social identification and social identification as a cause of
‘collective joy’. These models simply highlight the tendency for these
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dimensions to co-vary and provide an opportunity to examine the relationships
between them.
So, what do these models suggest of the relationship between proximity,
identity and collective joy? The first thing to note is that it makes perfect sense
for model 1 to suggest only partial mediation. There is no reason whatsoever to
suggest that the relationship between social identity and positive experience is
completely accounted for by close physical proximity. Other aspects of shared
identity, such as sharing an ideology, working together to achieve goals, and
feelings of empowerment that might come from collective participation, might
also account for the increases in positivity that the demonstrators reported.
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the relationship between identity and
positive experience remained significant, although less so, when physical
centrality was included in the model. In other words, physicality accounted for
this relationship to some extent, but not fully, possibly due to these other
potential unmeasured variables.
The fact that the second model suggested full mediation also makes
theoretical sense. It has been argued throughout this thesis that variable
responses to crowding operate as a function of our variable desires for close
physical proximity, which in turn operate as a function of the variable and
multiple nature of our self-concept. In other words, whether our definition of self
is inclusive or exclusive of others co-present will impact on our desire for, and
experience of close physical proximity to them. This line of reasoning is
supported by model 2: being at the core of the crowd was associated with an
increase in positive experience, but this relationship was fully accounted for by
the extent to which those at the core identified with their fellow crowd members.
These findings provide interesting insights into the relationship between
physical and psychological processes in crowds. However, the third set of
findings, which compared social identification and positive experience at phases
one and three, provided at least suggestive evidence in support of the idea that
physicality – this time in the form of synchronised movement – can impact on
identity processes and the experience of crowding. It was shown that both
social identification and collective joy increased between phases one and three
of the demonstration (after a period of largely synchronised movement). In
addition, the relationship between phase and collective joy was partially
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mediated by the demonstrators’ social identification, which hints at the potential
for physical co-presence and co-action to weaken the boundary between
individual and group, while intensifying our positive collective responses. This
finding is of particular importance as it demonstrates for the first time, the
potential impact that physical orientation can have on social identification.
While a promising start, a limitation to this study must be acknowledged.
The conclusion that synchronised movement played a part in the increased
social identification and collective joy fits in part with the proposed SCT
hypothesis relating to a coordinal basis of self-categorization. However, it is a
conclusion based solely on correlational evidence. The demonstrators certainly
marched as a single unit, chanted and played musical instruments in the period
between the two data collection points, so in that sense they were seen to be
‘moving in time’. However, due to lack of control over the critical variables, it is
impossible to rule out the possibility that the increases in social identity and
collective joy were simply the result of a time effect (or indeed some other
extraneous variable). It could be argued that simply being with in-group
members – people who share our norms and values – might strengthen group
bonds, and in turn make the experience of crowding more positive.
Therefore, in order to supplement the suggestive evidence presented in
the current chapter, the following chapter will examine the potential two-way
relationship between synchronicity and social identity, and their impact upon
experience of close physical proximity. This time, the work will be conducted in
a laboratory environment where it is possible to retain control over the critical
variables and minimise the impact of potential confounds.
194
Chapter 8: Introducing a two-way embodiment model of social
identity processes (2). Identity, synchrony and ‘collective joy’:
A laboratory study
8.1 Introduction
The core finding of the previous chapter is of fundamental importance in the
context of this thesis. The link between social identity and physical proximity –
a link already established in one-to-one interactions and imagined crowd
scenarios in the experimental studies described in the preceding chapters (and
also Novelli et al., 2010) – was quantified out in the field for the first time at a
large-scale demonstration. It was shown that demonstrators who identified
more with the other crowd members (as supporters of the NHS) sought a
physically more central location in the crowd. That is, they immersed
themselves in the crowd and placed themselves in a position where they would
experience closer proximity to their fellow crowd members. In addition, it was
shown that contrary to much of the early crowding research (discussed in
Chapter 2), being at the centre of a densely populated crowd in inevitably close
proximity to strangers, was associated with enhanced positive feelings. In line
with a SCT account of crowding, this relationship between physicality and
positivity became non-significant when the demonstrators’ social identity levels
were held constant – that is, the demonstrators’ positive feelings were
enhanced because they were in close physical proximity to people who were
perceived as in-group members.
These findings further highlighted the impact that the process of
depersonalization can have on our physical relations in crowds. They
demonstrated that as the psychological boundary between self and other
relaxes, so too can the physical boundary. However, it was also argued in the
previous chapter that to be in an in-group crowd – a crowd that is united
psychologically – is not to simply share a space. It is not a static process, which
ends when we are brought together, content with simply rubbing shoulders with
one another. More often, crowds gather for a purpose – e.g., to support a team,
to enjoy music, to voice an opinion, or to attempt to bring about social change –
and achieving these purposes often involves some form of synchronised co-
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action such as chanting, marching or clapping. This raises questions regarding
whether or not these forms of synchronised physical co-action might impact
upon the ways in which we see those we are acting in unison with, and
ourselves.
It was speculated in the previous chapter that synchronised movement
might operate as a criterion for comparative fit and hence the salience of a
social category and the enhanced in-group identification that goes with such co-
action. Tentative support for this argument came from the finding that the
demonstrators’ sense of shared social identification increased between the two
phases of data collection. Although the time between these two phases of data
collection was largely characterised by periods of sustained synchronised action
(especially in the form of marching, but also in the form of chanting and playing
musical instruments), it is impossible to conclude with confidence that the
synchronised action caused the social identity increases. This is due to the lack
of control over the critical variables that comes with correlational studies, such
as the one described in the previous chapter.
Therefore, the study presented in this chapter was designed to supplement
the important, ecologically valid fieldwork that was described in Chapter 7, by
examining the causal effects of synchronised movement on social identity
processes in a controlled laboratory environment.
Following McNeill’s (1995) observation that following periods of sustained
synchronised movement, collectives can experience ‘joy’, Wiltermuth and Heath
(2009) conducted an experiment to investigate whether synchronicity could
have a positive effect on group-level processes, such as in-group cooperation.
To test this idea, participants were assigned to one of four conditions (1. no
singing or movement, 2. synchronised singing, 3. synchronised singing and
movement, and 4. asynchronous singing and movement), in groups of three. It
was found that cooperation was highest in the groups who had synchronised
their action and that the relationship between synchronicity and cooperation
was partially mediated by the participants’ feelings of ‘being on the same team’.
However, the authors did not link this finding to a theoretical framework
such as SCT. In fact, while they acknowledged that the effects could be
facilitated by ‘social attachment’, they dismissed the potential role of social
identification. This conclusion was based on the fact that all of the groups were
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referred to as ‘groups’ in an attempt to induce feelings of social identity – a
method that is common in social identity research. Thus, it was claimed that
social identity would be highly salient for participants in all conditions. However,
the authors relied on the assumption that this approach would lead to equal
levels of social identification across the conditions. While this may be the case,
the authors did not report whether there were actually differences in social
identification across the conditions – they stated that participants were asked to
complete a measure of ‘similarity’ following the a/synchronous activity, but did
not report the findings from this measure. In fact, if anything, their reported
findings do point to the suggestion that identity did vary across conditions. To
elaborate, it was found that participants in the synchronised conditions reported
higher levels of ‘being on the same team’ than did those in the asynchronous
condition, and more importantly, the effect of synchronised movement on in-
group cooperation was mediated by the participants’ feelings of ‘being on the
same team’. Thus, it is unclear how feelings of ‘being on the same team’ and
social identification are distinguished in this case, and as a result, it seems
reasonable to question the authors’ decision to outwardly reject the link
between synchronicity, identity, and group co-operation.
The relevance of Wiltermuth and Heath’s (2009) findings to the current
research does not end there. In disagreement with McNeill (1995), the authors
concluded that synchronised action does not need to instil ‘collective joy’ to
increase participants’ desire to cooperate with the group. Wiltermuth and
Heath’s (2009) conclusion makes sense from a SCT perspective. Rather than
seeing collective joy as a mediating variable between synchronised movement
and group bonding, group bonding – or in other words, social identification –
should be seen as a mediating variable between synchronised movement and
collective joy. To elaborate, synchronised movement might increase the
salience of a social identity and lead to the depersonalization of individual
perceivers in a crowd. This increased identity salience should then facilitate the
joyful responses that we so often observe at crowded events as our physically
proximal relations are to people who we perceive to be increasingly proximal to
our psychological self. In other words, we should feel more comfortable,
relaxed, happy and so on, as we come to realise that those around us are like
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us – that they are ‘us’ – and hence share our perspectives, ideologies, goals or
desires, and with whom we share a sense of solidarity or fate.
8.2 Study 8
Robust evidence from multiple methods has demonstrated that social identity
affects physical behaviours such as proximity (e.g., Neville & Reicher, 2007;
Novelli et al., 2010, and the studies already presented in this thesis) and the
choice of location in a crowd (see Chapter 7). The obvious next step is to
consolidate evidence in support of the second part of the two-way relationship
between the psychological and the physical – a relationship that is so intuitively
plausible (e.g., from swaying fans at sports events and festivals, or from
anthropological observation) yet hardly tested and barely theorised in
experimental social psychology.
In other words, this study allows for a further test of the impact of physical
co-action (in the form of synchronised movement) on participants’ psychological
responses. The design of the experiment involves participants sitting in small
groups at close proximity to one another8. Having been told that they were
taking part in an experiment investigating whether or not social facilitation
effects (e.g., Triplett, 1897-1898; Zajonc, 1965, 1980) were the same in student
and non-student samples, participants were asked to complete a ‘learning task’
which involved either synchronised or non-synchronised movement. Thus, the
experimental design allowed for control over the independent variable. This
allows for a clearer test of the impact of synchronised movement on social
identification, and hence the experience of close physical proximity.
Thus, the first hypothesis, which is central to this study, is that the groups
who synchronise their movement will identify more with their laboratory group
than those who do not move in synchrony. This is based on the assumption
that moving as a unit will operate as a criterion for salience and hence shared
social identity.
8 Although small groups differ in size from many types of crowd (such as those at sports events,
festivals, and raves), there is a long tradition of investigating crowd processes in small groups,
based on the premise that social identity and self-categorization principles should apply to both
small and large groups such as laboratory groups and crowds respectively. A good example of
this can be found in the deindividuation literature (see Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995).
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A secondary aim of the current study is to assess the extent to which
social identity processes mediate the relationship between synchronised
movement and the participants’ positive group experience. It is predicted that
synchronised movement will lead to increased social identification, and that
despite the densely arranged chair configurations, the dimensions of social
identification which relate to the relationship between self and other group
members (such as solidarity, centrality, and individual self-stereotyping; Leach
et al., 2008), will mediate the relationship between synchronised movement and
positive group experience. In other words, the groups will enjoy their ‘crowded’
experience more as their sense of social identification intensifies and group
members become increasingly defined as self.
8.3 Method
8.3.1 Design
A between-subjects design was used for the current study. The independent
variable was manipulated across two levels (1. synchronised movement, and 2.
individual movement).
8.3.2 Participants
Sixty-two participants whose ages ranged from 18 to 33 (M = 19.74, SD = 2.17)
took part in the study in exchange for either partial fulfilment of course
requirements, or a cash payment of £6. As was the case in the other
experimental studies presented in this thesis, the sample was comprised of
female native English speakers. This was to minimise the potentially
confounding effects of gender (Uzzell & Horne, 2006) and culture (Evans &
Howard, 1973; Evans et al., 2000; Hall, 1966) on spatial behaviours, and hence
the experience of crowding.
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8.3.3 Materials
Figure 8.1 Example of a clapping pattern given to participants as part of the
stimulus for the ‘learning task’.
Clapping patterns: A series of eight clapping patterns were devised for the
current study. The patterns were loosely based on clapping patterns used by
spectators at sporting events around the world. The patterns were presented to
the participants in graphical form – an example is displayed in Figure 8.1.
Participants were asked to repeat each of the patterns several times (ranging
from five times to ten times) to ensure that they were moving for a sustained
period of time when performing the patterns to the experimenter.
8.3.4 Measures
‘Dummy’ questions: Four items were added to the measures of the
dependent variables, which were contained in a questionnaire and handed to
the participants at the end of the procedure (see below). The four items were
designed to enhance consistency between the false research objective (social
facilitation effects) and the measures completed by the participants. Thus, the
opening items to the questionnaire were as follows: ‘I feel that the presence of
the other participants enhanced my ability to learn’, ‘I feel that the presence of
the other participants impaired my ability to learn’, ‘I found the learning task to
be easy’, and ‘The learning task was challenging’. These items were not used
for analytical purposes.
Dependent variables: Social identification and positive group experience:
Identification with the laboratory group was measured using an adapted series
of items compiled by Leach et al. (2008). The identity components and their
__ __ __
__ __
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corresponding measures were as follows: (i) solidarity (‘I feel a bond with the
group of people who just participated in the study with me’, adapted from
Cameron, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998, ‘I feel solidarity with the group of people
who just participated in the study with me’, adapted from Leach et al., 2008, and
‘I feel committed to the group of people who just participated in the study with
me’, adapted from Doosje et al., 1995), (ii) centrality (‘I will often think about the
fact that I was in the group that just participated in this study’, adapted from
Cameron, 2004, ‘The fact that I am in the group that just participated in this
study is an important part of my identity’, adapted from Luhtanen & Crocker,
1992, and ‘Being in the group that just participated in this study is an important
part of how I see myself’, adapted from Doosje et al., 1998; Ellemers et al.,
1999; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), (iii) individual self-stereotyping (‘I have a lot
in common with the other people who participated in the study with me’,
adapted from Spears et al., 1997, and ‘I am similar to the other people who
participated in the study with me’ (adapted from Doosje et al., 1995; Spears et
al., 1997), and finally (iv) perceived in-group homogeneity (‘The people who just
participated in the study with me have a lot in common with each other’,
adapted from Spears et al., 1997, and ‘The people who just participated in the
study with me are very similar to each other’, adapted from Ellemers et al.,
1999; Spears et al., 1997).
When measuring ‘satisfaction’ with regards to the laboratory group identity,
the items were as follows: ‘I was glad to be in the group that just worked
together during this study’ (adapted from Cameron, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998;
Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), ‘I think that the group that just participated in the
study together has a lot to be proud of’ (adapted from Ellemers et al., 1999), ‘It
was pleasant to be in the group that just participated in the study’ (adapted from
Doosje et al., 1998), and ‘Being in the group that participated in the study gave
me a good feeling’ (adapted from Cameron, 2004; Luhtanen & Cocker, 1992).
It is important to note that due to the change from the use of present tense (in
the original measure, Leach et al, 2008) to past tense, the items originally
designed to measure ‘identity satisfaction’ perhaps measured something which
would be better described as ‘positive group experience’. Accordingly, from this
point on, when discussing identity ‘satisfaction’, it will be referred to as ‘positive
group experience’.
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8.3.5 Procedure
Figure 8.2 Room layout, Chapter 8
Participants took part in groups of either three or four (there were an even
number of three and four-person groups in each condition: five groups with
three participants and four groups with four participants). The laboratory had
been set-up prior to the participants’ arrival. The layout of the room is depicted
in Figure 8.2.
Four chairs were arranged facing each other in a square formation. The
mean distance between the chairs was approximately 26 inches. The mean
distance was calculated by taking measures of the four leg-to-leg distances plus
the distance between the middle of the front edge of the base of the seats and
then dividing by five. In Novelli et al.’s (2010) ‘personal space’ studies, the
smallest mean distances were 38.60 (SD = 4.95) inches in study 1, and 46.56
(SD = 1.19) inches in study 2 (study 1 in Chapter 4 of this thesis). Both of these
distances were for participants expecting interaction with an in-group member.
It can therefore be deduced that as the 26-inch distance used in the current
study is more than two standard deviations closer together than the smallest
mean distance observed by Novelli et al. (2010), the chair configuration will be
too close for almost everyone, regardless of the group context, thus causing
Position A
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some level of discomfort to the participants. There were four chairs left in the
laboratory regardless of the number of participants in each group.
When entering the laboratory, participants were informed that the seats
had been arranged in a specific way. They were asked to take a seat and to
take care not to move any of the chairs when sitting down. Having settled,
participants were handed a written brief, which provided a cover story relating to
the purpose of the study. Participants were briefly informed of social facilitation
effects and told that the current study was being conducted to establish whether
social facilitation effects on learning were equal in student and non-student
samples.
The experimenter then handed each participant a sheet of paper detailing
the instructions to the ‘learning task’ that they would be asked to complete. For
participants in both of the experimental conditions, the instructions stated that
they would be allowed ten minutes to work as group to interpret the clapping
patterns. They were told that they would then be asked to perform the patterns
to the experimenter so that the extent of their learning could be assessed.
Participants in the individual movement condition were told that only one person
should be clapping at any one time, and that they would be asked to perform
the patterns individually. They were told that they must clap at least two
patterns each. Participants in the synchronised movement condition were told
that they should perform the patterns as a group, synchronising their claps.
The experimenter then left the room for ten minutes while the participants
worked collectively to interpret the clapping patterns before re-entering and
asking the participants to perform. The experimenter sat in position ‘A’ while
the participants performed. When the performance was complete, the
experimenter handed out questionnaires containing the measures of the
dependant variables to each of the participants and asked them to complete
them alone. Having completed the questionnaires, participants were probed for
suspicion with regards to the true nature of the study before being fully
debriefed.
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8.4 Results
A note on analytic strategy: As the design of the current study involved
interaction between participants (in both of the conditions), there was some
concern regarding the potential for the assumption of independence to be
violated (see Kenny, 1996; Kenny & Judd, 1986; Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger,
1998). In order to overcome this potential problem, the mean score for each
group was used as the unit of analysis; a method often used in small group
research (e.g., Gaertner & Schopler, 1998). Although this method incurs a loss
of power due to the reduced N (from thirty one participants in each condition to
nine groups in each condition), it was considered to be the appropriate
statistical approach.
8.4.1 Reliability analyses
Reliability analyses were conducted to ensure internal consistency between the
items within each of the four laboratory group identity components and also the
measures of ‘positive group experience’. It was found that the items largely
scaled together reliably within each of the identity components (solidarity: α =
.63, centrality: α = .76, individual self-stereotyping: α = .93, perceived in-group
homogeneity: α = .93) as did the measures of positive group experience (α =
.89). Therefore, mean scores were calculated to obtain four single-score
representations of identification and one single-score representation of positive
group experience.
8.4.2 Main effects
When comparing the conditions on each of the identity components, t-tests
revealed a significant difference in ‘solidarity’, t (16) = -2.23, p = .04, r = .47,
with the groups in the synchronised movement condition (M = 4.56, SD = 0.48)
expressing higher levels of perceived solidarity than the groups in the individual
movement condition (M = 3.94, SD = 0.68). A highly significant difference in
identity centrality also emerged between the conditions, t (16) = -3.83, p = .001,
r = .69, with a large effect-size. Unsurprisingly perhaps, groups in both of the
conditions reported low levels of laboratory-group identity centrality. However,
and importantly, the identity was more central to the groups in the synchronised
movement condition (M = 2.27, SD = 0.30) than it was to the groups in the
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individual movement condition (M = 1.77, SD = 0.25). T-tests also revealed a
highly significant difference between the conditions in positive group
experience, t (10.97) = -3.13, p = .01, r = .62, with a large effect-size. The
groups who synchronised their movement (M = 5.46, SD = 0.28) reported a
more positive group experience than did those who moved individually (M =
4.73, SD = 0.64).
There was not a significant difference between the conditions in individual
self-stereotyping, t (16) = -1.43, p = .18, r = .34, although as predicted, the
groups in the synchronised movement condition (M = 3.78, SD = 0.63) scored
higher than the groups in the individual movement condition (M = 3.40, SD =
0.47).
In summary, then, synchronised movement led to significant increases in
social identification on the dimensions of solidarity and centrality, as well as
positive group experience. However, there were not significant differences
between the conditions in individual self-stereotyping.
205
8.4.3 Multiple mediation model
Figure 8.3 Multiple mediation model for direct and indirect effects of condition
(synchronised vs individual movement) on self-reported positive experience.
Values represent β weights * < .05, ** < .01, *** <.001.
In addition to the key test of the relation between synchronised movement and
identity, it was hypothesised that the effect of synchronised movement on the
groups’ self-reported positive group experience would be mediated by the three
identity components which described the relationship between self and the
other group members (identity centrality, solidarity, and individual self-
stereotyping).
Condition Positive group
experience
C = 0.73**
Solidarity
Condition Positive group
experience
Individual self-
stereotyping
Identity centrality
C’ = 0.09
a = 0.50** b = 0.53*
a = .38 b = -.20
a = 0.62* b = .72***
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Preacher and Hayes (2008) outlined the following advantages associated
with using a single multiple mediator model as opposed to multiple single
mediator models. First, it allows for an assessment of the combined effect of a
set of proposed mediators. Second, the effect of a single mediator can be
assessed when taking into account the presence of the additional mediators in
the model. Third, it enables comparisons between the magnitudes of the
effects that each mediator contributes to the model. And fourth, the potential
parameter bias associated with omitted variables (as would be the case when
using single mediator models) is eliminated. In addition, the use of the Sobel
(1982) test to determine the significance of each mediator is unreliable when
using small samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Therefore, a single multiple
mediator model will be assessed here, using the SPSS macro devised by
Preacher and Hayes (2008). The bootstrapping method with bias corrected and
accelerated confidence intervals will be used to test the mediational hypotheses
(Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The analysis and bootstrap estimates reported
below are based on 5,000 bootstrap samples.
The full multiple mediator model is shown in Figure 8.3. As can be seen,
the total effect of condition on positive experience is significant, c = 0.73, t =
3.12, p = .007. However, the direct effect of condition on positive experience is
not, c’ = 0.73, t = 0.52, p = .61, which indicates that as a set, identity centrality,
solidarity and individual self-stereotyping fully mediated the effect of
synchronised movement on positive experience. This is further supported by
the fact that the difference between the total and direct effects is significant, with
a point estimate of .64 and a 95% BCa bootstrap CI of 0.16 to 1.20 (as these
values do not contain zero, the effect is significant). When examining the
specific contribution of each of the three proposed mediators, it was found that
solidarity is a significant mediator of the relationship between condition and
positive experience with a point estimate of .45 and a 95% BCa bootstrap CI of
.08 to 1.04, as is identity centrality with a point estimate of .27 and a 95% BCa
bootstrap CI of .02 to 0.66. Individual self-stereotyping is not a significant
mediator of the relationship between condition and positive experience, with a
point estimate of –0.07 and a 95% BCa bootstrap CI of –0.34 to 0.02. A
pairwise contrast of the indirect effects of the two significant mediators reveals
that solidarity and identity centrality did not differ in terms of the magnitude of
207
their specific indirect effects, with a point estimate of 0.18 and a 95% BCa
bootstrap CI of –0.26 to 0.82. The direction of the ‘a’ and ‘b’ paths of the
significant mediators reveals that as hypothesised, synchronised movement
significantly increased the groups’ feelings of identity centrality and solidarity,
both of which then significantly increased the groups’ self-reported positive
experience associated with being in the group.
8.5 Discussion
The results of this study confirm the prediction that synchronised movement can
be associated with an increase in social identification. The groups in the
synchronised movement condition scored higher on identity centrality and group
solidarity than those in the independent movement condition. However, there
was not a significant between-condition difference in individual self-
stereotyping.
With regards to positive laboratory group experience, the groups who
synchronised their claps reported a more positive experience than did those
who clapped individually. This is despite the densely arranged chair
configurations. To elaborate on this point, the chairs were arranged at closer
proximity than participants may have chosen for themselves in an intra-group
context (based on Novelli et al., 2010, study 1, and Chapter 4, study 2 of this
thesis). It can therefore be assumed that such close proximity may have
induced the negative outcomes sometimes associated with crowding for all of
the groups. However, it was shown that synchronised movement affected the
groups’ experience, leading to higher levels of positivity for those who moved as
a coherent unit.
When the relationships between the variables were examined in more
detail, it was shown that the effect of synchronised movement on positive group
experience was mediated by two of the identity dimensions relating to the
relationship between self and the group – centrality and solidarity – but not by
individual self-stereotyping, which is not surprising when considering that
individual self-stereotyping did not differ between the conditions. The mediating
role of identity processes confirms Wiltermuth and Heath’s (2009) conclusion
that collective joy is not necessary for synchrony to have an effect on group
bonding. Instead, it demonstrates that in contrast to McNeill’s (1995) position,
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collective joy can be an outcome of the group bonding that emerges from
synchronised movement as an identity becomes more central to group (or
crowd) members and they feel more solidarity with those around them.
Together with the findings of the field research described in the previous
chapter, the results from this study support a two-way embodiment model of
positive social identity processes in both small groups and large crowds. The
findings of both studies, coupled with the work of Novelli et al. (2010) and some
of the studies presented in this thesis (see: Chapters 4 and 6) demonstrate the
inter-relationship between psychological and physical processes. Using SCT
principles, it has been shown that the psychological process of
depersonalization can lead people to come together in a space, and that being
together in a space, and moving together in time, can operate as a criteria for
self-categorization, and hence shared identity. It has also been shown that the
sense of unity that ensues from moving as one can account for the collective joy
that is so often observed in large gatherings of people, yet rarely addressed by
psychological theory.
The finding that synchronised physical movement can work to strengthen
the social bond between people raises an important distinction between virtual
groups and physically co-present groups. A large body of research has
investigated social identity processes in computer-mediated communication
(CMC; for a review see Spears, Lea, & Postmes, 2007). It has been shown that
CMC can foster a wide range of social identity related phenomena, such as
group norm formation (Postmes, Spears, & Lea, 2000) and social support
networks (Spears, Lea, Corneliussen, Postmes, & Ter Haar, 2002). However,
the two-way embodiment model of social identity presented here can only apply
to groups and crowds that are physically co-present, which shows that social
identification can be strengthened by at least one aspect of physically co-
present groups that is absent from virtual groups. That is not to say that a two-
way relationship between social identity, virtual space and co-action is
inconceivable. In fact, it seems likely that people may be drawn to a (cyber)
space such as a common interest forum or message board and that engaging in
collective activities in such a space might then feed back and operate as a
criterion for self-categorization and any subsequent shared social identity.
However, the two-way relationship between the psychological and physical that
209
has been proposed in this thesis is unique to physically co-present groups and
crowds.
In summary then, in combination with the work presented in the previous
chapter, this study has supplemented past work (e.g., Cassidy, et al., 2007;
Neville & Reicher, 2008; Novelli et al., 2010; The Prayag Magh Mela Research
Group, 2007a, 2007b) by showing that social identity can draw people together
in a crowd event. However, it has also gone beyond that work by
demonstrating the two-way relationship between psychological and physical
processes in crowds, and explaining the relationship in terms of SCT. In doing
so, it has been shown that collective events are not simply an expression of a
particular social identity. Instead, they should be seen as a platform from which
social identities can strengthen and evolve as groups come together and unite
in synchrony.
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Chapter 9: Discussion and conclusions
9.1 Summary of findings
The primary motivation for conducting the research presented in this thesis was
to provide a theoretical account of spatiality and crowding, which could account
for the inconsistency and confusion that has characterised the crowding
literature for more than half a century. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, crowding
has been described as something that can happen at the national or
neighbourhood level, in the home, in institutions, in physically co-present
crowds, or in laboratories. Crowding has been described as a vehicle for
pathology, for joy, or even as a vehicle for pathological joy. Theorists have
described crowding as a demand for space that could not be met, or as a
psychological-evaluative response to density. For some, variable psychological
responses to crowding were reducible to individual differences, with the crowd
simply serving to amplify pre-existing likes and dislikes. For others, such
variation was explained in terms of vast lists of intervening and interacting
variables. Crowding was defined in the context of this body of work as physical
density, and perhaps the clearest and simplest conclusion to draw from the
review of the literature, and also from anecdotal and observational evidence, is
that despite there being a tendency for some researchers to focus on the
negatives, there is no simple, generic response to such density.
The ‘personal space’ approach to crowding (e.g., Evans & Wener, 2007;
Freedman, 1975; Worchel & Teddlie, 1976; Worchel & Yohai, 1979), which
stipulates that close physical proximity can elicit a negative response when it is
perceived as a violation of the self-other boundary, was introduced as a widely
used framework for explaining variable responses to crowding. Whilst the
approach makes some sense at first glance, several weaknesses were
highlighted and will be briefly recounted here. First, the traditional ‘personal
space’ approach can only account for when close proximity will or will not be
experienced negatively, and therefore does not allow for those situations in
which close proximity is welcomed or enjoyed. Second, spatial variations (and
hence variable responses to crowding) have been explained in terms of a long
list of intervening variables (such as individual differences, interpersonal
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relationships and setting-environmental factors) as opposed to a unified
theoretical framework, resulting in static, unsatisfactory, and often situation-
specific accounts of crowding variability. Third, group-level influences on
‘personal space’ have been framed as fixed, objective, demographic facts (e.g.,
culture, gender, or ‘race’), and as a result, within-demographic variations in
spatiality and responses to crowding have been left unaccounted for.
It was argued in Chapter 3 that self-categorization theory (SCT) provides
an overarching theoretical framework, which can be used to radically
reconceptualise the concept of ‘personal space’, thus overcoming the problems
that are outlined above. SCT describes the self as both a personal and a social
concept. According to SCT, when a perceiver self-categorizes according to
their personal identity, their interactions will be with other individuals, and hence
the spatial zone of selfhood surrounding them will indeed be personal, and
violations of that space will be from other individuals. However, when self-
categorized according to a shared social identity, in-group members will be
perceived as an extension of the perceiver’s psychological self, and the spatial
zone of selfhood will be a group-level construct. Thus, in this case, close
proximity to in-group members will not be perceived as an intrusion – instead, it
might be welcomed and enjoyed, whilst close proximity to out-group others
might be perceived as a violation of the self-other boundary and hence the
cause of discomfort, anxiety or distress. Importantly, as SCT hypothesises that
social identities, and hence group memberships, vary as a function of an
interaction between contextual and perceiver variables, there is scope for
variation within broad demographic groups or categories.
Chapter 4 presented two studies designed to test the most basic spatial
hypothesis drawn from SCT; that proximity varies as a function of group
relations. In study 1, participants who were divided according to minimal group
identities (dot ‘over-’ and ‘under-estimators’) were asked to set up a room for a
discussion. It was found that participants sought closer physical proximity when
their expected interactant was an in-group member as opposed to an out-group
member, thus supporting the hypothesis. The experimental paradigm was
adjusted slightly for study 2. English participants anticipated interaction with
either another English person (an in-group member) or an American (an out-
group member). Whilst this design allowed for a further test of the impact of
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group relations on proximity, it also presented an opportunity to examine the
impact of manipulated difference within each group context. It was found that in
line with study 1, participants sought closer physical proximity to an in-group
member than to an out-group member. Whilst the overall difference between
the in-group and out-group conditions was only 1-inch smaller than that
observed in study 1, it was not statistically significant. More interesting perhaps
is the finding that perceived difference (in terms of stereotypical views of
‘Englishness’) led participants to seek closer physical proximity when the
anticipated discussion was in an in-group context, but to seek greater distance
when the anticipated discussion was to be with an out-group member. As a
result of this interaction, there was not a significant difference in the spatial
requirements of participants in the in-group and out-group conditions when they
believed that their discussion partner held relatively similar views to them, but
there was a significant effect of group context on ‘personal space’ when the
participants’ discussion partner was perceived to hold relatively different views
to them. Although the absence of a group effect in the ‘similar’ condition was
unexpected, the moderating effect of group condition on the relationship
between perceived difference and ‘personal space’ was interpreted as evidence
in support of an active physical process, which might facilitate in-group
consensus.
While the studies in Chapter 4 looked at the impact of group relations on
the behavioural dimension of so-called ‘personal space’, the studies presented
in Chapter 5 were designed to examine the impact of group relations on the
experience of close proximity. If, as expected, participants perceive in-group
members as an extension of self and out-group members as other (and thus
separate from self), close physical proximity to an in-group member should be
experienced more positively, and less negatively, than close proximity to an out-
group member (because it is less likely to be perceived as a spatial ‘invasion’).
In a similar experimental paradigm to the one used in the studies presented in
Chapter 4, participants were assigned to minimal group categories. In Chapter
5, study 3, participants anticipated discussion with either an in-group or out-
group member at either a ‘near’ of ‘far’ distance. Contrary to expectations,
there was no effect of group context on the participants’ self-reported levels of
positive or negative affect, regardless of their proximity to their expected
213
interactant. However, in line with the findings of the studies presented in
Chapter 4, participants in the in-group condition expressed a greater desire for
close proximity than did those in the out-group condition, thus lending further
support to the suggestion that psychological proximity can impact on people’s
desire for physical proximity. The lack of an observed effect of group context on
subjective affect was attributed to the fact that participants simply anticipated
the arrival of an in-group or out-group discussion partner, and consequently
only ever experienced close proximity to an empty chair.
The second study of Chapter 5 (study 4) was designed to overcome this
problem. Participants were again assigned to minimal groups and then asked
to interact with either an in-group member or an out-group member, who was
played by a confederate. Whilst participants in the in-group condition reported
higher levels of positive affect than did those in the out-group condition,
subjective positive experience and affect did not vary as a function of interaction
distance, which was contrary to expectations. However, consistent with the
results of study 3, when the interaction distance was ‘close’, participants
expressed a stronger desire for closer proximity to the confederate when he
was an in-group member as opposed to an out-group member, thus lending
further support to the hypothesised relationship between psychological
proximity and (desired) physical proximity.
The results of the first four studies presented in this thesis offer evidence
in support of the behavioural spatial consequences of self-categorization, and in
doing so, are at least suggestive of the fact that close proximity to an out-group
member might be experienced as more unpleasant (or less pleasant) than close
proximity to an in-group member. However, the studies provided little
measurable evidence in support of the hypothesised impact of group relations
on the experience of close proximity. It was speculated that potential reasons
for this may include, (i) as already mentioned, the absence of a physical
interactant in study 3, (ii) the fact that the interaction in study 4 was rather
fleeting, on a one-to-one basis, and in a sterile laboratory environment, (iii) the
novel, and relatively meaningless basis on which the groups were divided in
both studies, and (iv) the fact that the manipulation of the minimal group
identities was relatively weak in both studies.
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Owing to the fact that the impact of group relations on the experience of
close proximity was not supported in the studies of anticipated and actual one-
to-one interactions (possibly due to the reasons outlined above), the studies
that were presented in chapters 6, 7, and 8 began to investigate the potential
relationship between self-categorization, group relations, spatiality, and
crowding experiences in small groups – and perhaps more importantly in the
context of this thesis – large crowds (both real and imagined). To begin with,
Chapter 6 presented two studies (studies 5 and 6) which used an experimental
paradigm that was adapted from a series of studies by Garcia et al. (2002).
Garcia et al. have established a robust paradigm, which has been used to show
that simply imagining immersion in a crowd can lead to subsequent helping
behaviours that are normally associated with physical co-presence (see also
Levine et al., in press). Therefore, it was hypothesised in Chapter 6 that simply
imagining immersion in a dense crowd could potentially uncover not only a
relationship between social identity and desired proximity in the participants’
visualisations, but might also impact upon their mood following the visualisation
task.
In study 5, participants were asked to spend a few minutes visualising
themselves on either (a) an empty train carriage, (b) a train carriage that was
packed full with commuters on their way to work, or (c) a train carriage was that
packed full with fans of the participants’ favourite band (following a concert). It
was predicted that participants who had imagined being surrounded by
commuters would not be united with the crowd by a common social identity,
whilst those who had visualised being surrounded by fellow fans of their
favourite band would be immersed in a crowd of in-group members. As a
result, participants in the commuter train condition should have perceived close
proximity to the others co-present in their visualisation as a violation of the self-
other boundary, whilst those on their way home from the concert should not
have experienced any kind of spatial violation due to the perceived status of
those co-present as self. It was therefore predicted that following the
visualisation task, those who had experienced the self-other violation would
report the highest levels of subjective negative affect, whilst those who had
visualised close proximity to common category members would report the
highest levels of subjective positive affect. These hypotheses were supported.
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However, even though it was found participants in the ‘commuter’ condition and
those in the ‘concert’ condition differing significantly in the extent to which they
identified with those present in the imagined crowd, it was impossible to
conclude with any degree of certainty that the between-condition differences in
affect were indeed the result of differences in identification as opposed to being
a consequence of potential confounds in the design. For example, participants
in the ‘commuter’ condition may have reported higher levels of negative affect
because they had imagined that they were on their way to work, whereas those
in the ‘concert’ condition may have reported higher levels of positive affect
because they had imagined seeing their favourite band, which is most likely to
be perceived as a positive, uplifting and exciting experience.
For this reason, a second study was conducted. Although the
experimental paradigm was similar to that used in study 5, rather than assigning
participants to experimental conditions, all participants were asked to visualise
the same scenario, thus allowing for an assessment of the correlations between
the critical variables. Having been asked to imagine that they were working as
summer interns, participants were asked to imagine that they were due to meet
their boss at Wembley Stadium to watch England play in a World Cup qualifying
match (the study was conducted during the period of time in which the
qualification rounds for the 2010 World Cup were taking place). They were
asked to visualise a scene in which they were travelling to the match on a
crowded Tube train, surrounded by England fans who were chanting loudly.
Due to the fact that no pre-testing was conducted to establish whether they
had any interest in football or going to watch England matches, it was expected
that identification with the England supporters would vary across the sample.
This would therefore allow for an assessment of the relationship between
participants’ identification with the crowd and (a) their desired proximity to the
others co-present in their visualisations, and (b) their subsequent levels of
subjective positive and negative affect. As expected, participants who identified
more with the crowd expressed a weaker desire for more space in their
visualisation. However, more importantly, social identification was positively
correlated with positive affect, but negatively correlated with negative affect
when the backdrop to the visualisation was held constant.
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Even more interesting, perhaps, was the finding that participants’ desire for
more space was associated with higher levels of subjective negative affect and
lower levels of subjective positive affect in the subsequent task. This lends
further support to the proposed relationship between spatial desires and
responses to (imagined) density. However, these relationships between
desired proximity and affect were fully mediated by the extent to which
participants did, or did not, identify with the crowd that they were immersed in.
This therefore supports the hypotheses that (a) (imagined) close proximity can
elicit negative psychological consequences (in this case affect) when it is to a
person or persons perceived as other, and that (b) (imagined) close proximity to
a person or persons perceived as self can give rise to positive psychological
consequences.
Whilst the findings of Chapter 6 offer strong support for a SCT approach to
spatiality and imagined crowding, Chapter 7 presented a field study which was
designed to investigate the relationship between social identification, physicality
and ‘collective joy’ at a large-scale protest and rally, or in other words, a
physically co-present crowd. As predicted, participants at the event reported
high levels of both social identification (as NHS supporters) and ‘collective joy’.
Two mediation models were tested to investigate further the relations between
identity, physicality, and ‘joy’. It was found that physical location in the crowd
partially mediated the relationship between social identity and ‘joy’. However, it
was also found that the relationship between location in the crowd and ‘joy’ was
fully mediated by participants’ social identification with the crowd.
A further finding to emerge from the study described in Chapter 7 was that
following a period of potentially synchronised movement (in the form of
marching, chanting, and playing musical instruments), participants reported
higher levels of (a) shared social identity, and (b) ‘collective joy’. In addition, it
was found that the change in self-reported ‘collective joy’ between the two
phases of data collection was partially mediated by the observed increase in
social identification. This finding provided suggestive evidence in support of the
hypothesis that synchronicity might facilitate the depersonalisation process, and
in doing so, weaken the boundary between self and other/s, which in turn might
increase positive affective responses to physical density.
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Although an interesting starting point, the lack of control over critical
variables in the field study left the observed link between synchronicity, identity
and joy open to the criticism that any increases in identity and joy may have
simply been a result of participants spending a sustained period of time
together, as opposed to being an outcome of their synchronised physical
movement. Therefore, Chapter 8 presented a laboratory study in which
participants worked together in extremely close physical proximity to learn a
series of clapping patterns, which they were either asked to perform individually
or as a synchronised group. It was found that despite the dense physical
arrangement of the chairs in the room, participants who synchronised their
movement reported a more positive experience of being in the group. In
addition, the relationship between synchronicity and positive group experience
was mediated by an increase in perceptions of group solidarity and identity
centrality. This finding therefore supported the hypothesis that identity
formation can operate as a function of physical synchronicity.
9.2 Contributions
The findings to emerge from this body of work make several important
contributions to the spatiality, crowding, and social identity literature. First, this
thesis has demonstrated that the concept of ‘personal’ space – a concept which
has largely framed the self-other boundary as an individual level construct –
can, and should, be reconceptualised in line with SCT to allow for the physical
boundary between self and other/s to function at the level of groups as well as
individuals. In doing so, intra-individual and intra-demographic spatial
variations can be now be accounted for within a single theoretical framework.
The second contribution of this thesis is closely related to the first.
‘Personal space’, in its traditional formulation, has often been used to explain
variable experiences of crowding based on the premise that when close
proximity in crowds is perceived as a violation of the self-other boundary, it will
be experienced negatively. As this work has now provided evidence of the self-
other boundary varying as a function of group-level and social identity
processes, it follows that experiences of close proximity and crowding will vary
accordingly. In fact, going beyond the traditional personal space approach to
crowding, which simply dictates when density will be experienced negatively or
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neutrally, the SCT approach can also account for when close proximity will be
experienced positively. As SCT frames in-group members as self, it follows that
a shared identity might bring with it a sense of solidarity and intimacy, which
might make close proximity to strangers a pleasant experience.
As discussed in Chapter 4, these two insights into the impact of group
processes on ‘personal space’ and crowding can be incorporated into
mathematical, computerised simulation models of crowd-flow, which are used to
assist in the architectural design process when developing public buildings,
such as sports stadiums, shopping malls, or stations (e.g. Helbing, Farkas &
Vicsek, 2000; Pan, Han, Dauber & Law, 2007). This therefore demonstrates a
practical application of the work presented here.
The third contribution of this work also relates to issues of spatiality.
Throughout this thesis, the focus has been on the theoretical
reconceptualisation of ‘personal space’ as a variable that can operate at the
level of groups as well as individuals, and this reconceptualised view has then
been applied to the domains of spatiality and crowding. In particular, the focus
has been on why people might seek out end enjoy close proximity in places
such as nightclubs, sports stadiums, or even on public transport in some
contexts, but might avoid or dislike close proximity in those very same places in
other contexts. The central focus has been on ways in which contextual shifts
can impact upon the ways in which a perceiver defines themselves and those
around them, or in other words, when and why they will come to see others as
‘their own kind’, and how these perceptions might in turn influence their spatial
behaviour. Thus, it has focussed on the fluid nature or self-other relations, and
thus, the ability for within-group variability in spatial and crowding behaviours
and experiences. However, the SCT approach to spatiality can also shed some
light on a related phenomenon that has recently received attention in the social
psychological literature; namely, the so-called ‘micro-ecology of segregation’,
which focuses on inter-‘racial’ spatial relations (Dixon, Tredoux, Durrheim,
Finchilescu, & Clack, 2008).
In a series of insightful studies, John Dixon and his colleagues have
investigated the ways in which ‘racial’ segregation occurs in public spaces. In
particular, Dixon et al.’s work has focussed on societies with a history of macro-
level ‘racial’ segregation (such as South Africa and the Unites States of
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America), but which are now thought of as desegregated. According to Dixon et
al. (2008, p. 1550), as is the case with the broad, macro concept of segregation,
“micro-ecological segregation involves the production of social spaces that
create, maintain and signify racial separation”. However, Dixon et al. (2008)
differentiate micro-ecological segregation from the macro-level segregation that
has received a substantial amount of academic attention - the type that might
occur in neighbourhoods and societies. According to Dixon et al. (2008, p.
1550): “The micro-ecological dimension, by definition, implicates the scales of
social life at which people encounter one another as they are brought into
relations of sensuous immediacy, proximity and co-presence”.
One of the most striking findings to emerge from the work of Dixon and his
colleagues is that micro-ecological racial segregation occurs in public spaces –
which are at first glance – desegregated areas. For example, Durrheim and
Dixon (2005) mapped the spatial behaviours of ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘Indian’, and
‘coloured’ people on a beach in South Africa. During apartheid, beaches were
specifically allocated as exclusively for the use of ‘whites’ or ‘blacks’. However,
post-apartheid South African beaches have become ‘mixed-race’, or in other
words, desegregated areas. Durrheim and Dixon found that despite the
beaches being accessible to people of any ‘race’, there tended to be racial
‘clustering’ on the beach. In addition, ‘white’ people tended to leave parts of the
beach which became heavily populated by ‘black’ people’, thus suggesting their
discomfort at being in close proximity to people defined as ‘other’. Similar
patterns of micro-ecological segregation have been observed in other public
settings such as cafeterias (e.g., Clack, Dixon, & Tredoux, 2005) bars, and
nightclubs (Tredoux & Dixon, 2009).
As noted by Dixon et al. (2008), the studies of ‘personal space’ presented
in this thesis (see also Novelli et al., 2010) provide a potential explanation of the
micro-ecological segregation discussed above. It is easy to see how the link
between psychological and physical proximity can be applied to Dixon et al.’s
work. Just as participants in the studies presented in this thesis sought closer
proximity to in-group members than to out-group members, the people in the
bars, restaurants, cafeterias and beaches in South Africa might have
represented group boundaries with their use of physical space. It is important
to stress here, that this in no way implies that micro-ecological ‘racial’
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segregation is inevitable – far from it. To suggest such a thing would be a
perverse misinterpretation of this thesis, and indeed of the core principles of
SCT, which suggests that the psychological boundary between who is self and
who is other operates as consequence of an interaction between contextual and
perceiver variables, and is hence fluid, and not determined by fixed
demographics such as ‘race’. However, in a context in which there exists an
historical emphasis on ‘race’ as an important social category, as is the case in
South Africa, then it is likely that self-categorizations and social identities will
often be determined according to ‘racial’ divides. As such, when a ‘white’ or
‘black’ identity is salient, it follows that members of other ‘racial’ groups will be
perceived as ‘other’ and members of the in-group will be perceived as ‘self’, and
that subsequent physical boundaries between ‘races’ might reflect this.
The ability for SCT to enhance our understanding of spatiality and
crowding has been highlighted extensively throughout this thesis. However, this
work also contributes to our theoretical understanding of identity and group
processes. Most notably, this thesis has highlighted the inter-relationship
between psychological and physical processes, and hence points to a two-way
embodiment understanding of social identification. Put differently, this body of
work has demonstrated that whilst self-categorizations can play an important
role in determining the organisation of bodies in a space, it has also shown that
the organisation of bodies in space, and the synchronisation of those bodies in
time, can feed back and influence self-categorizations (see also, Cassidy et al.,
2007). The field study presented in Chapter 7 pointed to this inter-relationship
in a naturalistic setting. However, perhaps the clearest examples of a two-way
relationship between self-categorization and physicality can be found in the first
and the last of the laboratory studies presented in this thesis. The first (Chapter
4, study 1) showed that self-categorizations can have an impact on participants’
physical orientation to a discussion partner, whereas the last (Chapter 8)
showed that physical synchrony can lead to a shift in how people categorize
themselves and others, and how this in turn can impact upon the experience of
close physical proximity to a group of strangers.
Whilst this ‘return path’ from physicality to identity sheds some light on the
potential two-way relationship between psychological and physical processes, it
also makes an important contribution as a stand-alone finding. To elaborate,
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there has recently been a fascinating body of work that was designed to
investigate the mechanisms underlying social identity formation – particularly in
small groups. According to Postmes, Haslam and Swaab (2005), social identity
formation operates via two routes, which they refer to as deduction and
induction. Deduction is seen as a top-down process, in which ‘social “realities”
existing in the social structure’ (Postmes et al., 2005, p. 8) inform group
members’ shared understanding of what it means to belong to a particular
social category. The authors cite the consensualisation literature as a good
example of this top-down process (see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of
consensualisation). To elaborate briefly, Haslam and his colleagues have
shown in a series of studies (e.g. Haslam et al., 1998, 1999) how stereotypical
views of both an in-group and an out-group can become consensualised
following a period of intra-group discussion. Importantly, this effect is most
evident when participants are asked to discuss these stereotypes in an inter-
group context, thus demonstrating the way in which inter-group comparisons
can aid social identity formation (as a slight digression, it is worth pointing out
here that Chapter 4, study 2 has contributed to our understanding of the way in
which physical processes might facilitate this active consensualisation process).
Induction, on the other hand, is seen as a bottom-up process, in which the
actions of individuals within a particular group help to formulate a social identity
(Postmes et al., 2005). Importantly, this process can operate in the apparent
absence of an explicit out-group to serve as a frame of reference – that is, it can
be an intra-group process. As noted by Postmes et al. (2005), research
examining interactive small groups has been rather sparse. This is, in part, a
consequence of the well-documented problems associated with the analysis of
data from such studies (see McGarty & Smithson, 2005). However, Postmes et
al. (2005, p. 25) cite a series of studies which have demonstrated that social
identification can be strengthened following a period of intra-group discussion
and the shared cognition that such discussion fosters (Swaab, Postmes,
Spears, van Beest, & Neijens, 2005; see also Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, and
Spears, 2007).
Whilst there is no doubting the value of this finding in terms of its ability to
demonstrate the inductive route to identity formation via intra-group discussion,
Chapter 8 in this thesis contributes further to our understanding of this ‘bottom-
222
up’ route to social identity formation. To elaborate, the study described in
Chapter 8 demonstrated that synchronised physical movement could strengthen
participants’ sense of social identification with the group. To be more specific –
synchronicity enhanced participants’ feelings of group solidarity and made the
identity more central to them (in comparison to participants who did not
synchronise their movement). Prior to their participation in the clapping task,
participants in both the synchronised movement condition and the individual
movement condition were involved in a period of group discussion to (a)
interpret the clapping patters, and (b) decide how they would work as a group in
order achieve the optimal performance in their subsequent ‘assessment’. Thus,
the finding that those in the synchronised condition felt a stronger sense of
group identity than did those in the individual movement condition demonstrates
that social identity can be induced via physical synchronisation, and that this
effect can operate above and beyond the effect of intra-group discussion.
Now that the core contributions of this work have been outlined, the final
section of this chapter will outline some potential avenues for future research
into the SCT approach to spatiality and crowding. In some cases, this future
work could be conducted to address the potential limitations of this thesis, but in
other cases, the suggested work could be used to expand the application of
SCT to crowding and spatiality.
9.3 Limitations and directions for future research
Although the following section marks the end of this thesis, it should be seen as
just the end of the beginning of the development of the SCT approach to
spatiality and crowding. The current body of work has answered some early
questions, and has provided some important insights relating to the efficacy of
SCT as an explanatory tool in crowding and spatial work. However, it has been
impossible to answer all of the questions that will inevitably emerge from this
novel theoretical application, and as such, this thesis opens up several
interesting avenues for future work, which will be briefly discussed below.
Beginning with the application of SCT to spatiality, the impact of group
relations on so-called ‘personal space’ was strongest when minimal groups
were used – that is, when the groups were relatively meaningless to their
members, with no history of interaction between them. When national identities
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(English and American) were used, the group effect on space was somewhat
reduced (although, still evident). As it can be argued that the United States of
America and England have a history of alliance and cooperation, it becomes
reasonable to suggest that this may have influenced this weakened group effect
on spatiality – that is, participants might have felt that it was normative to
cooperate with an American, and thus normative to sit relatively close to them.
However, this interpretation can be seen as nothing more than speculation at
present. As such, one possible avenue for future work might be to investigate
how different group relations (e.g., hostile versus harmonious) can impact upon
spatiality. The nature of these relationships could be either perceived social
realties (e.g., national identities with a history of hostility or cooperation), or
experimentally imposed, thus opening up a wide range of potential variations on
the ‘personal space’ paradigm developed in this thesis.
Further work could also be conducted to provide further evidence in
support of the idea that contextual shifts can impact upon the inclusiveness of
group boundaries, and that this in turn can impact upon spatiality. For example,
it has been argued that close physical proximity to a particular person or group
of people might be avoided or experienced as unpleasant when they are
perceived as out-group members, but that close proximity to that very same
person or group of people might be actively sought and enjoyed when they are
perceived as in-group members in a different context.
One potential way of examining this would be combine the ‘personal
space’ paradigm described in this thesis with a research paradigm used by
Levine et al. (2005). Levine et al. found that in a context which made
participants’ social identity as Manchester United fans salient, they were more
likely to offer help to an ‘injured’ person if they were wearing a Manchester
United shirt (in-group) as opposed to those wearing a Liverpool FC shirt (out-
group), or a non-branded sports shirt. However, in a context which made
participants’ social identity as football fans salient, Manchester United fans were
just as likely to offer help to Liverpool fans (despite their historical status as
rivals) as they were to offer help to those wearing Manchester United shirts.
The ‘injured’ person wearing the non-branded sports shirt was least likely to be
offered help. Thus, a study could be conducted to investigate whether (a) fans
of a particular team (e.g., Manchester United) seek closer proximity to fellow
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fans of their team than to fans of a rival team (e.g., Liverpool) in a context which
makes their team identity salient, and (b) whether fans of the same team
(Manchester United) seek closer proximity to ‘rival’ fans (Liverpool) than to
people who dislike football in a context which makes their identity as football
fans salient.
Despite the strengths of the ‘personal space’ paradigm developed in this
thesis (and Novelli et al., 2010), experimentally manipulating social identities
and group relations and then asking participants to arrange chairs for a
discussion, is of course, just one way of testing the SCT approach to spatiality
and crowding. One of the main appeals of the paradigm is that participants
remained unaware that their spatial preferences were the focus of study – thus
providing an ecologically valid measure. However, future researchers should
consider developing methods for investigating spatial behaviours that require no
intervention from researchers, and that can also be applied in field settings. For
example, in a similar vein to the work conducted by Dixon and his colleagues,
cameras could be used to ‘map’ the physical relations of people in various in-
group and out-group crowds. Although the field study described in Chapter 7
began to examine spatial relations in an in-group crowd, one of its limitations
lies in the fact that the measure of proximity was based on participants’ self-
reports, which may or may not have reflected their actual physical relations with
the others present in the crowd. Whilst the self-reports correlated with the
researcher’s estimations of proximity, it could also be argued that the
researchers’ estimations may have been inaccurate. Therefore, combining a
‘mapping’ technique with self reports would not only allow for objective
measures to be taken of the distances that people seek from one another, but
would also allow for an assessment of the extent to which people’s self-reports
of proximity reflect their actual physical relations with their fellow crowd
members.
Future fieldwork should also be conducted to further investigate the
hypothesised relationship between perceived self-other violations (i.e., in inter-
group and interpersonal crowding contexts) and negative psychological
outcomes (such as increased negative affect). Much of the work described in
this thesis certainly points to such a relationship, with the most lucid example
being the visualisation studies in Chapter 6, which revealed a direct link
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between crowding, identity and both positive and negative affect. However, a
limitation of this thesis is that the evidence is limited to one-to-one interactions
and visualised crowds. Whilst it is certainly true that the field study discussed in
Chapter 7 uncovered a relationship between identity processes and affect in
physically co-present crowds, the focus remained on in-group crowding and
positive affect. Therefore, future work should focus on the potentially negative
outcomes associated with immersion in a crowd of people with whom a
perceiver does not identify. It is however, certainly the case that recruiting
participants for such studies on an ad hoc basis would be challenging, if not
virtually impossible. For example, if one were interested in crowding
experiences in crowds that are comprised of individuals – such as commuters
travelling to work – distributing questionnaires on a crowded train would be a
logistical challenge, and to expect commuters to fill in questionnaires when they
can barely move would be unreasonable. On the other hand, if one were
interested in the experience of immersion in an out-group crowd, it would be
simply impossible to go into a crowd and to expect to find ‘out-group’ members.
Therefore, researchers interested in this area would be advised to recruit
participants prior to conducting their studies and to then ask them to immerse
themselves in various crowds and to either (a) report their experience (this
could be done either as a running commentary to an accompanying researcher,
or retrospectively by taking part in an interview or completing a questionnaire),
or to (b) wear apparatus such as a heart-rate monitor to allow for an
assessment of physiological arousal. It could also be argued that an even
better solution would be to triangulate the research methods by combining each
of these approaches.
Whilst this thesis has focussed on the ways in which close proximity and
crowding can increase positive and negative affect, another potentially
interesting avenue for future work could be to examine the ways in which
immersion in an in-group crowd might serve to actively reduce stress. A large
body of work has begun to uncover the ways in which social identity can impact
upon the experience of stress and how people react to stressful experiences
(e.g. see Haslam, Jetten, O’Brien, & Jacobs, 2004; Haslam & Reicher, 2006). In
short, it has been shown that (a) both the content and normative aspects of a
social identity can shape the ways in which group members appraise stressful
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situations, and that (b) when a social identity is salient, in-group members can
serve as a social support network, thus reducing the impact of stressful
situations. For example, in an elaborate study that was conducted as part of a
BBC documentary, Haslam and Reicher (2006) created a ‘prison’ and assigned
participants to the social categories of ‘prisoners’ and ‘guards’. In support of the
notion that social groups can serve as a social-support unit, it was found that for
participants in the ‘prisoner’ group, an increased sense of shared social identity
led to an enhanced ability to cope with stressful situations, such as experiencing
poor living conditions. However, for participants in the ‘guard’ group, an inability
to develop a sense of shared identity, and thus the absence of a social support
network, was associated with an inability to cope with stressful situations such
as being bullied by the prisoner group. In an earlier study, Haslam, O’Brien,
Jetten, Vormedal, & Penna (2005) demonstrated the potential for past
experience and also the normative aspects of a particular work-based identity to
influence the degree to which a situation was perceived to be stressful. To
elaborate, whilst bomb disposal officers viewed their work to be less stressful
than that of bar staff (and vice versa), neutral participants (students)
consistently valued bomb disposal work to be more stressful than bar work, thus
demonstrating the subjective and group-based nature of stress.
When bearing these findings in mind, it certainly seems feasible to suggest
that social identity processes might actively reduce feelings of stress in crowds.
For example, a crowd of football fans – united by the common social identity
that is associated with a particular team – might experience a tense match or
defeat as stressful or upsetting, especially if the defeat were to a hostile rival,
thus threatening the status of the in-group. Whilst a fan watching the match in
isolation (i.e. on television) would have to experience the stress alone, for a fan
in the crowd, fellow supporters might provide a social support network. This
social support could come in many forms. First, a crowd of fans might act as a
point of reference for one another so that they can strive for consensus on how
to feel and who to blame. Second, the crowd might provide its individual
members with the ability to be heard via the medium of collective chanting,
which in turn could give rise to a sense of collective empowerment, which could
be of particular importance if the source of stress was a group of taunting
opposition fans. Third, the crowd could simply converse to reassure and
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console one another. Of course, each of these predictions are speculative at
present, thus demonstrating the need for future work in this area.
The final potential avenue for future work to be outlined in this thesis
relates to the finding that synchronised movement can facilitate the
depersonalisation process and aid social identity formation. Despite the
strength of this finding, it must be acknowledged that it is fairly limited in its
scope, and is therefore deserving of further attention. For example, the link
between physical co-ordination and identification is currently limited to perfectly
synchronised clapping. Future work could examine whether moving in time to a
beat, but not necessarily in perfect synchrony (i.e., clubbers dancing to beat-
heavy music) might have a similar impact on the way in which people see
themselves and others, although perhaps to a lesser extent. In a similar vein,
work could be conducted to look at the impact that asynchronous movement
might have on social identification. In the study described in Chapter 8,
comparisons were made between people who moved as individuals and those
who moved as a synchronised unit. Thus, future work could include an
experimental condition in which participants are asked to move at the same
time, but not in time with one another. On the one hand, it could be predicted
that participants in the asynchronous condition might identify with each other
the least due to the resulting cacophony that might be associated with disjointed
clapping. On the other hand however, a more plausible prediction might be that
those in the asynchronous condition might identify more than those in the
individual movement condition. For example, spectator crowds often applaud
as a show of appreciation, and although such applause in really synchronous, it
is unlikely to decrease feelings of shared identity – perhaps the simple
production of noise can increase identity via the process of collective
empowerment. However, it would seem sensible to predict that those in the
synchronised condition would identify the most due to the feelings of solidarity
and identity centrality that emerges from moving as one. However, these are all
questions that require further empirical attention.
Whilst undoubtedly interesting, all of these potential directions for the SCT
approach to spatiality and crowding are for the future. For now, it is time to
draw this current body of work to a close. In sum, this new application of self-
categorization theory to the field of spatiality and crowding has provided some
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important insights into the impact that social identities and group relations can
have on when and why we want to be physically near to, or far from others in
one-to-one interactions, small groups, or in crowds – be them real or imagined.
It has shown that social groups can be represented physically as well as
psychologically. In doing so, an explanation has been provided as to why
situations of close proximity and density can sometimes be experienced as
unpleasant and stressful and thus avoided, but at other times sought out and
enjoyed. However, this work has gone even further by demonstrating that
collective events are not simply an expression of an existing social identity.
Instead, they should also be seen as a platform from which social identities can
strengthen and evolve as groups congregate and unite in synchrony. Taken
together, these findings mark the first steps towards developing a two-way
embodiment understanding of social identity processes.
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Appendix 1: Chapter 4, study 1 – participant brief
Research background
According to Hoffman and Routledge (2004), people can be reliably divided into
two cognitive categories: dot over-estimators and dot under-estimators.
Following a series of studies, Hoffman and Routledge (2004) concluded that
these two groups are distinguished by several differences. For example,
variation between the groups on the dimensions of analytical problem solving
ability, degree of cognitive bias, literacy, mathematical ability, and social
competence, have all been identified.
Building on the idea that there is a relationship between cognitive style and
social competence, this study is being conducted to identify whether members
of the cognitive categories differ in their communication styles in a variety of
contexts – e.g., when interacting with members of the same or different
cognitive categories. Therefore, you will be assessed in order to distinguish
whether you are a dot over-estimator or a dot under-estimator. You will then be
asked to fill in a typicality measure. Finally, you will be asked to have a short
discussion with another participant so that your communication style can be
observed.
If you wish to know more about the differences between these cognitive
categories, feel free to ask me questions on completion of this study.
Alternatively, you can see:
Hoffman, R. J. & Routledge, B. (2004). Dot estimation style as a predictor of
social and mental competence. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 569-592.
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Appendix 2: Example dot matrix
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Appendix 3: Chapter 4, study 1 – ‘typicality’ measures
1) Imagine you are in a casino. You started the evening with £50 and
planned to leave with no less than £30 because you had planned to buy a gift
for a friend costing £30 the following day. In your excitement, you got slightly
carried away and having checked your wallet you are alarmed to discover that
you only have £15 left. However, you notice a blackjack table and realise that
the odds are 2-1, and you therefore have a chance of winning your money back.
Would you:
a) Count your losses and leave the casino £15 down.
b) Bet £5 of your remaining money.
c) Bet £10 of your remaining money.
d) Bet all of your remaining money.
2) You are in central London and have an important job interview in half an
hour. You are running late and the office you need to get to is a forty-five
minute walk from where you are. It’s rush hour so it is hard to say how long a
taxi might take, so you decide to take the tube, which should take around ten
minutes. You are waiting on the platform when the announcer declares that
there is a fault on the line and all trains will be delayed. They state that normal
service should resume but do not specify when.
Would you:
a) Walk to the interview, think of an excuse and turn up late.
b) Wait five minutes to see if the trains start running, then walk if they do not.
c) Wait ten minutes to see if the trains start running, then walk if they do not.
d) Go outside, try to hail a taxi, and hope that the traffic is not too bad.
3) You’ve been invited to a friend’s party and you’ve been looking forward to
it for weeks. To your dismay, on the morning of the party your lecturer reminds
you of a deadline the next day that you had completely forgotten about. At a
push, you would be able to finish the work if you stayed in and worked through
the night.
Would you:
a) Call your friend, apologise, and let them know that you can’t make the
party.
b) Go to the party, forget about the assignment, and accept that you’ll lose
out on the marks.
c) Work for half of the evening and catch the end of the party and then try to
get the assignment in 24 hours late and lose ten percent.
d) Fake illness and try to get deadline extension.
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4) A coat you’ve been admiring for months turns up in the January sales. It’s
half price and sure to be sold before long. However, it still costs £150. You’ve
reached your overdraft limit and you have several bills to pay.
Would you:
a) Forget about it. There’s no way you can afford it.
b) Put it on your credit card and worry about it at a later date.
c) Try to do some extra shifts at work during the week and see if the coat is
still on offer next week.
d) Buy a different, cheaper coat to make yourself feel better.
5) You’ve just moved into a new house. At your housewarming party, your
best friend stands up to make a speech. During the speech, they present you
with a painting that they have been working on for months and say that they
would be honoured if you would hang it in your new home. It’s a portrait of you,
and you hate it.
Would you:
a) Put it on the wall just to keep your friend happy.
b) Smile, take the painting, and decide you’ll only hang it when your friend
visits.
c) Be honest with your friend and tell them you don’t like it.
d) Say that you can’t accept something that your friend has worked so hard
on.
6) Imagine you’ve been to a pub several miles from home with a group of
colleagues from your new job. You’ve lost track of time and realise that you’ve
missed the last train home. A taxi will cost you at least £30 but you have no
money left. Your new boss offers you a lift home. He looks sober but you know
he’s had a few drinks and may be over the drink-drive limit.
Would you:
a) Accept the offer of a lift and hope your boss isn’t too far over the limit.
b) Risk offending your boss by declining his offer, and then ask a colleague
to lend you the £30 for a taxi.
c) Risk offending your boss by declining his offer, and prepare yourself for
the several hour walk home.
d) Suggest to your boss that he’s over the drink-drive limit and that you’ll
report him if he drives his car.
7) In your opinion, which of these inventions has changed the world the most?
a) Air travel.
b) The Internet.
c) Mobile phones.
d) Television.
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8) If you were never able to use one of the above again, which would you
choose?
a) Air travel.
b) The Internet.
c) Mobile phone
d) Television.
9) Which of these clichés do you agree with the most?
a) What goes around comes around.
b) Always look on the bright side of life.
c) Que sera, sera.
d) When it rains, it pours.
10) You listened to a piece of music at the start of this task. How long do you
think it was?
a) 2 minutes 36 seconds.
b) 3 minutes 6 seconds.
c) 3 minutes 36 seconds.
d) 4 minutes 6 seconds.
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Appendix 4: Chapter 4, study 2 – list of traits
Intelligent Suave
Brilliant Courteous
Scientifically-minded Conventional
Witty Argumentative
Sophisticated Straightforward
Alert Slovenly
Shrewd Suspicious
Sly Reserved
Meditative Quiet
Imaginative Stolid
Stupid Ponderous
Ignorant Stubborn
Superstitious Impulsive
Naive Quick-tempered
Industrious Suggestible
Lazy Passionate
Honest Sensual
Deceitful Pleasure-loving
Unreliable Jovial
Evasive Happy-go-lucky
Faithful Humourless
Treacherous Sensitive
Cowardly Methodical
Cruel Neat
Kind Persistent
Generous Imitative
Grasping Frivolous
Mercenary Gregarious
Materialistic Practical
Revengeful Progressive
Quarrelsome Conservative
Gluttonous Musical
Pugnacious Artistic
Aggressive Sportsmanlike
Conceited Tradition-loving
Boastful Efficient
Ambitious Very religious
Ostentatious Extremely nationalistic
Individualistic Physically dirty
Talkative Loyal to family ties
Loud Arrogant
Rude Radical
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Appendix 5: Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space
next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way RIGHT NOW, that
is, at the present moment. Use the following scale to record your answers.
1 2 3 4 5
Very slightly
or not at all
A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely
__________interested __________irritable
__________disinterested __________alert
__________excited __________ashamed
__________upset __________inspired
__________strong __________nervous
__________guilty __________determined
__________scared __________attentive
__________hostile __________jittery
__________enthusiastic __________active
__________proud __________afraid
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Appendix 6: Chapter 5, study 3 – Participant brief
Research background
According to Hoffman and Routledge (2004), people can be reliably divided into
two groups, based on their estimation style.
Following a series of studies, Hoffman and Routledge (2004) concluded that
members of these two groups are distinguished by several differences in their
cognitive styles. For example, variation between the groups on the dimensions
of analytical problem solving ability, degree of cognitive bias, literacy,
mathematical ability, and social competence, have all been identified.
Building on the idea that there is a relationship between cognitive style and
social competence, this study is being conducted to identify whether members
of these groups vary in their perceptions of social situations, and whether or not
their performances in social interactions differ in a variety of contexts – e.g.,
when interacting with members of the same or different group to themselves.
Therefore, you will first be assessed in order determine which of the groups you
belong to, and to determine whether or not you are a typical member of the
relevant group. You will also be asked to fill in two questionnaires, before and
after a short discussion with another participant.
You won’t find out which of these groups you belong to until the study is
completed. However, for the benefit of the experimenter, your group will be
represented by a colour – either blue or red.
If you wish to know more about the differences between these groups, feel free
to ask me questions on completion of this study. Alternatively, you can see:
Hoffman, R. J. & Routledge, B. (2004). Cognitive style as a predictor of social
and mental ability. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 17, 569-592.
